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A tension arises whenever the South African private law fails to meet constitutional right 
norms.  To remedy a deficiency, two law-making options are available.  The first is for 
the judiciary to develop or change private law principles and rules in order to provide 
protection for the implicated constitutional norm.  The second is for the judiciary to 
enforce an obligation upon Parliament to enact legislation to amend or replace existing 
private law rights and obligations so as to safeguard the norm against interference from a 
private individual or entity.  The former is the more conventional option, but, in recent 
years, the law reports record an increasing reliance on the legislative duty to protect 
constitutional right norms in private legal relationships.  The thesis investigates the extent 
to which the latter phenomenon — which will be described as a ‘pivot towards legislative 
remedies’ — exists, and the circumstances in which the courts pivot towards legislative 
remedies rather than developing private law of their own accord. 
 The thesis finds that legislative schemes that give effect to constitutional rights 
are likely to contain an array of benefits that are absent from or reduced in the judicial 
law-making process.  The judicial pivot towards legislative remedies is thus a strategy to 
enhance the process through which conflicting rights are resolved, as it allows for the 
constitutional rebuilding of private law in a way that the judiciary is unable to do on its 
own.  Importantly, however, theories of judicial deference do not explain the pivot.  On 
the contrary, the courts have exercised a strict level of control over the legislative law-
making pathway.  Through either statutory interpretation or the review of legislation, the 
courts require legislation to contain the essentials of the judicial law-making framework.  
From this perspective, the judicial law-making process produces the floor of the 
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We are not dealing with a Constitution whose only or main function is to 
consolidate and entrench existing common law principles against future 
legislative invasion.  Whatever function constitutions may serve in other 
countries, in ours it cannot be properly understood as acting simply as a 
limitation on governmental powers and actions.  Given the divisions and 
injustices, it would be strange indeed if the massive inequalities in our 
society were somehow relegated to the realm of private law, in respect of 
which government could only intrude if it did not interfere with the vested 
individual property and privacy rights of the presently privileged classes.   
That, to my mind, is not the issue. 
The real issue, in my opinion, is how the Constitution intends fundamental 
rights in the broadest meaning of the term to be protected.  More 
particularly, is the Constitution self-enforcing in all respects, or does it 
require legislative intervention in certain areas? 














CHOOSING BETWEEN LAWMAKERS 
 
This chapter introduces the law-rebuilding project of the South African 
Constitution, and proceeds to ask how the two primary law-making institutions — 
namely, the legislature and the judiciary — should relate to one another when 
rebuilding private law. 
 
1 Travelling on an unfinished map 
The preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) 
speaks of the need to sail away from the ashes of apartheid to a society grounded upon 
‘democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights’.  The aim of the constitutional 
project, it was once famously proclaimed, is to breakaway from an oppressive and insular 
legal system.1  The new legal order would preserve from the past only those parts that are 
defensible, and, as South Africa charts towards a democracy that encapsulates a culture of 
human rights and accountability, a new set of legal principles and institutions would be 
built.2  The project is all encompassing.  The policies of the apartheid government 
scorched virtually every aspect of the legal system.  The Constitution therefore demands 
that all parts of the law are subject to review and rebuilding, including, perhaps most 
controversially, private law.3 
                                                      
1 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 261 (Mahomed J).  See also Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) para 1. 
2 Makwanyane (n 1).  See also Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai 
Motor Distributors 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) para 21. 
3 Constitution ss 8(2), 39(2), 172(1)(a), 173. 
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Two decades into the journey, our current coordinates are somewhat debatable.  
The country has made remarkable progress in certain areas.  Notable victories include the 
abolition of the death penalty,4 the recognition of same-sex marriage,5 and the regular 
holding of democratic elections.  In other areas, however, the pace remains stubbornly 
slow.  The most recent national survey records that more than half of the population live 
in poverty, which is a statistic made even more alarming by the fact that South Africa is 
measured as one of the most economically unequal societies in the world.6  The transition 
to democratic rule has also failed to curb the prejudice and violence that characterised the 
apartheid state, the only difference today being that these acts appear more concentrated 
in the hands of private individuals.  An additional challenge is the management of public 
resources.  The financial reports of the state describe unacceptably high levels of 
mishandled public funds while corruption remains endemic in both the public and private 
sector.7 
The transition away from authoritarian rule will always prove an arduous venture 
as an endless array of legal and political forces impel both the speed and trajectory of 
travel.  Although many of these forces are difficult to identify or grasp fully, there is one 
prominent factor that is easy to discern from the law reports: the type of legal action 
needed to remedy a defective law.  The tossing overboard of an indefensible rule is 
straightforward.  It is easy, for instance, to delete a rule that criminalises consensual acts 
of sodomy.8  That discriminatory rule requires no replacement because no additional 
action is needed to secure the freedom to engage in homosexual relationships.  Removing 
a rule from the law books is not always sufficient, however.  In some instances, and in 
line with the rebuilding goals of the Constitution, new laws must be written to meet the 
commands and aspirations of the supreme law.  And it is this task of law-making, at least 
when compared to the act of merely deleting rules, that proves far more difficult and 
complex.  The crafting of new legal rights, procedures, and institutions invites a series of 
                                                      
4 Makwanyane (n 1). 
5 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). 
6 Statistics South Africa, Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty 
Between 2006 and 2015, Report No. 03-10-06 (2017) 14.  A quarter of the population — nearly 14 
million people — fall below the food poverty line of R441 (less than £30) per person per month. 
7 No constitution can solve all socials ills, but the full potential of the South African Constitution in 
developing platforms to assist in ameliorating some of the country’s toughest social problems has 
yet to be realised.  See Edwin Cameron and Max Taylor, ‘The Untapped Potential of the Mandela 
Constitution’ (2017) Public Law 382, 407. 
8 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
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tough choices.  The Constitution may sketch the foundations, but it offers lawmakers no 
complete blueprint on how competing options should be evaluated and ultimately 
resolved.  
That the Constitution defers its completion to future laws provides an indication 
of some of the challenges this law-making task poses.  Constitutional drafters often adopt 
general and flexible language to manage both political conflict and uncertainty, which, in 
time, requires lawmakers to perform a task that the drafters could not accomplish; that is, 
to translate general principles and broadly phrased requirements into concrete duties and 
workable procedures.9  And the space in which to execute this law-rebuilding mandate 
can be narrow.  Not only must these rebuilding laws comply with all the commands of the 
supreme law, they also have to respond appropriately to the many economic and other 
social pressures that already make governing difficult. 
To illustrate the above point, consider the constitutional right to make 
reproductive decisions.10  In addition to prohibiting laws that impose a blanket ban on 
abortions, the right requires the active taking of measures to ensure the opportunity to 
abort a foetus is both actual and safe.11  As the Constitution remains silent on how to 
achieve this outcome, lawmakers are required to identify and provide the conditions 
under which women may choose to terminate a pregnancy.  This includes, amongst many 
other things, prescribing protocols to identify and monitor the medical practitioners and 
institutions authorised to perform abortions, funding pre- and post-abortion counselling 
services, and designing specialised procedures in situations where the pregnant woman is 
a minor or mentally disabled.12  These choices are difficult, partly because the production 
of new laws is often made on the basis of assumptions, incomplete information, and 
conflicting moral viewpoints.  Furthermore, the funding of public goods and services is 
enormously expensive and the provision of healthcare is amongst the costliest.  In a 
country where a majority of people cannot afford private healthcare services, lawmakers 
must decide how best to raise and allocate limited public resources.  The law reports tell 
of the harrowing decisions that state officials have had to make on account of public 
                                                      
9 Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design’ 
(2011) 9 ICON 636, 646–58. 
10 Constitution s 12(2)(a). 
11 UNCESCR, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Art 12 of the 
Covenant), 2 May 2016, E/C.12/GC/22, paras 11–21. 
12 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, read alongside Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Amendment Act 1 of 2008. 
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resources being insufficient to secure those basic goods needed for human preservation 
and development. 13   The inherent difficulty of the law-making process is further 
compounded by the fact that lawmakers can rarely predict with precision the end results 
of a new law.  Society is complicated and forever changing, and so too are the problems 
that lawmakers are expected to solve. 
The South African Constitution is thus an unfinished map, entrusting upon future 
lawmakers discretion to mark and navigate the path towards the society it envisions. 
 
2 Who should rebuild the law?  
There is an additional difference between the two types of remedial actions which further 
amplifies the complexity of the law-building task.  The power to declare laws 
unconstitutional and unenforceable is assigned exclusively to a single branch of 
government.  Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution mandates the courts alone to declare 
invalid any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution.14  No other institution is 
afforded a similar power.15 
The hierarchy between the branches of government turns murky whenever the 
law fails to give proper effect to the Constitution.  Section 172(1)(b), which serves as the 
overarching power of the courts to order remedies in constitutional matters, merely 
enjoins the courts to ‘make any order that is just and equitable’.16  As the text of the 
Constitution offers no automatic solution or clear framework on which law-making 
institution should rebuild the law, the courts are left with a choice.  A court can either 
amend the law of its own accord or order Parliament to promulgate legislation.17  The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa (court) views this judicial discretion as part of the 
                                                      
13 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) paras 28–30. 
14 Constitution s 172(2)(a) requires the Constitutional Court to confirm any ruling by a lower court 
that finds invalid national or provincial legislation or the conduct of the President. 
15 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic 1995 (4) SA 877 
(CC) para 100.  See Constitution ss 79–80 (the two elected branches of government are provided 
with non-binding procedures to deliberate whether or not a proposed law overreaches constitutional 
boundaries). 
16 Constitution s 172(1)(b) permits the courts to make any just and equitable order following a 
declaration of invalidity, including limiting the retrospective effect of an order and suspending the 
declaration of invalidity to allow the relevant authority to correct the defect. 
17 See generally Gaertner v Minister of Finance 2014 (1) SA 442 (CC) paras 82–84; Dawood v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) paras 62.  
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intentional design of the Constitution.  The court has thus refused to codify a fixed rule as 
to when courts are permitted to create law without the input of the legislature believing 
that the appropriate institution for remedying a defect must be determined by the facts 
and circumstances of each case.18 
2.1 Legislative law-making 
As a general principle of constitutional law — or, at least, as a starting point to this 
discussion — it should be of no major controversy to claim that the Constitution appoints 
the legislative branch of government to serve as the primary institution responsible for 
law reform.19  Parliament is conferred with the general authority to enact legislation, and, 
on no fewer than 50 occasions, the text of the Constitution instructs the legislature to 
promulgate laws in order to flesh out and give proper effect to constitutional provisions.20  
These instructions are scattered throughout the Constitution, and cover a wide range of 
matters.  They include, amongst other things, the management of public servants,21 the 
civil control over security services,22 and the organisation of an independent prosecuting 
authority.23  The Bill of Rights also mandates the promulgation of legislation.  Seven 
constitutional rights require the legislature to enact laws so as to either define the scope of 
the right or provide mechanisms for the implementation of the right24 (a further six 
constitutional right provisions permit but do not oblige the state to enact legislation).25  
The duty to enact legislation is not confined to those instances where the legislature is 
expressly burdened.  The legislature assumes an important role in realising constitutional 
rights, and the courts have accordingly held that certain constitutional rights embody an 
                                                      
18 C v Department of Health and Social Development 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC) paras 43–44; National 
Council for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 66. 
19 Constitution ss 43–44.  See Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) para 57. 
20 Constitution ss 3(3), 6, 9(4), 25(9), 26(2), 27(2), 32(2), 33(3), 46(1)(a), 47(4), 61(2)(a)(i), 62(5), 
96(1), 105(2), 106(4), 136(1), 155(2), 155(3), 157(2), 158(3), 159(1), 171, 172(2)(c), 174(4), 
179(3), 179(4), 179(7), 182(1), 182(5), 184(2), 185(2), 186(1), 187(2), 190(1)(a), 191, 192, 195(3), 
196(2), 197(1), 197(2), 199(4), 199(8), 204, 205(2), 206(6), 207(6), 208, 210, 215(2), 216(1), 
219(2), 219(5), 221(1)(b), 236.  
21 ibid ss 196–97. 
22 ibid s 199(8). 
23 ibid s 179. 
24  Constitution ss 9(4) (equality); 24(2) (environment); 25(5), (7), & (9) (property); s 26(2) (housing); 
27(2) (health care, food, water, social security); 32(2) (information); 33(1) (administrative action). 
25  Constitution ss 15(3) (religion, belief, and opinion), 22 (trade, occupation and profession), 23(5) 
(collective bargaining), 23(6) (union security), 25(1) (expropriation of property), 25(8) (land, water 
and related reform). 
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implicit duty upon the state to take active measures to ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ a right, which 
may necessitate the promulgation of legislation.26 
Four core reasons justify the primacy of the legislative law-making process. 
First, the legislature is the modern-day civic square.  The legislative process 
encourages the representation and participation of citizens in public decision-making.  
This is not to say that a legislative majority may simply ignore the commands of the 
Constitution.  That sort of reasoning would defeat the entire purpose of entrenching 
constitutional provisions.  The benefit of public participation is rather found in the 
observation that the legislative law-making process promotes a more informed and 
reflective process capable of creating political solutions to reconcile competing 
constitutional and public interests.27  Rarely are there clear solutions, but consultative and 
participatory decision-making is championed as a way to improve the quality and 
accuracy of decisions.  In fact, the very purpose of some constitutional provisions is to 
provide for the creation of frameworks to assist in managing and curing some of South 
Africa’s most complex social problems.  For example, socio-economic rights mandate the 
state to take reasonable legislative measures to achieve the progressive realisation of 
essential human goods like housing and healthcare for those who are unable to secure 
these goods on their own means.28  Constitutions must therefore remain alive to public 
thinking and changes in the social environment if they are to serve as an effective 
roadmap for governance, and the legislature is arguably the best positioned state 
institution to absorb and respond to change and conflict.  It is for this reason that the 
courts have at times shown a reluctance to produce new laws, turning rather to the 
legislature for advice.  In the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, for instance, after 
the Constitutional Court declared bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the 
majority of the court declined to rewrite the legal definition of a marriage.  The court 
emphasised that the recognition of same-sex marriage was not purely a matter of striking 
down a discriminatory law.29  Law reform on matters of family relationships requires an 
                                                      
26  Constitution s 7(2).  For examples of the Constitutional Court interpreting constitutional provisions 
to impose an obligation on the state to promulgate legislation in the context of preventing violence, 
see Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); para 44; S v Baloyi 2000 
(2) SA 425 (CC) para 11. 
27 Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) para 33; 
Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic (No. 2) 2007 (6) SA 477 (CC) para 66. 
28 Constitution ss 26(2), 27(2). 
29 Fourie (n 5) paras 121, 125–53. 
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array of choices, including how best to manage disagreement in society.  The majority of 
the court concluded that the legislature is better placed to provide a final solution.  The 
legislature responded by recognising both same-sex marriage and civil partnerships for 
homosexual couples, but offered marriage officers the opportunity to exempt themselves 
from solemnising same-sex unions.30  
Second, the legislative process benefits from the expertise of the elected branches 
of government.  Legislation is built upon policy research and government experience.  
Although this combination does not guarantee perfect results, it does inject a great 
amount of knowledge into the process of creating legal frameworks.  The benefit of 
expertise is not confined to the moment of creating frameworks.  The legislature often 
creates a mixture of internal and external oversight mechanisms to monitor and review 
the implementation of public programmes.  Oversight and feedback adds to the 
institutional knowledge of the state, allowing Parliament with the assistance of the 
executive government to improve legal frameworks whenever new insights are learnt.    
Third, legislation permits a degree of arbitrary line drawing.  The purpose of 
legislation is to implement policy, and, to do so, legislation draws boundaries amongst 
segments in society, conferring benefits on some and disadvantages on others.31  Consider 
abortion legislation.  The legislative scheme divides the gestation period into three 
parts.32  From conception until the thirteenth week of pregnancy, women may undergo an 
abortion for whatever reason they believe acceptable.  Between thirteen and twenty 
weeks, women may only terminate a pregnancy in one of four circumstances.  These are 
(i) if the mother’s own physical or mental health is at stake, (ii) the baby will have severe 
mental or physical abnormalities, (iii) the pregnancy is a result of incest or rape, or (iv) 
the women is of the opinion that her socio-economic conditions require termination.  
Furthermore, after the first gestation period, enhanced medical procedures are also 
required.  After twenty weeks, abortions are only permitted if the life of either the mother 
or the foetus is in danger or the foetus is likely to be born with serious defects.  The 
decision to make weeks thirteen and twenty the cut-off periods is taken on the basis of 
scientific evidence and policy considerations, but they are also made on somewhat 
arbitrary grounds (consider the fact that legislators in other countries not only divide the 
                                                      
30 Civil Unions Act 17 of 2006, s 6. 
31 Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 (4) SA 491 (CC) para 85. 
32 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (n 12) s 2. 
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gestation period differently but also list different conditions for each period).  The 
division of the gestation period is certainly not an exact science given that each foetus 
develops at a different rate.  But this line drawing is necessary as more individualised and 
decentralised processes would prove far too timely and costly.  To govern a country of 
more than 55 million people, somewhat arbitrary requirements and fixed boundaries are 
needed. 
Fourth, the legislature commands the public purse.33  Public programmes requires 
funds, and, given that the legislature is exclusively vested with the power to raise and 
allocate public funds, the participation of Parliament is needed whenever a new public 
programme is created and implemented. 
All of these benefits innate to the legislative law-making process allow the 
legislature to create legal frameworks that flesh out and give proper effect to the 
commands of the Constitution, provided of course that the legislature has the political 
will to do so.  It is a law-making process that no other state institution — say, for 
example, the judiciary — can match.  In truth, some of these law-making responsibilities 
are so administratively technical and so intertwined with the functioning of government 
that is seems unfathomable that judges would ever produce laws on their own.  The courts 
will not, for instance, legislate the operations of the prosecuting authority or administer 
the running of the civil service.  To the extent that subordinate laws fails to do so, courts 
would merely order the legislature to remedy their inaction.34    This leads to an additional 
argument in favour of legislation.  The judiciary is never excluded from the process of 
rebuilding the law, as courts retain their powers to review whether or not the enacted law 
passes constitutional muster.  The legislative law-making pathway thus prioritises the 
respective expertise of the two institutions.  Parliament produces laws, and the courts 
ensure legal compliance. 
2.2 Judicial law-making 
Despite these benefits, the legislative law-making process may prove troublesome.  
Legislation is the product of political decision-making.35  Even if parliamentarians 
                                                      
33 Constitution ss 77, 213–14. 
34 See Glenister v President of the Republic 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
35  David Feldman, ‘Can and Should Parliament Protect Human Rights?’ (2004) 10 European Public 
Law 635, 647. 
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profess that they are acting in accordance with the legal prescripts and aims of the 
Constitution — and South Africans politicians often say they are — the inherent nature of 
the legislative law-making process is that laws will be produced with an aim of furthering 
the policy aims of each political party.  To be clear, that Parliament makes choices based 
on political motives should not be read as a criticism of the legislative law-making 
process.  Members of the legislature are elected to offer competing versions of policy, 
and, once a majority consensus is reached, policy is translated into law.  This process is 
essential for the functioning of an orderly society, and it is the reason that law-making 
powers are conferred upon the legislature.  At the same time, however, one cannot always 
expect the political machinery of a democratically representative decision-making body 
to advance constitutional provisions. 
Political decision-making is a particular concern for the protection of 
constitutional right provisions, which are entrenched primarily as a means to safeguard 
certain individual interests against ordinary majority decision-making.  There is a strong 
argument to be made that the views of the legislature should not matter when it comes to 
the enforcement of constitutional right provisions.36  A litigant is entitled to a remedy 
unless a compelling government interest is at jeopardy, and the protection of their 
constitutional right should not depend on whether or not a democratically elected 
legislature has the political will to promulgate appropriate legislation.37  Moreover, the 
judicial development of the law — which is usually, but not exclusively, done through the 
common law — does not prevent the legislature from intervening in the future provided 
of course that any revisions to judge-made law comply with the Constitution.38 
The political nature of legislative decision-making explains why Parliament 
invokes constitutional rights to intervene in certain areas and not others.  Consider 
marriage law.  Section 15 of the Constitution safeguards the right to freedom of religion 
and belief.  The constitutional provision permits, but does not mandate, the state to enact 
legislation that recognises marriages concluded under any traditional practice or religious 
law.  Prior to the Constitution, the common law adopted elements of the Christian 
definition of marriage: a union between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others.  The post-apartheid legislature has since passed the Recognition of Customary 
                                                      
36 See Fourie (n 5) paras 166–72. 
37 S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 32.  
38 Paulsen (n 19) para 116. 
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Marriages Act, which provides recognition and protection to African customary 
marriages (which may be polygamous).  The passing of the Act made political sense.  A 
large majority of the South African population belong to groups that practice customary 
marriages.  Yet Parliament has opted not to extend the same protection to other sorts of 
religious or cultural marriages that may permit polygamy, such as marriages concluded 
under the Islamic faith.  The Muslim community is a small minority in South Africa, 
forming no more than two per cent of the population.39  As is the case in nearly all 
instances of state inaction, the failure of the legislature to conform law to constitutional 
standards is on account of either their approval or indifference with the status quo.  The 
silence of Parliament has forced the courts to provide piecemeal support.  While the law 
still does not recognise Muslim marriages, the courts have extended the right to 
maintenance and inheritance to spouses in Muslim marriages, including to those spouses 
in polygamous relationships, reasoning that these personal family relationships constitute 
a unique contractual duty of support similar to marriage contracts.40 
 
3 Rebuilding private law 
The law-making function is arguably the main reason why the process of rebuilding 
private law in accordance with constitutional rights has proven difficult to navigate.  The 
application of constitutional provisions to private law — called the horizontal application 
of constitutional rights — rarely requires just the deletion of rules.  It more often results 
in a process of rebuilding existing laws.  Consider an example from contract law: the 
adjudicative process of identifying the extent to which the freedom to contract should be 
restricted in order to safeguard the right not to be unfairly discriminated against will 
invariable result in the creation of new rules, ones that carve out exceptions to the general 
principle of contractual autonomy.41 
                                                      
39 The government initiated legislation to recognise Muslim marriage, but those efforts stalled when 
the proposed legislative scheme failed to gain support from religious communities.  See South 
African Law Reform Commission, Project 59: Report on Islamic Marriage and Related Maters, 
July 2003.  The Women’s Legal Centre Trust has recently initiated litigation seeking an order to 
compel the state to recognise Muslim marriages (they argue that Muslim women are subject to 
discriminatory practices, including financial inequality). 
40 Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC); Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C).  In Hassam v 
Jacobs 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC), the Constitutional Court ruled that women in polygamous marriages 
concluded under Muslim personal law are entitled to inherit from the estate of their deceased 
husband if there is no will. 
41 Botha v Rich 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para 45; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 70. 
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The law journals record a dizzying amount of debate over the judicial application 
of constitutional right norms, with every other essay plotting a fresh cluster of bearings 
that the courts should track.  In fact, it is difficult to find scholarship that believes the 
courts have proceeded along the correct route and at the correct pace.  The court is 
criticised in equal measure for travelling both too slowly and too quickly.  The first group 
of critics argues that the court has not been robust enough in adapting the rules of private 
law to constitutional norms, even though the waters ahead are choppy and unchartered.42  
Though there is no clear way forward, this group contends that the need to ensure that 
private law meets constitutional norms overrides concerns over the disruption and 
unpredictable result that the rebuilding process may cause.  The second group of critics 
argues that the court has evaporated legal doctrine and introduced too much uncertainty 
into private law.43  They advise the courts to slow down, or perhaps even remain 
anchored, warning that embarking on a journey without first fully establishing new sets of 
doctrines will prove destructive to centuries-old law. 
Despite offering a multiplicity of conclusions, most of the literature on the 
horizontal application of rights tends to share a similar feature.  The emphasis falls upon 
the law-making powers of the courts, and the role of the legislature is either confined to 
the periphery of the analysis or completely ignored.  The reasons why scholars prioritise 
the judicial law-making function are not clear, but one can speculate on some of them.  
For starters, there is a general trend in legal scholarship to focus on analysing case law 
over legislation (presumably because the process through which legislation is created is 
political, and thus falls outside the expertise of lawyers).  Another possible reason is that 
the horizontal application of rights invites the courts to assume a more active role in 
making law.  Courts, and particularly those in common law systems, have of course 
always enjoyed the authority to create law in situations of legislative reticence.  The very 
nature of judicial discretion is a law-making task, but, in certain quarters, it is 
blasphemous to state so out loud (the more palatable approach is that judges find the law 
from general legal principles and convictions).44  In one sense, the horizontal application 
of rights removes this pretence.  The Constitution actively spurs the courts to undertake a 
                                                      
42 See Dennis Davis, ‘Private Law After 1994: Progressive Development or Schizoid Confusion?’ 
(2008) 24 SAJHR 318. 
43 See Malcolm Wallis, ‘The Common Law’s Cool Ideas for Dealing with Ms Hubbard’ (2015) 132 
SALJ 940. 
44  See Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (SECLD) at 597J–
598A. 
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law-making task in order to give effect to constitutional right norms in private law.  In 
fact, the horizontal application provisions are the only instance where the Constitution 
vests in the courts an express power to make law (which stands in contrast to the more 
than 50 occasions the Constitutions instructs the legislature to promulgate new laws).45  
The intellectual challenge of horizontal application is therefore to identify both the source 
and the limits of the judicial power to rewrite the rules of private law with public law 
norms.  Another potential explanation is that horizontal application flows as a 
consequence of state inaction.  The judicial process of reviewing and rewriting the rules 
of private law is only instigated if there is no suitable private law available to vindicate 
the interest protected by a constitutional right.  Perhaps then there is an implicit 
assumption underlying all horizontal application scholarship that the power of the courts 
to remedy state inaction is automatic, and it is of no consequence that the legislature has 
opted not to act. 
The underlying foundation of this dissertation is that scholarship is the poorer for 
failing to consider the role of the legislature in protecting constitutional rights in the 
private sphere.  Rights legislation — which is the term that will be used to describe 
legislative schemes that aim to give effect to constitutional rights in the private sphere — 
forms a central and integral component of our doctrine on the application of constitutional 
rights to private individuals and entities.  Not only is legislation the primary route through 
which private litigants must realise their constitutional rights, but, given the hierarchy 
between the two sources of law, rights legislation informs the way in which the judiciary 
exercises their law-making powers under the horizontal application provisions.  
To amplify the importance of legislation, one need only consider the fact that 
there are only two constitutional rights that expressly impose obligations upon private 
individuals and entities, and, in both instances, Parliament is mandated to pass laws in 
order to give legal effect to the private duty.  The first is the equality clause.  Section 9 
prohibits all non-state actors from discriminating on any of the listed grounds.46  The 
obligation is however not self-executing.  That is, private litigants cannot plead the 
constitutional right as a cause of action.  The provision continues to instruct the 
legislature to enact a statutory framework that gives effect to the obligation.  In other 
words, the constitutional right not to be discriminated against in the private sphere is not 
                                                      
45 Constitution ss 8(3), 39(2). 
46 Constitution s 9. 
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so much a right against a private individual or entity.  It is primarily a right, enforceable 
against the state, to anti-discrimination legislation.  The second instance is the right to 
access information.  Section 32(1)(b) provides that each person has the right to gain 
access to any information held by another person if that information is needed to exercise 
or protect another right.  The enforcement mechanism of the access to information right 
mimics the equality clause.  It too does not give rise to an immediately enforceable right-
duty relationship between private individuals and entities, but rather demands the 
promulgation of national legislation.47 
If nothing else, the thesis argues that when the legislative law-making pathway is 
considered alongside the judicial pathway, the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the 
horizontal application of rights is neither as slow nor as uncertain as the critics suggest.  
But a question still remains on how these two law-making pathways relate to one another.  
Figuring this out is the primary goal of the thesis. 
 
4 The research project 
The research project investigates the law-making tension that arises whenever private law 
fails to meet constitutional norms.48  Two law-making options are available.  The first is 
for the judiciary to develop or change private law principles and rules in order to provide 
protection for the implicated constitutional norm.  The second is for the judiciary to 
enforce an obligation upon the legislature to enact legislation to amend or replace existing 
private law rights and obligations so as to safeguard the norm against interference from a 
private individual or entity.  While the former is the more conventional option, in recent 
years, the law reports record an increasing reliance on the legislative duty to protect 
constitutional right norms in private legal relationships.  The research project investigates 
the extent to which the latter phenomenon — which will be described as a ‘pivot towards 
legislative remedies’ — exists, and the circumstances in which the courts pivot towards 
legislative remedies rather than developing the private law of their own accord. 
To answer these question, the research project must identify the differences 
between the ways in which the two law making institutions give effect to the horizontality 
                                                      
47 Constitution s 32(2). 
48 ‘Constitutional right norms’ encompass constitutional rights and constitutional values. 
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provisions in the South African Constitution, and, thereafter, identify how the judiciary 
has responded to these differences.  To do so, the research project splits into three parts. 
§ The (Missing) Architecture.  The starting point is to identify the aims of 
horizontality within the South African constitutional order, and to explain why 
the translation of those aims into constitutional provisions give rise to two sorts 
of law-making problems.  The first problem is a tension between two law-
making institutions, and, as explained above, requires the courts to decide 
whether to remedy the law or seek legislative assistance.  The second problem 
arises whenever the courts opt to develop the law, and stems from the 
observation that the Constitution fails to provide the courts with a 
comprehensive framework on how to exercise their law-making powers under 
the horizontality provisions.  These two law-making problems are explained in 
chapters two and three respectively. 
§ Judicial Law-Making.  The middle part of the thesis identifies how the 
Constitutional Court has solved the second law-making problem.  Chapter four 
demonstrates the court’s preference for a certain type of law-making framework, 
which is called the ‘balancing process’.  Chapter five elaborates on how the 
balancing process operates, including how constitutional right norms must 
assume certain characteristics to make the balancing process functional. 
§ The Judicial Response to Legislative Law-Making.  The last part of the thesis 
circles back to the first law-making problem.  Chapter six employs a case study 
to show how the court pivots horizontal application disputes away from judicial 
remedies to legislative ones, and chapter seven employs a case study to show the 
opposite result.  Through comparing these two case studies, chapter eight 
identifies the enhanced benefits of the legislative law-making pathway  (as 
compared with the limits of the judicial process).  This analysis provides an 





The judicial law-making process turns on the balancing of conflicting right norms.  To do 
so, the Constitutional Court has developed the ‘balancing process’.  The defining feature 
of this framework is that it allows for the contextual balancing of right norms within 
private law, which, in its simplest form, distils to a process that weighs the need to 
safeguard the interest protected by a constitutional right norm against the need to control 
the exercise of private power.  In comparison, the legislative law-making process enjoys 
an array of benefits that are absent from or reduced in the judicial law-making process.  
Three core differences are identified.  Legislation is an enhancement on the judicial law-
making process because the legislative framework for the balancing of conflict rights: 
§ is better structured, which promotes legal certainty and narrows the scope of 
disagreement between disputing parties; 
§ contains government policy, which assists in directing the outcome in 
socially and economically complicated disputes; and 
§ clarifies the constitutional obligations of the state, which, in turn, clarifies the 
obligations of private individuals and entities. 
It bears noting from the outset that theories of judicial deference do not explain 
the pivot.  The courts have ceded neither their power nor their mandate.  On the contrary, 
the courts have exercised control over constitutional rights legislation.  Through either 
statutory interpretation or the judicial review of legislation, the South African 
Constitutional Court has demanded that the essentials of the product developed during the 
judicial-law making process is observed within legislation.  From this perspective, the 
judicial law-making process is the floor of law-reform and the legislative process is an 
enhancement on that process.  The judicial pivot towards legislative remedies is thus best 
explained as a creative strategy to enhance the judicial balancing process, as it allows for 
the constitutional rebuilding of private law in a way that the judiciary is unable to do on 
its own.   
In the end, the strategy to enhance the judicial balancing process offers a more 
precise as well as a more constitutionally sound explanation — as opposed to generic 
arguments like the ‘separation of powers’ and ‘Parliament is the chief law-reform 
institution’ — for why courts decline to exercise their law-making powers under the 




Before proceeding, it may prove wise to set out four brief notes on the methodology and 
treatment of the source material. 
First, the thesis applies mostly a doctrinal methodology, and the bulk of the legal 
texts consulted include the Constitution, national legislation, and the case law of the 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal.  That being said, however, the 
analysis cannot be defined as purely ‘black letter’.  Legal scholarship is a social science, 
which renders the reading of law contingent on the broader context in which it applies.  
More specifically, the subject nature of the research project demands this more holistic 
treatment of the source material.  Law-making is not a self-contained and purely logical 
process of deducing rules from general legal principles, and the success of the rebuilding 
project requires the Constitution to absorb and respond to the economic and political 
landscape of the country.49  To this end, the thesis applies a historical methodology in 
chapter two in order to place the legal texts within their social context.  The broader 
social environment also informs the analysis of legal texts, which, for example, include 
assessing the political and economic conditions under which the legislature is willing to 
act.  The inclusion of these factors into the analysis is necessary, but it does introduce a 
risk of bias and caution must therefore be exercised.  To mitigate this risk, data and 
empirical accounts are used to describe and assess the broader social context.  The thesis 
takes care to demarcate its own assessment of the broader environment from that 
contained in case law and legislative policy.  Additionally, in a few instances, the thesis 
analyses case law from foreign jurisdiction in order to help expose the assumptions upon 
which certain judicial decisions rests.50  
Second, the thesis assumes that coherence is a core objective of the law.  As is to 
be expected with any new and highly contested area of the law, which the application of 
constitutional rights to private individuals and entities certainly is, the courts have at 
times produced contradictory results and left logic-gaps in their arguments.  To the extent 
possible and necessary, the thesis seeks to reconcile conflicting positions and complete 
the steps of reasoning. 
                                                      
49 See Hyundai Motor Distributors (n 2). 
50  See Kate O’Regan, ‘Text Matters’ (2012) 75 MLR 1, 24–25. 
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Third, Part C of the thesis focuses on two case studies to illustrate how the 
judiciary responds to the legislative law-making process; namely, the section 26 right to 
access adequate housing and the section 19(1)(b) right to participate in the activities of a 
political party.  These two case studies are selected because they best illustrate two 
extremes.  The case law on the housing right shows a Constitutional Court avoiding the 
common law and rather pivoting towards legislation, whereas the case law on the right to 
political participation shows a court embracing the development of the common law and 
ignoring legislative preference.  The two contrasting approaches allows for an 
examination of the conditions under which the Constitutional Courts is likely to refrain 
from exercising its law-making mandate under the horizontal application provisions and 
rather seek out legislative remedies. 






















REMEDYING WICKED LAWS 
 
This chapter traces the drafting history of the Constitution to identify the 
initial aims of horizontality, which, in turn, explains why the horizontality 
provisions give rise to a law-making tension between the judiciary and the 
legislature.  To place the drafting history in context, the beginning sections of 
the chapter sketch a brief (and selected) history of apartheid. 
  
1 A racist economy 
The apartheid legal system was not limited to acts of electoral disenfranchisement.  The 
political subordination of racial groups was built upon, and maintained in furtherance of, 
a market economy geared to favour the white minority.  The defining feature of this 
rigged economic model was to control access to land, which was a strategy implemented 
through the enactment of discriminatory laws that imposed extensive restrictions on the 
ownership and occupation of immovable property.  The Group Areas Act, for instance, 
split urban areas into several residential and commercial sections.1  Race groups were 
allocated different sections of the city, and, under threat of criminal conviction, 
individuals were prohibited from owning, residing, and conducting business practices in 
areas designated for a different race group.  The basis upon which land was allocated is 
predictable.  The black population was assigned the underdeveloped townships located on 
the city outskirts.  In stark contrast to the valuable areas of urban land reserved for the 
white population, the townships suffered from a shortage of public infrastructure, 
                                                      
1 41 of 1950.  The Act was replaced by the Groups Areas Act 77 of 1957, which was later replaced 
by the Groups Areas Act 36 of 1966.  The last manifestation of the Group Areas Act was repealed 
by the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991. 
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government services, and basic economic resources required for human development.  
Inferior schooling systems and inadequate health facilities further hampered the economic 
and personal development of township residents. 
Rural land was also divided and redistributed.  The Native Lands Act, and its 
supporting legislation, empowered the state to create a framework aimed at reserving 
approximately 93 per cent (later downgraded to 87 per cent) of arable land for white 
ownership.2  The rural black population was assigned to live on one of the ten ‘reserves’, 
defined on the basis of ethnicity.3  In later years, and in a further act of splitting up the 
South African population along racial and ethnic lines, the ‘reserves’ were 
reconceptualised as the so-called ‘independent’ or ‘self-governing’ Bantustan homelands.  
The homelands were however only independent in name.  The reality was that traditional 
leaders and other political elites governed these communal lands with the financial 
assistance, and therefore under the control, of the apartheid government.  Like their 
compatriots in the cities, the rural black population was starved of economic 
opportunities.  Government services were abysmal, partly due to the fact that corruption 
was a common feature in the homelands.4  The limited funds sent from apartheid Pretoria 
were sparingly used for basic goods like housing, healthcare, and education.  
Employment opportunities were equally dire.  A large majority of the Bantustan 
populations were forced to find employment in white-South Africa to support themselves 
and their families, and migrant workers shared a similar experience.5  They worked far 
away from their families, in poor conditions, and for minimal wages.  Their economic 
deprivation was further exacerbated by the fact that residents were only afforded tenuous 
communal land rights to reside on plots of land, as opposed to stronger individual 
property rights.6  Outside the homelands, the tenure rights of the rural black were equally 
                                                      
2  29 of 1913.  See also Native Trust Land Act 18 of 1936, which decreased the share of white-owned 
land to around 87 per cent.  These Acts were repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based Land 
Measures Act (n 1).  
3  Transkei (amaXhosa), Bophuthatswana (Batswana), Venda (VhaVenda), Ciskei (amaXhosa), 
Gazankulu (the Tsonga people), Lebowa (Bapedi), QwaQwa (Basotho), KaNgwane (amaSwati), 
KwaNdebele (amaNdebele), KwaZulu (amaZulu). 
4  For a summary of the (limited) sources of income and the stifled economic development within the 
independent homelands, see Jeffrey Butler and others, The Black Homelands of South Africa 
(University of California Press 1977) chaps 6–8.    
5  For an overview of how discriminatory land, tax, and labour laws coerced black individuals into the 
employment of white-owned businesses (particularly agricultural and mining companies), see 
Charles Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa (CUP 2005) chap 3. 
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fragile.  Their right to occupy land was subject to ‘permission to occupy’ licences.7  The 
apartheid government had to grant permission before a licence holder could transfer, let, 
or mortgage the land.  Furthermore, the government retained the right to terminate these 
tenure rights in a number of instances, including the failure to pay administrative charges 
or upon the conviction of certain offences like theft or drug possession.8 
The enforcement of racial segregation laws inflicted a quadruple economic 
burden on non-white communities.  First, the law authorised the eviction of individuals 
residing in areas that were designated for different racial groups.9  Hundreds of thousands 
of people, if not more, were forcibly removed from their urban households, and more than 
three million South Africans were removed from about one fifth of all agricultural land.  
These evictions resulted in some of the harshest actions of the apartheid government.  Not 
only were shelters and other personal property destroyed, people lost their most 
economically valuable asset: their home.  The cruelty of this system was amplified by the 
fact that the legislature prevented judicial assistance.  The Natives (Prohibition of 
Interdict) Act outright prohibited the courts from issuing any interdict or other legal 
process that had the effect of staying or suspending any government order directing a 
person be vacated or removed from an area.10  Second, as described above, the urban 
townships and rural black reserves suffered from a lack of basic resources essential for 
personal and economic development.  Third, the provision of weaker communal land 
tenure rights over stronger ownership rights decreased the ability of black individuals to 
participate as equals in the economic market.  In an unrigged economic market, many 
individuals opt to raise funds and pursue economic opportunities through mortgaging 
their fixed property.  While available to white South Africans, black individuals were 
deprived of this economic opportunity.  Fourth, racial segregation allowed the apartheid 
                                                                                                                                                            
6  Black South Africans, including those residing in urban areas, were stripped of their South African 
citizenship and forced to register as a national of the Bantustan homeland that corresponded to their 
respective ethnic group.  See Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 26 of 1970, repealed by the 
(interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
7  Black Areas Land Regulations Act, Proc R188 of 1969.  Licences operated in areas of rural land 
classified as South African Development Trust Land. 
8 Catherine Coles, ‘Land Reform from Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (1993) 20 Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 699, 720. 
9 Eviction orders, including orders permitting the destruction of property, were issued under the 
provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (repealed by the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998); the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953 (repealed by the Discriminatory Legislation Regarding Public 
Amenities Repeal Act 100 of 1990); and the Trespass Act 6 of 1959. 
10 64 of 1956, s 2.  
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government to control access to the labour market.  Through a system of influx control, 
enforced with passbooks, the government imposed extensive restrictions on the number 
of non-white individuals who could access high-earning jobs.  This strategy ensured that 
uneducated black labour remained cheap, further impairing the ability of black families to 
secure a comfortable livelihood through their own means. 
The effects of past discriminatory laws remain a painful and crippling wound in 
the economic and political landscape of South Africa and will continue to be the case for 
generations to follow.  Previous economic deprivation is reflected in every metric.  
Today, white South Africans are far more likely to enjoy access to quality education, 
healthcare, and high paying employment opportunities.  A recent national survey, for 
instance, shows that white-headed households earn five times more that black-headed 
households.11  Figure 1 displays the historical difference between race groups. 
 
Figure 1: Change in per capita income for each race group relative to white income12 
Legislation was not the only legal tool employed to engineer economic disparity 
along racial lines.  On the most charitable interpretation, the common law played a 
supporting role to apartheid legislation.  The common law was subject to parliamentary 
                                                      
11 Statistics South Africa, Living Conditions of Households in South Africa, 27 January 2017, at 14–
15. 
12 Murray Leibbrandt and others, ‘Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty Since the 
Fall of Apartheid’, 2010, OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 101, 
OECD Publishing, 13. 
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sovereignty, and it was therefore forced to assume a subordinate role to racially rigged 
economic laws.  Even judges sympathetic to the effects of discrimination were required to 
ensure that the common law remained blind to the structural inequality the law produced.  
In doing so, however, the common law enabled racially discriminatory statutes to achieve 
their goals.  All of this shows how hypocritical the law had to be to support the aims of 
apartheid.  On the one hand, legislation treated non-white individuals as inferior and 
accordingly restricted their capacity to pursue productive endeavours.  On the other hand, 
however, the common law applied the exact same standards and rules across the race 
groups believing that all adults enjoyed the intelligence and freedom to engage with one 
another as equal partners regardless of race.13  The courts would therefore enforce 
commercial contracts between black and white individuals (unless legislation prohibited 
such contracts).   
The common law never developed in a way that took cognisance of the deeper 
structural inequality in society, amending its rules and application to compensate for the 
fact that poverty and racism precluded a large majority of the population from engaging 
in the markets as equals.  This was all intentional, of course.  The ostensibly ‘neutral’ 
rules of the common law allowed for economic exploitation because wealthy white 
individuals could exploit cheaper labour on account of their relatively better economic 
position, which further exasperated the inequality between race groups.  Furthermore, the 
classical liberalism philosophy of the South African common law enabled prejudice to 
flourish.  Though there were some attempts to restrict the capacity of individuals to act on 
their prejudice in particular situations,14 the general principle was that private individuals 
and entities were free to choose their association partners and were entitled to do so on 
irrational reasons such as racial bias.15   
Apartheid therefore tells not only a story of abusive state action.  It was an 
ideology that crept into every corner of society and every part of the law, including the 
private common law.  The law engineered an economically unequal society.  Those at the 
                                                      
13 See Mapenduka v Ashington 1918 EDL 299, at 309, read alongside Martin Chanock, The Making of 
South African Legal Culture 1902–1936 (CUP 2001) 14. 
14 For example, see Jockie v Meyer 1945 AD 354, at 357, 360–61 (A hotel refused to provide 
accommodation to a lodger on the basis of their race; the AD suggested, without deciding, that a 
hotel could only deny accommodation to a traveller if there is a ‘good ground’ to do so, suggesting 
that race was not a sufficiently good reason). 
15 Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue 1958 (3) SA 343 (A) at 347F (‘For no reason or the worst of 
reasons the private owner can exclude whom he wills from his property and eject anyone to whom 
he has given merely precarious permission to be there’). 
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top could act on their biases free from any legal or economic consequences, with the law 
providing white individuals an opportunity to exploit their relative economic advantage.16   
The inability of the South African common law to provide adequate protection to 
the liberty interests of non-white individuals is ironic given one of the main reasons 
individual common law rights originally developed.  The South African common law’s 
notion of private property stems from European roots, where it evolved in response to the 
socio-political concerns of that time.  Land had historically been administered under 
communal or feudal powers, which granted individuals certain entitlements to reside on 
the land.  But these entitlements were contingent on the performance of duties, including 
the provision of labour and the payment of taxes.  The call to recognise and protect a 
stronger form of individual property rights amplified in the eighteenth century, which is 
the time when the historically dubbed Age of Enlightenment introduced into public 
thinking a greater emphasis on individual liberty and the constitutional management of 
government.  Individual property rights came to be celebrated as the guardians of 
personal and economic freedom, as they ensured a degree of autonomy for each right 
holder which was enforceable against state and neighbour alike.17  In South African, and 
for a large portion of the population, the judicial enforcement of property rights resulted 
in the opposite effect.  The common law, operating alongside discriminatory legislation, 
hindered economic and personal security.  With little-to-no property of their own, non-
white populations struggled to participate as true equals.  In a recent case before the 
Constitutional Court, a judge astutely remarked that South Africa’s colonial and apartheid 
history meant that there never was a ‘free market’ as these ostensibly neutral private 
property rights found in the common law were applied within a broader legal framework 
that only permitted a few to benefit.18 
[W]e must recognise that the common law protection of property and its attendant 
economic privilege did not, in our historical context, support personal autonomy and 
economic freedom, but effectively worked against it.  The argument that the protection 
of existing property is a necessary condition for personal and economic freedom is not 
self-explanatory in the South African context.19 
                                                      
16  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para 125; Gardener v Whitaker 1995 (2) SA 672 (E) 
at 685C–E. 
17 AJ van der Walt, Property in the Margins (Hart 2009) 29–31. 
18  Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) para 152 (Froneman J). 
19  ibid para 143. 
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2 The patriarchal home 
The architects of apartheid justified their actions on an eccentric interpretation of 
Christian doctrine.  Their dogma not only propagated the supremacy of the white race, 
but also positioned men at the apex of both the economy and family.  Women earned less 
in the employment market, and were expected to assume a subordinate role in family 
life.20 
The common law encouraged patriarchal family relationships.  The default 
position was that married women were subject to the marital power of their husbands, 
which meant that women were legally required to obtain consent from their husbands 
before concluding a contract.  The common law literally treated married women as 
minors with diminished legal capacity.21  It was only towards the end of apartheid when 
Parliament changed the legal consequences of a civil marriage.  Civil marriages 
concluded from 1 November 1984 made both spouses the joint administrators of the 
communal estate.  Marriages concluded under customary-indigenous law would only be 
altered after the fall of apartheid.   
Another common law rule of shameful proportions was that a husband could 
legally not rape his wife.22  Consent was irrelevant as the common law offered husbands 
an unqualified conjugal right to sexual relations.  Given that the law viewed marriage as a 
private affair in which the law should not intervene, there are no official records on the 
full extent of marital ‘rape’ and other forms of domestic violence.  Estimates make for 
harrowing reading.  Between one quarter and one third of all women experienced some 
form of assault at the hands of their husband or intimate partner.23  In the final years of 
apartheid, the Law Commission proposed criminalising marital ‘rape’.  Parliament 
rejected the proposal.  The sentiments expressed by a member of the legislature in 
rejecting the proposal encapsulate the assumptions and justification on which Parliament 
                                                      
20 Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) paras 108–09. 
21 For an overview of how marriage law treated women as inferior prior to the formal commencement 
of apartheid, see Chanock (n 13) 200–201. 
22 For a summary of failed attempts to criminalise marital rape, see Felicity Kaganas and Christina 
Murray, ‘Law Reform and the Family’ (1991) 18 Journal of Law and Society 287, 287–90. 
23 See Human Rights Watch, The State Response to Domestic Violence and Rape, November 1995, 
and the studies cited under the heading ‘Domestic Violence’.  
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so often elected not to intervene in family relationships, and, in doing so, supported the 
common law position. 
It is simply unacceptable for one partner to be subject to [criminal] penalty — even in 
cases in which no violence has taken place — if the other party unreasonably refuses 
sexual accessibility and that party is left unpunished.  This is the kind of inexplicable 
situation that arises when criminal procedure becomes involved with the most intimate 
things in the law of family.24 
Even after the legislature criminalised marital ‘rape’ in 1993, 25  the courts 
continued to apply gender-discriminatory rules found within the common law.  The 
cautionary rule, for instance, required judges to treat the testimony of rape victims with a 
heightened degree of caution, particularly if there was no other supporting evidence.26  
Further, husbands and intimate partners convicted of raping their partner would tend to 
receive lighter sentences.  In mitigation of the sentence, (male) judges would sometimes 
cite that the perpetrator only committed the act on account of the close nature of their 
relationship with the victim or that the complainant suffered no visible harm.27  In a 
particularly striking case, a three judge panel of the Appellate Division remitted a rape 
conviction for resentencing and requested the trial court to consider whether a sentence of 
correctional supervision was more appropriate.  In mitigating for a lesser sentence, the 
AD cited that (i) the rape was not based on violence, but merely sexual gratification, (ii) 
the victim knew the rapists, and (iii) there was no evidence that the victim suffered a 
physical injury or psychological harm.28  The courts never self-corrected their draconian 
practices.  It was only in 2007 when the legislature intervened to abolish the cautionary 
rule, 29  and prohibited judges from considering factors like the victim’s previous 
                                                      
24 Hansard, 13 March 1989, cols. 2676–77, quoted in Kaganas (n 22) 291. 
25 Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993, s 5.  
26 S v Balhuber [1986] ZASCA 105, unreported judgment, 25 September 1986. 
27 S v Mvamvu [2005] 1 ALL SA 435 (SCA) para 16; S v Moipolai [2004] ZANWHC 19; unreported 
judgment, 20 August 2004, para 24; S v Modise [2007] ZANWHC 73; unreported judgment, 9 
November 2007, paras 19–22.  These judgments echoed sentiments expressed in pre-Constitution 
case law from the Appellate Division.  See S v N 1988 (3) SA 450 (A) at 465H–466A (the Chief 
Justice wrote that a mitigating factor is that ‘the shock and affront to dignity suffered by the rape 
victim would ordinarily be less in the case where the rapist is a person well-known to the victim 
[…] the lack of any serious injury to the complainant and the fact that she was evidently a women 
of experience from the sexual point of view, justice would be served by a suspension of half the 
sentence imposed’). 
28 S v Adriaanse [1994] 4 All SA 206 (A). 
29 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, s 60. 
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relationships, the apparent lack of physical injury, and the victim’s previous sexual 
history as mitigating factors.30 
Today, one fifth of all adult women will experience some form of domestic 
violence, and one out of fifteen women will suffer from an act of sexual violence by an 
intimate partner. 31   Domestic violence is inversely correlated to economic wealth.  
Women who own property and have the financial means to support themselves are far 
less likely to experience domestic violence, or at the very least will have the means to 
remove themselves from acts of violence.32  It is for this reason that the South African 
government has concluded that the economic emancipation of women is a top priority in 
their strategy to combat domestic violence.33  The attainment of this goal is still far off.  
Women are more likely to be unemployed, and, if employed, they are estimated to earn 
one quarter less than men.34 
 
3 Legislation as the primary remedy 
The African National Congress (ANC), which served as one of the main liberation 
movements against apartheid South Africa, recognised the imperative of implementing an 
aggressive social programme to remedy poverty, gender inequality, and economic 
disparity skewed along racial lines.  The ANC feared, however, that their commitment to 
a constitutional democracy that prioritised the protection of human rights would frustrate 
these goals.  Based on experiences from other constitutional democracies, there was a 
perennial concern that the courts would come to adopt negative-liberal interpretations of 
constitutional rights (i.e. freedom from external interferences) that would prevent the 
soon-to-be-governing ANC from pursuing their law-reform agenda.35  To guard against 
such an outcome, the ANC sought to carve out exceptions to liberty rights.  They did so 
                                                      
30 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007, s 1. 
31 Statistics South Africa, South Africa Demographic and Health Survey 2016, Report No. 03-00-09, 
15 May 2017, 54–57, 72. 
32 South African Government, Department of Women, The Status of Women in the South African 
Economy, August 2015, 139–140. 
33 ibid 141. 
34 ibid 70. 
35 A prominent example is the overturned decision of Lochner v New York (1905) 198 US 45.  The US 
Supreme Court invalidated employment legislation that limited the amount of hours an employee of 
a bakery could work on the ground that such a law limited the freedom to contact, as safeguarded 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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by formulating constitutional rights in a way that would empower the state to take 
measures that would otherwise be restricted in a liberal constitutional democracy built 
purely on negative freedoms.36  Three prominent examples from the final Constitution are 
summarised below. 
§ Affirmative action.  Section 9 of the Constitution guarantees that each person is 
equal before the law and prohibits the state from unfairly discriminating on any 
protected ground including race and gender.37  A liberal reading of the equality 
clause — that is, the equality clause only guards against state interference — 
would preclude government from passing laws that provide preference to one 
protected group over another.  The history of South Africa and the goals of the 
South African Constitution made such an outcome inappropriate.  Although 
unfair discrimination is prohibited, section 9(2) nevertheless permits the state to 
adopt affirmative action legislation as a means to remedy the consequences of 
past discrimination.  Pursuant to this permission, the legislature promulgated the 
Employment Equity Act38 and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act,39 which provide varying degrees of preferential treatment in the economic 
and labour market to three previously disadvantaged groups, namely black 
people (defined to include Africans, Coloureds, and Indians), women, and 
disabled persons. 
§ Land redistribution.  Section 25 of the Constitution prohibits the state from 
arbitrarily depriving a person of their property.  It further makes the 
expropriation of privately owned property contingent on the payment of ‘just 
and equitable’ compensation.  In addition to limiting the action of the state, the 
property clause mandates legislative action.  Section 25(7) orders the state to 
remedy the inequitable distribution of land on account of past discriminatory 
laws.  The provision provides that a person or community dispossessed of 
property after the date the Natives Land Act took effect ‘as a result of past 
racially discriminatory law or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an 
                                                      
36  Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy (CUP 2010) 88–90. 
37 For all of the listed grounds, see sec 8.2 below. 
38 55 of 1998. 
39 50 of 2003. 
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Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or equitable redress’.40  
At the commencement of the final Constitution, the state had already enacted the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.41  The legislative scheme sets up a framework to 
provide persons and communities, including their direct descendants, either the 
restitution of their land or equitable compensation in lieu of that land.  
Furthermore, section 26(6) requires the promulgation of national legislation to 
secure land tenure rights.  The provision provides that a ‘person or community 
whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to a form of tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress’.42  
This constitutional mandate is given effect through the Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act43 and the Communal Property Association Act.44 
§ Prevention of domestic violence.  In addition to enshrining the equal protection 
of the law and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender, 
and marital status, section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution guarantees everyone the 
right ‘to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources’.  The express inclusion of ‘private sources’ ensured that the state would 
have the authority to intervene in private spaces that have historically proven 
thorny (i.e. the family home).  The legislative translation of this constitutional 
imperative is found in the Domestic Violence Act, which provides persons at 
risk of domestic violence an array of injunctions, including protective orders on 
short notice and orders directing that a potentially abusive spouse be excluded 
from the joint home.45 
                                                      
40 The Natives Land Act took effect on 19 June 1913.  See also Constitution s 25(9) (‘Parliament must 
enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6)’). 
41 22 of 1994.  The interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, s 121(1) 
required an Act of Parliament to provide for matters relating to the restitution of land rights.   
42 Constitution s 25(4)(a) recognises that expropriation of property is part of ‘the nation’s commitment 
to land reform’. 
43 62 of 1997. 
44 28 of 1996. 
45 116 of 1998, ss 5, 7(1). 
–32– 
 
4 Horizontality as the supporting remedy 
Though the ANC viewed legislation as the primary tool to remedy the wicked effects of 
apartheid laws, there was a belief amongst the socialist-leaning members of the party that 
legislation alone would prove insufficient.  The ANC feared that their envisaged social 
programmes — geared towards land redistribution, economic growth within historically 
disadvantaged groups, and the protection of vulnerable groups — would be blocked or 
frustrated by private law rights (as well as liberal constitutional rights).  Their fear 
stemmed from the observation that private actors enjoy the capacity to wield a 
considerable amount of power in any society built upon a market economy, and that 
private common law rights and liberal constitutional rights largely insulate this economic 
power from public regulation.  The goal of growing wealth within historically 
disadvantaged groups would be undermined if private individuals and entities were 
permitted to use their rights to exclude another from economic opportunities on the basis 
of race or gender.46  The ANC therefore advocated a constitutional rights framework that 
imposed a degree of control over the actions of private individuals and entities.  The 
horizontal application was mooted not only as a means not to prevents acts of 
discrimination, but, more importantly, as a way to insulate the envisaged legislative law-
reform initiatives from judicial obstruction. 
The intention was clear.  The mechanisms for doing so were not.  The question as 
to whether, and, if so, to what extent, constitutional rights would apply to private 
individuals and entities would come to consume a considerable amount of debate during 
the drafting of the interim and final South African Constitution.47  A large portion of 
these discussions centred on determining the respective roles of the legislature and the 
judiciary in giving effect to the constitutional obligations of private individuals and 
entities.  The drafting history of the interim and final South African Constitution traces 
                                                      
46 Albie Sachs, Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (OUP 1990) 157 (the constitutional 
regulation of private law prevents a ‘privatised apartheid’; democracy alone is insufficient because 
the resources needed to improve the lives of the poor black majority would remain constitutionally 
‘under white lock and key’ if human rights applied only vertically). 
47  Political leaders agreed to a two-stage negotiating process.  Immediately following the fall of 
apartheid, political reality suggested that there was little opportunity for a democratically elected 
body to negotiate a new Constitution.  The plan was therefore to negotiate an interim Constitution 
amongst all major political parties, and once democratic elections had taken place, a representative 
body would negotiate the final Constitution.  The interim Constitution would however set out 34 
principles with which the final Constitution had to adhere. 
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how the enforcement mechanisms shifted the emphasis onto legislative authority in order 
to limit judicial law-making powers.48  
 
5 Drafting the interim Constitution  
In November 1993, twenty-six political parties and other political groups convened to 
start the process of negotiating a transitional Constitution.  They called themselves the 
Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF), and, over time, the MPNF delegated most of the 
negotiations and administrative work to an array of sub-committees.  Figure 2 sketches 
the relationship between the committees involved in negotiating the chapter on 
constitutional rights. 
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Figure 2: Structure of the MPNF (pertaining to the negotiation of constitutional rights) 
Plenary Session of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) 
The Plenary served as the highest decision-making body, and was responsible for ratifying all 
political agreements.  The Plenary consisted of ten delegates for each of the 26 negotiating 
parties.  Plenary sessions were convened infrequently between April 1993 and 18 November 
1993, which is the day on which the interim Constitution was ratified. 
Planning Committee 
The Planning Committee managed the 
negotiating process including the 
workflow of the Technical Committees.  
The Committee consisted of 10 senior 
members of the Negotiating Council. 
Technical Committees 
The Negotiating Forum established seven Technical Committees (TC), one of which was the 
TC on Fundamental Rights During the Transition.  Each TC was composed of a handful of 
individuals appointed on the basis of their expertise.  The TCs were non-negotiating forums, 
at least not formally.  Their stated task was to conduct legal analysis and propose draft 
formulations (which were contained in Progress Reports), and to do so with the aim of 
facilitating debate within the Negotiating Council.   
After the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Fundamental Rights, the TC on Fundamental 
Rights During the Transition assumed responsibility for advising the Ad Hoc Committee as 
well as drafting formulations based on agreements reached by the Ad Hoc Committee. 
Negotiating Council   
The Negotiating Council operated as the main negotiating body, and was composed of two 
delegates and two advisors per negotiating party.  The Council met three to four days a week. 
(A Negotiating Forum was originally created to finalise the reports and agreements of the 
Negotiating Council.  But the Forum was scrapped in June 1993 after the Negotiating Council 
enlarged its membership and opened its proceedings to the media, which effectively made the 
function and workload of the Negotiating Forum redundant.) 
Ad Hoc Committee on 
Fundamental Rights 
The Technical Committee on 
Fundamental Rights proved unable to 
settle some of the more contentious 
disputes, which triggered the creation 
of the Ad Hoc Committee in July 1993.  
The Committee was composed of 
seven individuals, all of whom were 
senior members or representatives of 
the negotiating parties. 
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The Fifth Progress Report of the Technical Committee on Fundamental Human 
Rights During the Transition (Technical Committee) contained the first formulation of the 
horizontality provision.49  The Committee proposed that— 
The provisions of this Chapter shall— 
(a) bind the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government at all 
levels as well as the statutory bodies and functionaries; and  
(b)  bind, where appropriate, all social institutions and persons.50 
The Report reflected the starting position of the ANC.51  Over the course of negotiations, 
however, the ANC’s position in favour of a pro-horizontal Constitution weakened.  Two 
main factors changed their view.  
First, the pro-horizontal camp of the ANC met a forceful match.  The National 
Party (NP), which was still the governing party, strongly opposed horizontality.   They 
argued that fundamental rights should burden only state actors because the sole purpose 
for entrenching constitutional rights is to guard against excessive government actions.52  
Horizontality disrupted their classically liberal reading of human rights.  Their position 
was not purely principled.  The NP understood that they would lose a considerable 
amount of political power after the first democratic elections, and feared that the social 
programme planned by the ANC would negatively impact upon the economic interests of 
their core constituents (who were mostly white Afrikaners).  The NP’s negotiating 
objective was therefore to secure the greatest amount of personal freedom from state 
                                                      
49 The Technical Committee on Fundamental Human Rights comprised five non-political academics 
and practitioners, namely Hugh Corder, Lourens du Plessis, Gerrit Grové, Sbongile Nene, and Zac 
Yacoob. 
50 Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights During the Transition, Fifth Progress Report, 11 June 
1993, sec 1(1). 
51  ANC Draft Bill of Rights, March 1993 at 29, which stated that the forthcoming bill of rights ‘shall 
be binding upon the State and organs of government at all levels, and where appropriate, on all 
social institutions and persons’.  The ANC took inspiration from the Constitution of the Republic of 
Namibia, 1990 which, to the knowledge of the drafters, was the only national constitution in the 
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that ‘[t]he fundamental rights and freedoms in this Chapter shall be respected and upheld … and, 
where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons’. 
52  Government’s Proposals on a Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2 February 1993, at 1.  The NP-led 
government proposed that the interim Constitution should give rights to citizens against ‘all 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions, bodies and functionaries at central, regional and local 
government level’.  Their position was informed by the proposals contained in SALC, Project 58: 
Interim Report on Group and Human Rights, August 1991.  The Law Commission advised that the 
forthcoming bill of rights should only bind the executive and the legislature, which was premised 
on the belief that rights should only safeguard against state interference and not restrict private 
activity.  See discussion in Klug (n 36) 86–88. 
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interference.53   Horizontality threatened this strategy.  But their position was not 
absolute.  The NP submitted to the negotiating forum that the forthcoming Bill of Rights 
should bind the judiciary to ensure that rights have a limited ‘overflow’ into private law.54  
The available documents do not fully elaborate on this proposal, but it appears that the 
NP was comfortable with the ‘indirect’ horizontal effect model that had been adopted in 
Germany and Canada.  Other pro-horizontal political parties cautioned against the broad 
approach submitted by the ANC.  The Democratic Party (DP), for instance, argued that a 
more structured and detailed application provision had to be negotiated.  In their view, the 
Fifth Progress Report expressed a formulation that was formless and unpredictable.55 
The ANC required the support of other political parties, and, at least for the 
purposes of the transition, the ANC was willing to concede ground.  It was not only a 
concession, however.  The ANC would come to support parts of the logic of the NP and 
DP.  In their subsequent submission to the MPNF, the ANC wrote that the primary 
purpose of fundamental rights should indeed be to ‘limit the government from passing 
laws or using its executive powers in conflict with those rights’.56  This did not have to be 
the only purpose, but, if exceptions to the general rule were to be introduced, there would 
have to be wider consultations to identify the conditions under which rights would bind 
non-state actors.57  The due date for the finalisation of the interim Constitution was 
approaching, and the political appetite within the ANC to negotiate exceptions was 
waning.  The debate over the precise scope of horizontality would have to wait for the 
final Constitution. 
Second, the pro-horizontal camp feared that horizontality would yield unintended 
consequences.  For many ANC members  — including members in their alliance partner, 
the South African Communist Party (SACP) — there was no desire to afford the courts an 
unfettered discretion to apply constitutional rights to private law or private actors.  In fact, 
                                                      
53 Richard Spitz, The Politics of Transition (Hart 2000) 269. 
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Draft Bill of Rights, May 1993 at 1.  The DP submitted that the bill of rights ‘shall be respected and 
upheld by all organs of the State and government, whether legislative, executive or judicial and, 
where applicable, by all persons in South Africa’.  The DP’s support for horizontality is somewhat 
surprising given that the party prescribes to liberal politics (i.e. the DA supports limited government 
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56 Spitz (n 53) 270. 
57 ibid. 
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their intention was the exact opposite.  Horizontality was advocated as a means to subdue 
the courts and protect the law-making authority of the legislature.  The overall sentiment 
was that imposing constitutional obligations upon private individuals and entities would 
carve out exceptions to negative-liberal rights, which would preclude private actors from 
invoking (and ultimately the courts from applying) constitutional rights in a manner that 
prevents the legislature from pursuing social reform.  But the Fifth Progress Report 
phrased the horizontal application clause in general and open terms, raising concerns that 
the application clause would grant an unfettered power to the courts to regulate private 
legal relationships.  This was particularly problematic as there was zero guarantee that the 
judiciary’s vision of horizontality would square up with the policy position of the soon-
to-be-governing ANC.58  The party mistrusted the courts because the judiciary was still 
composed of judges appointed under the apartheid order.  There would be no stopping the 
courts from applying an openly phrased application clause in a manner that would allow 
economically powerful actors to invoke horizontality to their advantage.59  A corporation, 
for instance, could use their liberty rights to ward off attempts to introduce fair labour 
practices.  In other words, there was a possibility that horizontality would lead to an 
outcome that it was meant to prevent.  
 Fears over the unintended consequences resulted in a turning point.  The SACP 
negotiating member on the Ad Committee for Fundamental Rights submitted that 
legislative intervention was a far more appropriate means to achieve the aims of the pro-
horizontal camp.  Instead of a horizontal application clause that effectively afforded 
courts law-making powers, the member argued that a provision should be inserted into 
the interim Constitution to the effect that no constitutional right may prevent the 
introduction of legislation designed to end discrimination in the private sphere.60  Though 
the idea of legislation was raised as an alternative to an openly phrased horizontality 
clause, the proposal was not debated with any seriousness.  The proposal did however 
ignite a spark, which would flare up as the negotiations proceeded.  
The Sixth Progress Report echoed the revised position of the ANC.61  The 
‘judiciary’ was removed from the first part of the application clause.  The Chapter on 
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Fundamental Rights would therefore only bind the two elected branches of government.  
The second part of the application was also amended.  The phrase ‘bind, where 
appropriate, social institutions and persons’ was deleted, and replaced with ‘bind other 
bodies and persons to the extent expressly provided for in this Chapter’.62  The scope for 
horizontality narrowed.  In fact, the scope for horizontality was zero because the Report 
did not identify any constitutional rights that would find application to non-state actors.  
The negotiating parties had no formal or meaningful discussions on the rights that would 
find horizontal application.  In the accompanying notes to the revised provision, the 
Technical Committee told the negotiating parties that their request to identify applicable 
rights remained unanswered, and, should the parties fail to do so, the entire second clause 
of the application provision would be removed.  In other words, the Bill of Rights would 
apply only vertically.  
The Sixth Progress Report once more failed to satisfy the ANC.  The party was 
becoming more alarmed at the prospect of judicial discretion, and feared that merely 
removing the judiciary from the application clause would prove insufficient to curb 
judicial power.  The ANC identified a new concern.  It feared that constitutional 
provisions would become ‘self-enforcing’.  Private litigants would merely request the 
courts to provide constitutional remedies, which would altogether exclude Parliament 
from the law-rebuilding project.  The horizontal application of constitutional rights would 
effectively limit government action, and potentially result in the judiciary creating laws 
that clashed with the envisaged economic legislative schemes. 
The fears over an unfettered horizontality provision continued to take hold within 
the ANC.  Instead of offering creative solutions (like the one recommended by the SACP) 
and entering into constructive negotiations over the scope of horizontality, the ANC 
stopped actively supporting the inclusion of horizontality.  Their fears and doubts over 
horizontality pushed the ANC further towards the pro-vertical position of the NP. 
Before the ANC produced their comments on the Sixth Progress Report, the 
Technical Committee published the Seventh Progress Report.63  This too introduced 
major changes, which were necessitated because the political parties had failed to respond 
to the call of the Technical Committee to decide on the specific rights that would find 
                                                      
62 Own emphasis added. 
63 Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights During the Transition, Seventh Progress Report, 29 
July 1993, sec 1(1). 
–39– 
horizontal application.64  The Report reinserted ‘judiciary’ into the first subsection of the 
application clause.  The updated version also removed ‘bind other bodies and persons to 
the extent expressly provided for in this Chapter’ from the second subsection, and, in its 
place, inserted the phrase that rights will ‘bind, where just and equitable, other bodies and 
persons’.65  The Committee justified the change on the basis that it was best not to 
prescribe which rights find application between private individuals and entities.  The new 
formulation, the Committee submitted, ‘leaves room for the evolutionary and natural 
development’ of the horizontal application of rights within legal doctrine.66  In essence, 
the courts would be left to decide.  The reason for the expansive and somewhat vague 
approach was clear.  The Technical Committee sought to reconcile the competing views 
amongst political parties, including those conflicts that were emerging within the ANC 
and its alliance partners. 
The Seventh Report proved a step too far, and attracted heavy criticism.  Both the 
ANC and DP expressed displeasure with the phrase ‘just and equitable’.  The DP argued 
that the formulation was too imprecise, and the proposed amendment further fuelled the 
growing fear within the ANC that horizontality would provide the judiciary with large 
amounts of unrestrained discretion, which, in turn, would exclude the legislature from the 
law-reform process.  It bears noting that at this moment there was still no agreement on 
whether or not to create a new apex court.  For the ANC, leaving the apartheid-appointed-
courts with a law-making discretion was an unacceptable proposition.  The NP remained 
committed to removing horizontality from the interim Constitution. 
Public submissions hastened the retreat from horizontality. 67   Apart from 
women’s advocacy groups who supported the inclusion of horizontal application to help 
prevent domestic violence and gender discrimination in the workplace, nearly all of the 
submissions raised objections.  The economically powerful Chamber of Mines latched 
onto the growing criticism of the ANC, and submitted that the phrase ‘just and equitable’ 
was vague and unworkable.  The legal profession critiqued the proposal on similar 
grounds.  Perhaps the most forceful argument against horizontality was issued by Chief 
Justice Michael Corbett.  On behalf of the judiciary, the Chief Justice advised the 
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negotiating parties to scrap horizontality entirely.68  He wrote that the application of 
constitutional rights to private actors would replace large parts of the common law, 
which, in turn, would cause unpredictable results and social insecurity.  In its current 
form, the unqualified phrase ‘just and equitable’ would insert a great amount of 
uncertainty and confusion into the law.69  The crux of the criticism raised by the Chief 
Justice was that horizontality would raise complex political, economic, and social 
questions.  He advised that these were not legal issues amenable to judicial resolution, 
and should therefore not be left to the courts.  The Chief Justice proceeded to offer a 
solution to reconcile the conflicting positions within the ANC.  He noted that the primary 
reason for the debate on horizontal application was to eliminate certain forms of 
discrimination in the private sphere.  To achieve this end, the Chief Justice advised the 
negotiating parties to stop discussing horizontality in abstract and general terms but rather 
to identify the ‘precise field of impermissible discrimination […] from those areas of 
highly personal affairs where one should be free to choose one’s associates’.70  The Chief 
Justice’s solution was not implemented, but the argument that the issues surrounding 
horizontality were polycentric and not amenable to judicial adjudication added further 
support to the pro-horizontal but anti-court camp.  
On 31 August 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee on Fundamental Rights, which was 
the superior of the Technical Committee, accepted the swelling movement against 
horizontality, and resolved that ‘the whole Bill would operate vertically only’.71 
A week later, however, horizontality was revived.  The ANC representative on 
the Ad Hoc Committee requested that the issue be reconsidered.  The representative 
reargued the starting position of the ANC, and the concern that a horizontal-free 
Constitution would permit a privatised apartheid to prosper.  South African law is 
premised on a sharp distinction between private and public law, and insulating private 
law from constitutional control would allow many of the injustices of the apartheid legal 
system to continue.  Given that the Ad Hoc Committee had already debated the issue at 
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length and resolved not to write horizontality into the interim Constitution, the Committee 
requested the pro-vertical SACP member and pro-horizontal ANC member on the Ad 
Hoc Committee to resolve the dilemma amongst themselves and propose a solution.72  
Their private discussions led to a compromise.  The application clause would bind 
neither the judiciary nor any non-state entity.  The Tenth Progress Report recorded that 
the Chapter on Fundamental Human Rights would bind only ‘the legislative and 
executive organs of the State at all levels of government including all statutory bodies and 
functionaries.’73  The Report nevertheless noted that the Chapter would find ‘limited 
application’ to those bodies not listed in the application clause (i.e. private individuals 
and entities).  This was on account of two new provisions.   
§ The limitation clause.  A provision in the limitation clause was inserted to provide 
that ‘[n]othing in this Chapter shall preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair 
discrimination by bodies and persons other than those’ mentioned in the 
application clause.74  The genesis of this provision stemmed from the comments 
received on the Sixth Progress Report, and, more specifically, the earlier proposal 
of the pro-vertical SACP member to champion legislation over judicial law-
reform. 
§ The interpretation clause.  A provision was inserted into the interpretation clause 
that read that in ‘the interpretation of any law and the application and 
development of the common and of customary law, a court shall have due regard 
to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter’.  This interpretation clause, the 
Technical Committee advised, would allow for the ‘seepage’ of fundamental 
rights into the law that regulates private legal relationships.75  Although this type 
of clause was unique to constitutional texts, it was inspired by the indirect 
horizontal application model developed in German constitutional theory. 
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The compromise, initially reached between opposing members of the ANC and 
the SACP, also satisfied the NP and DP.  The interim Constitution would allow a 
democratically elected legislature to pass non-discriminatory laws in the private sphere.  
The ANC was therefore able to achieve what it initially intended to do with horizontality.  
Private discrimination would be outlawed, albeit at a future point once legislation had 
been enacted, and it would be the soon-to-be-ANC-controlled legislature promulgating 
this anti-discrimination law.  As for the interpretation clause, the NP was never opposed 
to a limited ‘overflow’, and the limited application model also satisfied the DP as a 
sufficiently structured and workable framework.  The influence of the interim 
Constitution would take place incrementally within the already existing fabric of the 
private common law.  One cannot but conclude that the obligation on the courts to merely 
‘have due regard’ to the Constitution was intentionally vague so as to provide both sides a 
partial victory.  The pro-horizontal camp was afforded an opportunity to plead to the 
courts for the development of the law in line with Constitution.  On the other hand, 
however, the duty upon the courts to merely have regard to the Constitution seems weak, 
potentially having no appreciable influence.  This duty to consider (but possibly not obey) 
was meant to calm critics who believed that horizontality would result in uncertainty and 
the removal of large parts of the law.  After having regard to the Constitution, the courts 
could easily reject its influence on the basis of incompatibility or irrelevance. 
Outside of the Ad Hoc Committee, however, some ANC members were 
displeased with the compromise.  The ANC’s Commission on the Emancipation of 
Women protested that the interim Constitution was now too weak.  In their view, the 
Constitution ought to provide all of the tools necessary to cure racial and gender 
discrimination in the private sphere.76  As it stood, the Constitution did not mandate the 
creation of antidiscrimination laws.  Such legislation would be merely permitted.  Victims 
of private discrimination would have to wait for the promulgation of legislation before 
they were entitled to a remedy.  Also, if enacted, there was no guarantee that the 
legislation would provide effective tools to protect women in both the economy and 
family home.  The ANC and SACP members on the Ad Hoc Committee however were 
not persuaded by these arguments, believing that their concerns were adequately 
addressed given that the interim Constitution as it stood prohibited gender discriminatory 
laws. 
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The formulations contained in the Tenth Progress Report, subject to a few 
stylistic amendments, proved final.  On 27 April 1994, the day of South Africa’s first 
democratic elections, the (interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993 took effect. 
 
6 Judicial application of the interim Constitution  
The interpretation clause produced contradictory judgments.  Some held that the 
Constitution did not prohibit the ‘unqualified’ application of rights. 77   That is, 
constitutional rights could find direct application between private individuals and entities.  
Other judgments adopted the middle ground, and concluded that the interpretation clause 
‘informs all legal institutions and decisions with the new power of constitutional values’78 
and imposed a duty upon the courts to ‘scrutinise’ whether the common law accords with 
the demands of the Constitution.79  The interpretation clause therefore required the courts 
to ‘blend’ constitutional rights into the common law in order to achieve a ‘harmonious 
amalgam’.80  That the interim Constitution influenced the application and development of 
the common law was undisputed, but most of these middle-ground-judgments remain 
somewhat vague on the precise force and extent to which right norms apply to the 
common law.  Do these norms merely flow through the common law allowing for the 
development of the law in an incremental manner and in accordance with the internal 
logic of the common law (i.e. does the common law constrain the application of the 
Constitution to private law), or do they break and remould the common law to ensure 
adherence with the supreme law?  The ambiguity in these judgments is somewhat 
understandable, given the drafting history and the compromise that yielded an imprecise 
formulation.  Another handful of judgments adopted a highly conservative interpretation, 
and held that the interpretation clause was only meant to apply to those parts of the 
common law that regulate the state’s interaction with private individuals.  The interim 
Constitution thus had no bearing whatsoever on the private common law.81 
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The only judgment of the Constitutional Court on the interpretation clause also 
failed to produce a unanimous reading.  Though none of the judges viewed the 
interpretation clause as an ‘on/off switch’, the seven opinions written offered varying 
intensities on the scope of horizontality.  These ranged from robust and aggressive 
interpretations to ones more incremental and reserved.82  It is not necessary discuss all of 
the opinions, but the judgment of Sachs J is of particular interest.  Prior to his 
appointment to the Constitutional Court, Albie Sachs served as one of the chief 
negotiators on behalf of the ANC.  His judgment neatly sums up the position of the ANC.  
In response to some of his colleagues’ belief that the judiciary should apply horizontality 
forcefully to ensure that private actors do not exercise their common law rights in an 
abusive and discriminatory way, Sachs J remarked that the issue over horizontality is ‘not 
about our commitment to the values expressed by the Constitution, but about which 
institutions the Constitution envisages as being primarily responsible for giving effect to 
those values’.83  The Constitution does not contemplate a— 
dikastocracy within which Parliament has certain residual powers.  The role of the 
courts is not effectively to usurp the functions of the legislature, but to scrutinize the 
acts of the legislature.  It should not establish new, positive rights and remedies on its 
own.84 
Applying this dictum to private acts of discrimination, Sachs J remarked that it would be 
‘inappropriate’ for the courts to resolve disputes without the assistance of a legislative 
framework. 
Litigation is a clumsy, expensive and time-consuming way of responding to 
multitudinous problems of racist behaviour. […] Widespread research and consultation 
would be needed to decide precisely where to establish the cut-off point in each 
situation […].  It is Parliament, and not the courts, that investigates these matters and 
decides on appropriate interventions and remedies.85 
The judgment of Sachs J appears to be the only piece of judicial writing under the 
interim Constitution that paid respect to the end position of the ANC (and accepted by 
other major parties).  That is, the Constitution carves out a primary and central role for 
rights legislation within the private sphere, particularly for legislation that aims to prevent 
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unfair discrimination.  Yet, as the women rights groups feared, the legislature never 
passed general antidiscrimination legislation during the operation of the interim 
Constitution. 
 
7 Drafting the (final) Constitution 
The Constitutional Assembly, which was the main body responsible for negotiating the 
final Constitution, began their task shortly after the 1994 democratic elections.  Like the 
process for negotiating the interim Constitution, the Constitutional Assembly delegated 
most of their responsibilities to a series of sub-committees.  Figure 3 sketches the 
hierarchy and responsibility of the committees that were involved in negotiating the 




Figure 3: Structure of the Constitutional Assembly (pertaining to the negotiation of 
constitutional rights) 
Constitutional Assembly 
The Constitutional Assembly was composed of the 490 members that made up the two houses 
of Parliament.  Seven political parties were thus represented in proportion to the votes 
received during the first democratic election.  The Assembly convened on nine occasions 
between 1994 and 1996, and was responsible for adopting the final Constitution. 
Constitutional Committee 
The Constitutional Committee served as 
the main negotiating forum, and consisted 
of 44 members appointed by political 
parties in proportion to their seats held in 
the Assembly.  The Committee initially 
met on a weekly basis, but convened less 
frequently after the creation of the Sub-
Committee.   
Constitutional Sub-Committee  
A Sub-Committee of the Constitutional 
Committee was created in June 1995 to 
better facilitate negotiations between 
parties.  The Sub-Committee consisted of 
around 20 members at any given time.  In 
addition to 12 permanent members from 
the Constitutional Committee, 
representative members of the relevant 
Theme Committee were added whenever 
their specific work stream was discussed. 
Theme Committees 
Six Theme Committees prepared reports for discussion in the Constitutional Committee and 
Constitutional Sub-Committee.  Each Committee consisted of 30 members of  the 
Constitutional Assembly (political parties were represented in proportion to their 
representation in the Assembly).  The Committees commenced their tasks in September 1994, 
and their final reports were presented to the Constitutional Assembly in September 1995. 
Theme Committee 4 was responsible for Fundamental Rights. 
Technical Committees to the Theme Committees 
Each Theme Committee was assisted by a Technical Committee of specialists.  Technical 
Committee 4 (Fundamental Rights) was composed of four advisors. 
Independent Panel of Constitutional Experts 
Section 72 of the interim Constitution mandated the creation 
of an independent five-member panel of constitutional 
experts to advise the Assembly. 
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Horizontality proved less divisive during the drafting of the final Constitution.  
Four reasons explain the growing consensus amongst political parties.   
First, the interim Constitution reflected the lowest common denominator, and all 
of the major political parties agreed to retain the compromise.  The first draft of the 
Chapter on Fundamental Rights copied the interpretation clause of the interim 
Constitution.86  There was however one major difference.  The obligation upon the courts 
to ‘have due regard’ under the interim Constitution was replaced with the seemingly 
stronger obligation to ‘promote’.  The publicly available documents unfortunately do not 
elaborate on the precise cause for this word change.  Apart from a few other minor 
changes, 87 the proposal would eventually be enshrined in section 39(2) of the adopted 
text.  The final version of the interpretation clause provides: 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. 
Although the clause initially stemmed from a compromise between the pro-
vertical and pro-horizontal camps, the Technical Committee rearticulated the goal of an 
interpretation clause within a constitutional democracy.  Pre-1994, and particularly 
towards the end of apartheid, judicial interpretation was often criticised for being 
executive-minded and ‘purely mechanical’.  The problem with this formalistic approach, 
the Technical Committee explained— 
led to a lack of confidence in the judiciary.  The judiciary, like the executive and the 
legislature, increasingly came to be seen as an illegitimate institution of the apartheid 
state.  When transition came there was therefore widespread agreement that a new court 
was needed to act as guardian for a democratic Constitution — hence the Constitutional 
Court.  But this was not enough to ensure that the new Constitution would be protected.  
In addition a provision was included in the Bill of Rights directing judges, mostly 
schooled in apartheid jurisprudence, to adopt a different approach to interpretation, 
particularly to the interpretation of the Constitution itself.  This approach […] gives 
constitutional recognition to the values of Roman-Dutch law and contemporary human 
rights jurisprudence and directs that they be applied in the interpretive process.  […] 
[The interpretation clause] seeks to redress the agony of our past and to commit our law 
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and its institutions to a future in which discrimination and repression have no place.  It 
is a provision which enjoyed full support in the [interim Constitution] negotiations.88 
Section 39(2) redefines the role of judges, not as scientists who discover and 
declare the ‘intention of the legislature’ but as artists taking inspiration from the 
ideological undercurrents that animate the provisions of Constitution.  The interpretation 
clause guards against the common law operating in the way it had under apartheid.  No 
longer would this body of law remain blind to structural inequality or facilitate practices 
of private discrimination.  
But criticisms nevertheless persisted that value-based reasoning invites an 
untrammelled amount of judicial discretion.  The Technical Committee disagreed, and 
advanced a powerful justification for including an interpretation clause within South 
Africa’s new constitutional order.  The process of adjudication inevitably requires the 
exercise of judicial discretion (and apartheid courts certainly exercised discretion when 
they followed executive-minded approaches).  Instead of enabling an unrestrained 
discretion, the interpretation clause serves to control the exercise of this discretion, as it 
provides a guiding structure to the courts on how law should be interpreted and 
developed.  While the process of judicial interpretation may result in new law, judges ‘are 
not free to make law as they please’.89  Judges are only permitted to act within the limits 
and values of the Constitution, and the interpretation clause both informs and constrains 
the powers of the courts because it introduces an ‘honesty and openness about the nature 
of the judicial role ensur[ing] a new accountability on the part of the judiciary.’90 
The first draft also retained within the limitation clause the provision permitting 
the state to enact antidiscrimination legislation.  The provision would however not 
survive the final version.  Explained below, the provision would morph from a permission 
to pass antidiscrimination legislation into an obligation to do so. 
Second, the power dynamics within the negotiating assembly altered 
fundamentally.  The interim Constitution was primarily negotiated between two 
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organisations — the African National Congress and the National Party — each wielding a 
similar level of political influence.  A democratically elected body, on the other hand, 
approved the final Constitution.  The ANC secured more than 60 per cent of the national 
vote in the first democratic elections, which provided the now-governing ANC with an 
immense amount of muscle during the negotiation process.  The ANC effectively enjoyed 
a veto over any proposal.  Though the party sought to reach unanimity where possible, the 
ANC had no pressing need to compromise.  Their focus was on long-term strategies and 
not transitional arrangements.91  In sum, despite continued resistance, the ANC was in 
position to implement their initial plan to ensure that fundamental rights exercised a 
certain level of control over private law.92  As a result, the first draft reflected the opening 
position of the ANC at the time of negotiating the interim Constitution.  The application 
clause provided that the Bill of Rights binds the ‘judiciary’ and ‘where applicable, binds 
all natural and legal persons’.93 
To secure support for the application clause, the technical legal advisors to the 
Theme Committee on Fundamental Rights advised the negotiating parties as well as other 
interest groups that the inclusion of the ‘judiciary’ and ‘natural and legal persons’ would 
not lead to large amounts of disruption and unpredictability.94  The advisors supported 
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their conclusion with the body of case law that had started developing under the interim 
Constitution pertaining to the type of remedies available to litigants.95  Most courts had 
recognised the wisdom of limiting constitutional disputes, and, as a result, required 
litigants to locate remedies within existing subordinate sources of law.96  A plea to create 
new remedies to vindicate a constitutional right would only be entertained if there were 
no appropriate remedies to be found in statutes, the common law, or customary-
indigenous law.97  The advisors predicted this trend would apply to the private common 
law.  This subordinate source of law already protected many of the interests safeguarded 
by constitutional rights, which meant that the horizontal application clause would only be 
applicable in those few instances where the pre-existing law did not already provide 
adequate relief.  Furthermore, given that the courts prefer litigants to locate remedies 
within subordinate sources of law, the advisors inferred that the courts would most 
probably extend common law remedies to meet any constitutional demands as opposed to 
creating an entirely new system of rights and duties.98  The advisors underscored their 
view by noting that the proposed horizontal application clause does not invite an 
unfettered judicial application, as the clause provides no indication as to the extent of 
application.  The phrases ‘judiciary’ and ‘where applicable, binds private all natural and 
legal persons’ does not imply that the courts enjoy a power to apply rights to private law 
in an ‘artificial’ and ‘totally unqualified way’.99  The authority of the judiciary depends 
on the extent to which a constitutional right can in fact be applied to private legal 
relationships.100  The nature of rights and their applicability to private legal relationships 
would thus act as natural constraints on any judicial law-making powers. 
Third, the scope of horizontality was not debated in general and abstract terms.   
Reflecting on their experience during the drafting of the interim Constitution, the Theme 
Committee believed that discussing horizontality without a specific context in mind had 
caused the negotiating parties to debate horizontality as a binary issue (i.e. either no or 
full horizontality).  The Committee instead focused on individual rights, and, as part of 
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the process of framing and formulating constitutional rights, discussed whether each 
individual right should apply to private individuals or entities.101  Once broad agreement 
was reached on the type of rights to be entrenched, each political party was requested to 
provide preliminary submissions on what they understood the underlying justification and 
scope of the right to be.  From there, they were further required to answer two questions 
(i) should the right apply to common law/customary indigenous law and (ii) should it 
apply to a person or entity other than the state.  Though parties offered varying 
interpretations, the Theme Committee noted in their final report that the new strategy 
significantly reduced disagreement.102  It appears that once the parties outlined their 
preferred interpretations of a constitutional right, they would be able to convince the 
courts on the appropriateness or otherwise of applying a constitutional right to private 
actors, given the underlying rationale of the right.  In truth, the submissions suggest that 
there was considerably more agreement than divergence amongst the negotiating 
parties.103   
Fourth, the ANC offered a clearer vision of horizontality, which received the 
support of other political parties.   Stemming from their belief that crystallised towards 
the end of the interim Constitution negotiations, the ANC informed the Constitutional 
Assembly at the outset of the negotiations that they intended for legislation to serve as the 
primary mechanism through which rights apply to private law and conduct.  The ANC’s 
characterisation of this issue is telling: the party framed horizontality as a positive state 
duty.  The party argued that the interim Constitution had prioritised the protection of civil 
and political rights, and, although these negative freedoms are vital in a constitutional 
democracy, they are nevertheless insufficient for a South African context.  The final 
Constitution would have to make— 
the chapter on fundamental rights applicable horizontally where appropriate and 
[enshrine] appropriate socioeconomic rights.  A balance needs to be established 
between equality and freedom. […] In short the balance which the interim 
[C]onstitution establishes leans in favour of liberty rather than equality.  The Bill should 
apply to human beings. [And rights must be drafted in way that gives] expression to a 
balance between democratic Government and the protection of individual liberty.  It 
may be that some of the rights in the Interim Constitution were drafted without a proper 
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perspective of the challenges of governance and thus do not reflect the appropriate 
balance between the role of the courts and the role of Parliament.104 
The quoted passage pits equality against liberty, and the protection of liberty is viewed as 
the prerogative of courts and the realisation of equality as the responsibility of a 
democratic legislature.  The ANC placed horizontality into the same group as socio-
economic rights and other sorts of affirmative obligations.  The ANC proceeded to note 
that these affirmative obligations meant that ‘[n]ot all rights can be appropriately set out 
in the Constitution and they may require proper elaboration in legislation’.105  This neatly 
sums up the view of the ANC.  They advocated horizontality as a way to protect the law-
making authority of Parliament to enact legislation aimed at preventing private 
discrimination and remedying unjust structural inequality.  Of course, splitting liberty and 
equality as described above is both incorrect and unworkable, and no court has ever 
followed such a strong distinction.  But the general perception of the ANC is 
understandable.  The most predominant view of human rights is that it preserves the 
status quo by limiting state action.  Legislation, on the other hand, is about changing 
things.  The pro-legislation position attracted little-to-no contest, as no political party 
could earnestly argue against providing Parliament the authority to enact legislation. 
 
8 Rights legislation in the final Constitution 
In the beginning of 1996, although considerable agreement existed between parties, 
horizontality remained an unresolved issue.  Members of the negotiating forum worried 
that the application clause was still phrased in extremely wide terms.106  To recall, the 
provision read that the ‘Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, and all other organs of state and, where applicable, binds all 
natural and juristic person’.107  One cannot but conclude that the main reason as to why 
horizontality continued to cause uneasiness amongst the drafters was because the text of 
the draft Constitution did not reflect the growing consensus amongst the political parties.  
That is, the legislature would serve as the principal institution for law-reform, and, if 
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necessary, the residual role for the courts would be exercised through extending common 
law remedies.  
The Panel of Constitutional Experts, which was the highest non-political advisory 
body within the drafting process, once more tried to calm fears over what some believed 
would lead to the unbridled application of rights to private law.  The Experts repeated the 
earlier position of the advisory team that horizontality is not a ‘day and night’ option.108  
Horizontality must be viewed in degrees.  The Experts also informed the negotiating 
parties that no Constitution has ever constitutionalised private law in totality and that 
certain rights would inevitably be more applicable.109  The other extreme was also true.  
Judges in a constitutional democracy would always look to the supreme law for 
inspiration on how to apply subordinate laws.  As such, some degree of horizontality will 
ensue even if the text did not expressly regulate the impact of the Constitution on private 
law.  Given that horizontal application operates along a continuum coupled with the fact 
that the drafters could not anticipate future disputes, the Panel of Constitutional Experts 
advised the negotiating parties to incorporate a degree of flexibility in the horizontal 
application clause.110   
Despite advocating for some flexibility, the Experts nevertheless advised the 
parties to clarify what they precisely intended to achieve with horizontality, and, once this 
was done, to reconsider the wording of the application clause.  The Experts warned that 
the phrase ‘applies… where applicable’ was both clumsy and invites an endless number 
of interpretations.111  The phrase could either mean that it only finds application when 
rights expressly burden private individuals and entities or it could refer more generally to 
the nature of rights.  Both were problematic.  The former was too narrow, and would not 
give effect to the broader purpose of controlling acts of private power.  The latter would 
inevitably result in rights clashing, which, the Experts predicted, would require future 
laws, and not the Constitution, to solve conflicting rights.112 
As the negotiating process came to an end, the drafters pushed towards creating a 
more structured framework in order to prevent unintended consequences.  The principal 
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task was to affirm the primacy of legislation, which is best evidenced in the way the 
drafters formulated the only two constitutional rights that expressly impose obligations 
upon private individuals and entities, namely access to information and equality. 
8.1 Access to information 
The first draft enshrined the right to access information held by the state.  But it was 
further proposed that the right should extend to include ‘any information that is held by 
another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights’.113  The 
significance of this moment must be emphasised.  It was the first time a working 
document sought to impose an expressly worded obligation upon a private actor.  
The Technical Committee was however concerned that the enforcement of the 
right would overwhelm the state bureaucracy and swamp the courts.  The Committee 
therefore advised the Constitutional Committee Sub-committee to consider the 
promulgation of national legislation to regulate access to information, which would 
administer the provision of information through a series of procedures and guidelines.114  
The proposal was inspired by the ‘Information Acts’ in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  These statutory schemes provide an array of interwoven 
procedures to facilitate the process of gaining information as well as prescribing the 
grounds upon which information could be denied (e.g. information that would jeopardise 
national security and international relationships).  The need to regulate the constitutional 
right through legislation was primarily to regulate information held by the state, but the 
Technical Committee also anticipated an additional benefit.  Legislation could assist in 
regulating private obligations, as there was also a need to afford an appropriate degree of 
protection to privately held information like the need to protect personal privacy and 
confidential commercial information.115   
The negotiating parties accepted the wisdom of the Technical Committee.  The 
next working draft incorporated the phrase that the right to access information ‘must be 
                                                      
113 Theme Committee 4, Formulations (n 86). 
114 See Theme Committee 4, Draft Bill of Rights – Working Draft (n 107), alongside Technical 
Committee of Theme Committee 4, Fundamental Rights, Supplementary Memo, undated, section 
31: Access to Information. 
115 Technical Committee of Theme Committee 4, Supplementary Memo (n 114). 
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regulated by national legislation’.116  The phrase was placed around squared brackets, 
however, meaning that its inclusion was provisional and subject to future debate.  It was 
therefore national legislation that would regulate this constitutional obligation on private 
individuals and entities.  In other words, the right to access information held by another 
person is not so much a right enforceable against a private individual or entity.  It is 
primarily a right, enforceable against the state, for legislation.   
The obligation upon private individuals and entities, including the legislative 
regulation of the right, never proved contentious.  At a meeting convened at the end of 
March 1996 between the panel of Constitutional Experts and the Theme Committee, the 
negotiating parties confirmed that legislation would indeed be introduced to regulate the 
right to access information.117  The adopted provision read: 
 (1) Everyone has the right of access to— 
(a) any information held by the state; and  
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights. 
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may 
provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial 
burden on the state.118 
8.2 The equality clause  
The second published working draft recognised an additional duty on private individuals 
and entities.  The equality clause extended the duty upon the state not to discriminate to 
also cover private individuals and entities.  The clause provided that ‘[n]either the state 
nor any person may [unfairly] discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
                                                      
116 Theme Committee 4, Fundamental Rights, Draft Bill of Rights – Working Draft, 22 November 
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117 Panel of Constitutional Experts and Technical Committee 4, Memorandum to Chairpersons and 
Executive Director of the Constitutional Assembly re: Access to Information (s31) and Just 
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Meeting, 18 March 1996, item 2.25–2.26.   
118 See Constitution, schedule 6, item 23(1).  The transitional arrangements afforded the state three 
years to enact the legislation required by sections 9 and 32.  The transitional arrangement further 
provided that the right to access information held by another person is not enforceable until the 
envisaged legislation is enacted. 
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more’ of the listed grounds. 119   The inclusion of this private obligation was not 
contentious, since, at the beginning of the negotiations for the final Constitution, it was 
agreed by all political parties that the right not to be discriminated against would find 
horizontal application.120  
 The private duty provoked no major debate until the first week of March 1996.  
The Constitutional Committee Sub-committee resolved that the horizontal application 
portion of the equality clause required more structure.121  Given that the ANC viewed 
legislation as the primary means for horizontal application, the parties agreed that the 
equality clause should contain an express obligation upon the state to promulgate 
legislation aimed at combating discrimination in the private sphere.  The negotiating 
parties split on the next step.  The NP and DP now viewed the obligation as only falling 
upon the state.  That is, the state is under an obligation to prohibit discrimination in the 
private sphere through the promulgation of national legislation.  For these parties, it was 
no longer necessary to directly and expressly impose an obligation upon private 
individuals and entities.  These parties therefore requested that ‘nor any person’ be 
deleted.  The ANC resisted the request.  Though national legislation would serve as the 
mechanism through which private acts of discrimination would be outlawed, the ANC 
was resolute in their belief that the combination of national legislation and an express 
constitutional duty upon private individuals and entities was necessary to curb 
discrimination and reinforce the idea that the obligation is both vertical and horizontal in 
effect.122 
The fourth working draft, published in the third week of March, partially reflected 
this consensus.123  The equality clause made reference to national legislation, but it did 
not impose an obligation upon the state.  The drafters merely moved the provision in the 
limitation clauses that provided ‘the provisions of the Bill of Rights do not prevent the 
state from adopting any legislative or other measures designed to prevent or prohibit 
[unfair] discrimination’ into the equality clause.  
                                                      
119 Constitutional Assembly, Consolidated Draft, 19 October 1995, s 4(3).  The word ‘unfairly’ was 
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At a meeting convened at the end of March 1996 between the panel of 
Constitutional Experts and the Theme Committee, it was noted that although there was no 
significant dispute regarding the application clause, there was still one final matter 
outstanding.  The political parties had yet to make a decision on an earlier report of the 
Joint Panel (Independent Panel of Constitutional Experts and Technical Committee) 
recommending that a provision be inserted into the application clause that would require 
the courts to build up common law remedies whenever rights find horizontal 
application.124  This was the intention of the parties, and the recommendation was 
accordingly accepted.125  The first published Bill, tabled on 22 April, provided that 
‘[w]hen a right in the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person, and there is no law 
of general application that grants a remedy based on the right, a court must develop the 
common law to grant a remedy based on that right.’126  This was the first time the text of 
the constitutional draft reflected the long-held expectations of the drafters.  Legislation 
would serve as the primary means through which private constitutional duties would be 
given effect.  The courts would assume a residual role, and their law-making powers 
would be exercised through the development of the common law. 
The equality clause was also reformulated to reflect the change in the application 
clause.  On the clearer understanding that the courts would enjoy the residual power to 
develop the common law whenever legislation did not provide a remedy, the drafters 
converted the legislature’s permission to enact antidiscrimination into a mandatory duty 
to act.  The provision read in part: 
No person may be unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds […].  The state must adopt national legislation to prevent or prohibit 
discrimination.  In applying [the right], courts may develop the common law only to the 
extent that the required legislation does not provide a remedy based on this right.127 
On 29 April, Technical Committee 4 proposed a reformulation of the horizontal 
application clause.  The Committee recommended that the phrase ‘a remedy based on the 
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right’ should be replaced with ‘a remedy giving effect to the right’.  The preference for 
the latter was to amplify the intention of the drafters that the powers of the courts to 
develop the common law is only triggered once subordinate sources do not provide 
adequate relief (many common law rights already give effect to portions of constitutional 
rights, despite the fact that common law was originally not based or derived from 
constitutional rights). 
The re-formulation […] is also designed to ensure that the development of the 
common law only occurs “to the extent” that existing common law or legislation does 
not provide a remedy giving effect to the right.  If there is existing law that gives 
effect to the right, an applicant must rely on this law.  Common law development […] 
is ousted when law of general application already exists giving effect to the 
constitutional right.128 
Finally, and after the ANC initially suggested its removal, the Technical 
Committee also concluded that the new formulation of the horizontal application 
dispenses with the need for the equality clause to instruct the courts to develop the 
common law if the state fails to enact antidiscrimination legislation in the private sector 
(as this instruction was now contained in the general horizontal application clause).129  
The proposal was accepted, though a portion of the language and structure was 
amended.130  The adopted equality clause read in part: 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4)  No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
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The minutes of 1 May/2 May record that the issue of horizontality was no longer an 
outstanding matter.  On 8 May 1996, the final version, subject to stylistic edits, was 
adopted.131  
 (1)  The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.  
(2)   A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right.  
(3)   When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person 
in terms of subsection (2), a court -  
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary, 
develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect 
to that right; and  
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the 
limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).132 
 
9 The missing law-making framework  
This chapter debunks a common understanding.  The horizontal application of 
constitutional rights is often viewed — and accordingly criticised or celebrated — as a 
means of increasing the law-making powers of the judiciary to regulate private laws with 
constitutional right norms.  But the drafting history of the South African Constitution 
shows a different intention.  Horizontality was introduced primarily to safeguard the law-
making authority of the legislature, which required taking measures to prevent the 
judiciary from applying a negative/liberal interpretation to constitutions rights that would 
otherwise restrict economic and social legislation (which was thought necessary to 
remedy the wicked legacy of apartheid).  The general idea being that courts would be 
dissuaded from invalidating legislation that limits private autonomy or property in 
situations where the Constitution permits the imposition of obligations upon private 
individuals and entities. 
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The translation of this aim into the architecture of the South African resulted in a 
tension between the law-making institutions.  While the primacy and role of the 
legislature is clearly demarcated and preserved, the precise scope of the judicial law-
making role is not fully defined.133  While section 8(3) requires the courts to develop the 
common law whenever legislation does not give effect to a right, there are indications that 
the power of the courts is not automatic as it appears on first glance.  For starters, the 
equality clause and the access to information right demand legislation to give effect to a 
private obligation.  Today, it seems highly improbable that the courts would override that 
express demand.134  Another factor to consider is that the courts cannot always remedy 
the inactions of the state.  Horizontality was introduced to secure the capacity of the state 
to implement an aggressive social reform policy.  That certainly is not a task amenable to 
judicial determination. 
That is not the only law-making tension.  The drafting history shows that the 
focus fell on securing the law-making powers of the legislature and disarming the courts 
from blocking state measures that could otherwise be prohibited or limited in liberal 
constitutional democracies.  The law-making powers of the judiciary remained at the 
periphery of the debate, which meant that the drafters never gave full and proper 
consideration to how the courts would actually exercise their residual law-making power.  
This missing law-making framework is elaborated on in the next chapter. 
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This chapter rejects the three judicial law-making frameworks that were 
mooted during the drafting of the Constitution. 
 
1 Three frameworks 
How should courts exercise their mandate to rebuild private law in accordance with 
constitutional right norms?  This question is answered more fully in Part B of the 
dissertation.  But, before doing so, it may prove helpful to demonstrate why the three 
broad frameworks mooted during the drafting of the final Constitution are ill equipped to 
operate as judicial law-making frameworks.  The first is the section 36 rights-limitation 
analysis; the second is the direct application of constitutional rights; and the third is the 
indirect application of constitutional values.  To simplify the analysis, and where 
convenient, the chapter combines the second and third proposed approach under the 
heading ‘theoretical models’.  To position the three law-making frameworks in context, 
the chapter begins with a summary of a conversation between judges and drafters that 
took place towards the end of the negotiation period for the final Constitution. 
In Du Plessis v De Klerk — which is the only horizontal application judgment 
delivered by the Constitutional Court under the interim Constitution — the majority of 
the court rejected an invitation to apply constitutional rights directly to private law and 
conduct.1  The court surmised that the direct horizontal application of rights would thrust 
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upon the judiciary a formidable and uncertain task of law-reform.  Direct application 
would not only usurp the law-making authority of Parliament, but it would also lead to 
parts of private law being invalided that would in turn require the courts to fill in the gaps 
with new laws.  The problem identified was that the (interim) Constitution had not 
provided the judiciary with a framework on how to make these laws.  More specifically, 
there was no framework to resolve conflicting constitutional rights in private disputes.2  
On what basis, for example, would a court decide whether an individual’s privacy right 
must yield to the free speech right of the media?  Or, in a land eviction application, under 
which conditions would a court favour the housing right of an unlawful occupier over the 
property right of a landowner? 
The section 36 rights-limitation analysis was mooted as a possible solution, 
presumably because the framework for reviewing legislation encapsulates a balancing 
exercise.  That is, courts are required to evaluate whether the benefit obtained from a 
particular legislative measure outweighs the harm inflicted upon a constitutional right.  
The Du Plessis court rejected the invitation.  The court opined that the framework would 
invite ‘insurmountable’ problems, and one of the judges further remarked that the 
limitation analysis was ‘clearly not designed and is quite inappropriate’ for resolving 
clashing rights in private law.3  The reasoning to support the rejection is terse.  It appears 
that the court believed that the limitation analysis provided no further assistance on how 
to balance rights within private law.  The common law already reconciled conflicting 
rights and interests through a finely-tuned system of balancing which had developed over 
centuries in response to a multiplicity of policy concerns.4  The limitation analysis – 
which merely required any limitation of a right to be reasonable and justifiable in open an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality — offered no better guidance 
on how the balancing exercise should operate in private disputes.5 
The Du Plessis court settled on the indirect application model holding that the 
application of constitutional values provides a more appropriate law-making framework.  
The court explained that while the judiciary does not have the power to strike down 
private law rules (and, in turn, legislate new ones), the judiciary is nevertheless required 
                                                      
2 ibid para 112. 
3  ibid paras 55, 112 (Ackermann J). 
4  ibid para 55. 
5 (Interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, s 33(1). 
–63– 
to develop and apply private law rules in a manner that has due regard to those values and 
objects that underlie constitutional rights.6  In sum, indirect application promotes the 
incremental development of existing rules in accordance with the rhythm and internal 
logic of the common law.  The Du Plessis court highlighted that this model better allows 
for the balancing of conflicting rights, and, because it only invites incremental change, 
has the added benefit of respecting the role of the legislature to serve as the principal 
institution for law-reform.7 
The Du Plessis court’s rejection of the rights-limitation analysis was notable.  At 
the time the judgment was delivered, the text of the final Constitution had already been 
approved and it enjoined the judiciary to perform a task that the apex court had now 
labelled insurmountable and inappropriate.  Section 8(2) of the Constitution authorises 
the direct application of rights to private individuals and entities, and, if necessary, 
section 8(3)(b) permits the courts to limit rights in the exercise of their law-making 
powers under the horizontality provisions provided that the limitation of the right 
complies with the section 36 limitation analysis.  The limitation analysis echoes its 
counterpart in the interim Constitution.  It provides that a constitutional right may be 
‘limited only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom’.8 
The constitutional drafters had thus also foreshadowed the problem of a missing 
law-making framework, but, unlike the court, the drafters believed the rights-limitation 
analysis to be an appropriate framework.  In the final months of negotiations, the 
Independent Panel of Constitutional Experts advised the negotiating parties that the 
horizontal application of constitutional rights would inevitably cause rights to come into 
conflict.  If the drafters did not formulate an appropriate framework, the Experts warned 
that future subordinate laws, and not the Constitution, would be required to solve 
conflicts.9  Less than two weeks before the Constitution was finalised, the Technical 
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Committee proposed a solution.  In the exercise of their law-making powers under the 
horizontal application clause, the courts were permitted to develop the law in a way that 
limits constitutional rights, provided such limitation is in accordance with the rights-
limitation analysis.10  That proposal was accepted and enshrined in section 8(3)(b) of the 
Constitution.  
The Du Plessis court’s preference for indirect application over direct application 
also stood in contrast to the approach of the constitutional drafters.  At the time of 
drafting the interim South African Constitution, there was a belief that there was a law-
making difference between these two theoretical models.  This all changed when drafting 
the final Constitution.  The legal team cautioned the negotiating parties not to place any 
import on academic distinctions between the so-called ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ models of 
horizontal application.  The advisors explained that these concepts aim to describe 
different views on the ‘point of entry’, but they do ‘not necessarily affect the impact and 
extent of application.’11  In other words, they have no appreciable bearing on the law-
making mandate and powers of the courts.  It was partly on this advice that the 
negotiating parties settled on provisions that incorporated elements of both direct (section 
8(2)) and indirect (section 39(2)) application.  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, it provides support to the initial 
view of the Du Plessis court that the rights-limitation analysis cannot be used as a judicial 
law-making framework.  Second, it supports the view of the constitutional drafters that 
neither the direct nor the indirect models of horizontal application operate as suitable law-
making frameworks. 
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2 Rejecting the section 36 rights-limitation analysis 
In the Certification Judgment, objectors argued that the application of constitutional 
rights to the legal relationships of private individuals is not a proper judicial function, and 
therefore should not be permitted, because the adjudicative process that accompanies 
horizontal application inevitably requires courts to balance rights.  The concern, it seems, 
was that courts do not have the expertise or necessary legal framework to evaluate 
competing constitutional rights and other private interests outside of a legislative scheme.  
The court disagreed, and held that the objection— 
fails to recognise that even where a bill of rights binds only organs of state, courts are 
often required to balance competing rights.  For example, in a case concerning a 
challenge to legislation regulating the publication and distribution of sexually explicit 
material, the court may have to balance freedom of speech with the rights of dignity and 
equality.  It cannot be gainsaid that this is a difficult task, but it is one fully within the 
competence of courts […].  That the task may also have to be performed in 
circumstances where the bearer of the obligation is a private individual does not give 
rise to a conflict with the [Constitutional Principles].12 
Although the logic of the court may seem acceptable at first glance, there is need for 
some scepticism on closer inspection.  A charitable interpretation of the objectors’ 
argument is not that the balancing technique is an inappropriate means to resolve 
conflicting rights.  The argument is rather that the process of balancing in the context of a 
legislative scheme is distinctive, in that its structure and function is different, from the 
balancing of rights in the context of the horizontal application of rights.  If this is indeed 
their concern, the objectors’ argument may have merit, and deserve a fuller explanation of 
how courts are expected to perform the balancing of constitutional rights in private 
litigation.  
This viewpoint is not uncommon.  In a leading case before the Supreme Court of 
Israel, Justice Aharon Barak wrote that courts cannot merely copy the limitation analysis 
used to test state action and paste it into private litigation.  He noted that a ‘change takes 
place’ when constitutional obligations are transferred from the realm of public law into 
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that of private law.13  Not only are the obligations of private individuals different from 
that of the state, the balancing of rights in vertical applications operates under 
assumptions and conditions that may be different in private law disputes.  In his 
subsequent academic writings, the Judge President argues that alongside the limitation 
analysis applicable to state action, courts should establish frameworks for balancing 
conflicting constitutional rights in disputes between private parties.14  The Canadian 
Supreme Court has similarly concluded that a different sort of balancing exercise must 
take place if the state is not a litigating party.15  Though the Canadian Supreme Court 
appears not to have provided much elaboration on this point, the court has nevertheless 
suggested that the act of balancing constitutional values in private litigation must assume 
a more flexible framework compared with the limitation analysis performed in cases 
litigated against government.16  
The differences between balancing in the context of state action and horizontal 
application disputes must be underscored.  When state action is reviewed, the judicial 
balancing exercise forms part of the broader proportionality analysis.  The doctrine of 
proportionality developed over time and across national borders as a means to facilitate a 
core objective of constitutional law: namely, to control the exercise of state power.  To 
this end, the proportionality analysis is a reconstructed decision-making process that aims 
to situate the courts in the position of government.17  The process does not allow the 
courts to choose between competing policies.  That decision is left to the elected branches 
of government.  The proportionality analysis is designed to provide the courts with a 
structured method of gathering and evaluating the evidence on which the policy is built in 
order to facilitate an enquiry into whether or not the implementation of a chosen 
government policy as translated into law is a permissible exercise of state power. 
The proportionality analysis typically commences with rationality, which 
enquires into whether the measure taken by the state has a rational connection to a 
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legitimate government purpose.18  The rationality test is derived from two central tenets 
of our constitutional law.  First, the idea that a legislature must act rationally stems from 
the rule of law, which, as a starting point, requires the exercise of any public power to be 
authorised in law.  The rule of law further obliges the state to follow the correct 
procedures when creating new rules.19  The promulgation of valid legislation is therefore 
dependent on debate within Parliament following the receipt of public comments.20  The 
Constitution simply cannot condone even the most benevolent of government acts when 
constitutionally prescribed law-making processes are disregarded.21  In addition to these 
procedural thresholds, the rule of law also prevents the legislature from exercising their 
law-making authority in an arbitrary or capricious manner.22  Second, the legislative 
scheme must be able to achieve a public good.  Legislative law-making powers must 
therefore be exercised in a manner that realises the purpose for which it is bestowed, 
namely to ‘ensure government by the people under the Constitution’.23  While Parliament 
is afforded wide discretion to choose policy objectives and plans, the rationality 
requirement nevertheless ensures that any chosen policy and plan is able to implement a 
‘defensible vision of the public good’ through coherent and integral legislation.24   
If the law under review satisfies the rationality component of the test, the next 
step investigates whether less restrictive means are available to achieve the same result.  
This prong of the analysis stems from the belief that constitutional rights enjoy an 
elevated status within the legal system, and thus aims to ensure that the implementation of 
a government policy does the least amount of harm.  These first two prongs of the 
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22 New National Party v Government of the Republic 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) para 19. 
23 Constitution s 42(3).   
24 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 25. 
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proportionality analysis are mostly objective evaluations, and, to satisfy the courts, the 
state is expected to tender evidence to demonstrate the basis upon which a rights-
infringing decision was taken. 
The last prong of the rights-limitation analysis is the balancing exercise.  Judicial 
balancing, or, to employ the more common term, proportionality in the narrow sense, asks 
the court to determine whether a state-authored infringement of a constitutional right is a 
disproportionate limitation of one right when compared with the benefit gained in 
realising another right or other public interest.  This is predominantly a value judgment, 
which is an enquiry that is less objective than the first two prongs of the proportionality 
analysis.   Judicial balancing consequently attracts a lot of criticism.  Some scholars have 
even argued that balancing is an inherently irrational decision-making process that leads 
to arbitrary and inconsistent results since the process is incapable of producing any clear 
and objective legal standards that can direct the weighing of competing rights and other 
legal interests.25  Given the problems with balancing, it should come as no surprise to 
learn that the South African Constitutional Court rarely uses this more subjective prong of 
the proportionality analysis to strike down legislation, opting rather to invalidate laws on 
the more objective criteria of ‘less restrictive means’, ‘over-breadth’, ‘illegitimate 
government goal’, and ‘irrational connection’.26 
In pursuit of a more principled method for limiting rights at the instance of the 
state, constitutional law has developed certain rules, procedures, and assumptions to 
counteract the potential risk of arbitrariness that is associated with value judgments.  One 
such rule is that the state bears the onus to justify the infringement of a constitutional 
right.27  The justification for doing so stems from a principal purpose of constitutional 
rights.  Rights protect interests that ought to be kept out of the reach of ordinary politics.  
If the state, exercising power over individuals, takes measures that erode these protected 
interests, it then seems appropriate for the state to provide an adequate justification.  If 
they fail to discharge the obligation of showing why a particular measure is more 
advantageous than detrimental, then the measure will be declared unconstitutional.  An 
additional reason for placing the onus on the state is that government entities usually 
                                                      
25 See Grégoire Webber, The Negotiable Constitution (CUP 2009) 87–115; Stavros Tsakyrakis, 
‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 ICON 468. 
26 Niels Petersen, ‘Proportionality and the Incommensurability Challenge in the Jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court’ (2014) 30 SAJHR 405, 425–429. 
27 Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 44. 
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enjoy far better access to information.28  Non-state entities simply do not have the level of 
experience and resources needed to justify state policy. 
An additional feature that contributes to the operation of the balancing exercise is 
that a democratically elected government must be afforded leeway to pursue objectives 
that it considers to be in the public interest.  The advancement of the public good is the 
primary purpose of the state, and, as the court reminds us, it is not the role of the judiciary 
to ‘second-guess the wisdom of policy choices’ made by the duly elected branches of 
government.29  The function of a court is rather that of a neutral arbiter to assess whether 
the creation and implementation of programmes or lack thereof complies with the 
commands of the Constitution.  The doctrine of balancing is therefore not only concerned 
with measuring a benefit:harm ratio but also identifying the discretion that must be 
afforded to the original decision-maker.  This leads to a well-recognised principle in 
constitutional law that one of the prime considerations in determining the latitude a court 
affords the state to implement a rights-infringing programme is the extent of the violation.  
As a general rule, the more intrusive the infringement on the interests of the right holder, 
the greater the need is for a compelling public purpose.30  When the limitation is 
considered minor, courts tend to provide the state more scope to pursue the rights-
infringing programme.  It is for this reason that in those few instances where the 
Constitutional Court has struck down legislation on the balancing-prong of the 
proportionally analysis, the court emphasised the significant impact that the impugned 
law had upon a constitutional right, employing the standard of ‘manifest disproportion’.31 
Law Society v Minister of Transport neatly illustrates the assumptions that 
underlie the proportionality analysis.32  The matter originates from major legislative 
alterations to the workings of the Road Accident Fund.  The legislature abolished the 
common law right of a road accident victim to claim compensation from the wrongdoer 
for losses that were not covered by the Fund.  The abolition of the claim was particularly 
striking given that the amendments also introduced limits to the type and amount of 
                                                      
28 Stu Woolman and Henk Botha, ‘Limitations’ in Stu Woolman and Michael Bishop (eds), 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2ed, RS April 2014, Juta) 34–44. 
29 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104. 
30 S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 18; Manamela (n 18) para 69.  
31 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) para 46.  See also 
Petersen (n 26). 
32 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC). 
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damages recoverable from the Fund.  Prior to the legislative amendments, and subject to a 
few exceptions, the Fund’s liability was unlimited.  Victims of road accidents were 
entitled to claim from the Fund what they would have otherwise been entitled to claim 
from the wrongdoer under the law of delict.  The amendment altered this approach.  In 
the future, the Fund would only cover non-pecuniary damages for ‘serious’ injuries; the 
amount recoverable for loss of future earnings was capped; and medical costs were 
confined to government-prescribed tariffs.  In essence, any residual damages — that is, 
the difference between actual loss and damages recoverable from the Fund — were to be 
borne by the victim. 
The decision to abolish the common law right was brought under constitutional 
review.  The court found the measure to infringe the section 12(1) right to freedom and 
security of the person, reasoning that the abolition of the common law right diminishes 
the capacity of victims to remedy violations to their bodily integrity and security of their 
person.33  However, following submissions by government on its policy rationales, the 
court concluded that the infringement was a justifiable and reasonable limitation.  The 
judgment does not follow a structured proportionality analysis, but the three main prongs 
of the analysis are detectable. 
First, the court held that there was a rational connection between the legislative 
amendment and a legitimate government purpose.  The abolition was part of a broader 
strategy to restructure the overall purpose and management of the Fund in order to make 
the system more sustainable and equitable.  The Fund was insolvent, and government had 
no option but to take urgent measures to improve the financial health of the Fund.  To this 
end, government presented evidence of how these cost-saving measures would assist in 
improving the financial viability of the Fund.34  Part of the saving resulted from reduced 
administrative and legal costs, as the type and amount of damages recoverable from the 
Fund were now more fixed and easily calculable.  The amendments were also part of 
government’s strategy to change gradually the operating premise of the Fund from fault-
based liability to no-fault liability.  The government’s primary objective was to make the 
Fund operate as a type of social security compensation system, which means that victims 
should be entitled to recover damages regardless of whether negligence can be proven.35  
                                                      
33 ibid para 75. 
34 ibid paras 41–42. 
35 ibid para 50. 
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The abolition of the common law claim served this rational purpose for two main reasons.  
First, maintaining a residual common law claim fits awkwardly with the ambition to turn 
the Fund into a social security system that is not dependent on wrongdoing.  Second, 
though the abolition of the common law claim does not affect the financial viability of the 
Fund, the claim for residual damages would have significantly increased the financial risk 
of motorists.  The need to provide immunity to a high-risk activity that is essential to 
everyday life was held to be a legitimate government goal.36 
Second, the court found that there were no less restrictive measures available to 
achieve the policy.  The evidence for reaching that conclusion is not clear, but it appears 
derived from the court’s holding that when a government aims to bring ‘about reform 
which entails several steps and involves complex and competing policy options it must be 
permitted to do so in incremental measures and “be given reasonable leeway to deal with 
problems one step at a time”’.37  
Third, the court engaged in a balancing exercise, comparing the harms and 
benefits of the legislative scheme.  The court noted that the infringement on the right is 
only partial as victims are still entitled to claim damages from the Fund, albeit a capped 
amount.38  The court further concluded that the balance struck by the legislature was 
constitutionally acceptable: retaining the common law claim would impose a ‘colossal 
risk’ on drivers due to a ‘relatively small inattentiveness or oversight’.39  The court 
further questioned the number of individuals who would actually benefit from retaining a 
residual claim for damages.  There are only a small number of South Africans who are in 
a financial position to pay damages arising from a motor accident, and the residual 
common law claim would effectively only be used by the few wealthy individuals who 
enjoy the economic means to pursue costly litigation.40 
The above discussion shows that the balancing exercise in vertical application 
disputes is different to that witnessed in horizontal application disputes.  Most of the 
assumptions that underlie the proportionality analysis for testing the validity of state 
action are absent in litigation involving the human rights obligations of private 
                                                      
36 ibid. 
37 ibid para 52, quoting Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513, at 573. 
38 Law Society (n 32) para 80. 
39 ibid para 50. 
40 ibid. 
–72– 
individuals and entities.  Private individuals do not enjoy the power, capacity, or expertise 
to advance the public good.41  In fact, within a legal dispute, private parties have almost 
no incentive to advance public policy considerations or the general welfare of the state.  
The immediate goal of a private litigant is to secure his or her own personal interests 
against all others.  In vertical application matters, on the other hand, state policy is 
equated to the interests of the state.  In the reconstructed balancing exercise, the state is 
required to advance supporting evidence.  In private litigation, the parties are not 
responsible for the creation of legal rules, and they therefore cannot be expected to offer 
broad justifications for the law, and, when private litigants do so, their argument takes on 
a strong tint of bias.42  Herein lies the important distinction between the vertical and 
horizontal application.  The legislature infringes upon constitutional rights in order to 
advance government policy, which is what the section 36 rights limitation analysis is 
designed to review.  In horizontal application matters, in contrast, the courts are not 
reviewing state policy.  Nor do courts choose policy grounds to champion, and, thereafter, 
test the validity of those policy grounds against constitutional rights.  
In sum, though the balancing exercise in vertical and horizontal cases share 
similarities, theory on the horizontal application of rights cannot cut-and-paste the 
proportionality doctrine into its framework.  To be clear, this chapter does not argue that 
the courts should not adhere to the prescripts of section 8(3)(b) of the Constitution.  The 
common law is a law of general application, and any limitation it introduces must comply 
with section 36.  The section 36 limitation analysis can therefore be of guidance, but on 
its own the rights-limitation analysis cannot produce law.  The judicial law-making 
framework must develop its own set of rules and principles that direct the balancing of 
conflicting rights in private disputes. 
 
                                                      
41  See Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) para 40 (the state must promote the interests of 
society as a whole which it must do through the raising of public funds; private individuals and 
entities have neither these objectives nor these powers, and so constitutional obligations upon 
private individuals and entities will differ from that of the state). 
42 Lorraine Weinrib and Ernest Weinrib, ‘Constitutional Values and Private Law in Canada’ in Daniel 
Friedman and Daphne Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart 2001) 43, 55–56. 
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3 Rejecting the theoretical models 
Following the lead of other jurisdictions from around the globe, South African legal 
commentary has proceeded on the assumption that there is a difference of practical 
significance between two theoretical models through which constitutional rights burden, 
or at least have an effect on the legal obligations of, private individuals and entities.43  
The central difference between the two models is built on a distinction between the 
(direct) application of constitutional rights and the (indirect) application of constitutional 
values.44  However, despite starting at different points, the models eventually funnel 
towards the same dilemma without providing a solution.  That is, none of the models 
actually provide a law-making framework on how to resolve conflicting rights.  Figure 4 
maps the discussion ahead. 
 
 
Figure 4: Theoretical models of direct and indirect horizontal application 
                                                      
43 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 186; Du Plessis (n 1) para 122; Frank 
Michelman, ‘On the Use of Interpretive Charity’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 1, 40. 
44 Part of the trouble with applying the theoretical models is that there is no universally accepted 
criterion for distinguishing between direct and indirect application.  The law journals record a 
multiplicity of variable and clashing accounts.  An alternative method to distinguish between direct 
and indirect application is to focus on whether constitutional rights apply to either private conduct 
or private law.  For an extensive typology of horizontality (under English law), see Alison Young, 
‘Mapping Horizontality’ in David Hoffman, The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private 
Law (CUP 2011) 16.  See also the various approaches in Dawn Oliver and Jörg Fedtke, 
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3.1 Direct application  
Direct application entails rights-based adjudication, and the literature identifies two 
possible ways in which this can occur.  The first sort is the application of rights to the 
conduct of private individuals and entities.  That is, the constitutional right is interpreted 
to impose an obligation upon a private individual or entity to either refrain from or 
perform a particular action.  The constitutional right therefore creates a right-duty 
relationship between two non-state entities which is immediately enforceable.  The right 
to privacy can illustrate this method.  One of the core rationales of the privacy right is to 
afford each person control over the type of personal information that enters the public 
domain.  A conceivable interpretation of the privacy right could therefore demand that 
any private individual or entity that enjoys access to another’s personal information 
should be imposed with a correlative duty not to disclose.45  For example, a priest could 
rely solely on the constitutional right to privacy to prohibit a news organisation from 
publishing a story detailing his homosexual affairs.  In sum, the direct application of 
constitutional rights to private conduct means that rights create independent causes of 
actions which a litigant may plead without relying on any other source of law.  
Courts rarely adopt this sort of direct application.46  Their reluctance is best 
explained through the core objection raised against the horizontal application of rights.47  
Constitutional rights are traditionally conceived as a set of negative liberties, and their 
core purpose is to safeguard individual freedoms against the otherwise coercive will of 
the state.48  Imposing obligations upon private individuals and entities threatens this 
                                                      
45 NM v Smith 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) paras 132, 136. 
46 A handful of judgments adjudicated under the interim Constitution suggested that certain 
constitutional rights could possibly impose direct obligations on private individuals and entities.  
See Holomisa v Argus Newspapers 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at 596G–597C; Gardener v Whitaker 
1995 (2) SA 672 (E) at 648H–I; Mandela v Falati 1995 (1) SA 251 (W) at 257H–J. 
47 For a summary of the core objections against horizontality, see Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law 
and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 766, 769.  The 
author cites that the application of constitutional rights to private law (i) threatens the core of 
private law, namely a libertarian view of autonomy and (ii) permits the judiciary usurp the power of 
the legislature to regulate private relations. 
48 The normative objection against horizontality is traceable to natural right theories developed more 
than three centuries ago. The work of John Locke proved amongst the most influential.  Locke 
believed that all individuals are born with a set of innate and inalienable rights.  However, and to 
ensure an orderly society in which these rights are secure, individuals were better off submitting to 
the controls of a governing structure.  Individuals therefore entered into the so-called social 
contract.  Governments only gained the authority to exercise public power over individuals for as 
long as they did not exercise their powers in a manner that encroached upon the innate rights of 
individuals.  Locke’s thinking reverberated in the works of many other theorists, which, over time, 
would come to establish but also limit the legal enforcement of human rights.  Natural rights 
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classical liberal reading of rights.49  Instead of protecting individual autonomy against any 
external interference, rights may come to limit the freedoms they profess to safeguard.50  
Consider the privacy right example from above.  The duty not to disclose private 
information would effectively impose restrictions on the news organisation’s right to free 
speech.  The potential clash of freedoms manifests into a practical concern.  A plaintiff 
who pleads a constitutional right as the sole cause of action would likely be met with the 
defendant raising a competing constitutional right.  The news organisation would cite 
their right to free speech, which, in our hypothetical case, protects their interest in 
exposing the priest who had preached anti-gay sentiments.   The practical objection is 
therefore a law-making problem.   The direct application of rights to conduct would leave 
the courts with unwieldy right v right clashes and no obvious mechanism on how to 
adjudicate competing claims.51 
The second sort of direct application seeks to alleviate the core objection.  Here, 
constitutional rights apply to the law that regulates private relationships.  This type of 
direct application is often viewed as a more palatable approach because it operates in a 
manner that is similar to the traditional judicial review of legislation.  The direct 
application to law model is premised on the notion that the validity of any private law is 
dependent on its consistency with constitutional rights, and any rule of private law found 
inconsistent with a constitutional right is liable to be declared unenforceable.  The 
argument that private law must meet constitutional standards is boosted by the 
understanding that the machinery of the state is always required to enforce law, and it 
should make no difference that the legislature never passed the impugned law.  To put it 
another way, private law is seen as the creation of the state, and, like all other laws, the 
process and outcome of law-making is subject to the control of the Constitution.  The 
                                                                                                                                                            
theories limit the application of human rights two ways.  First, human rights are only a set of 
negative freedoms.  They only protect freedom from interference, and do not demand the provision 
of any good or service.  Second, the focus on the social contract between state and individual means 
these negative freedoms were only enforceable against the state.  This thinking instilled a strong 
distinction between public and private life (and law).  These two features still command a 
stronghold over our understanding of human rights, which stunts the development of extending 
human rights obligations to private individuals and entities.  See Danwood Mzikenga Chirwa, ‘In 
Search of Philosophical Justification and Suitable Models for the Horizontal Application of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 294, 296. 
49 See Gavin Anderson, ‘Rights and the Art of Boundary Maintenance’ (1997) 60 MLR 120, 122–23. 
50 Du Plessis (n 1) para 99. 
51 ibid paras 55, 97.  See Chris Sprigman and Michael Osborne, ‘Du Plessis is Not Dead: South 
Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private Disputes’ (1999) 15 
SAJHR 25, 43 (the direct application of rights will require balancing, which is a policy choice that 
must be left to the legislature). 
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direct application to law ostensibly mitigates the core objection because the focus shifts 
away from the actions of private individuals and entities onto the law-making process.  
To the extent that private law does not comply with a constitutional right, a litigant must 
appeal to the courts to adjust those private laws that fail to meet constitutional standards.  
For instance, the right to equal treatment may strike down private common law rules that 
enable testators to discriminate on the basis of race or gender. 52   The defining 
characteristic of this model bears repeating.  The litigation between private litigants is not 
grounded in constitutional rights, and private individuals and entities are not classified as 
duty-bound constitutional actors.  The cause of action and defence remain sourced within 
the subordinate private law, which must comply with the Constitution. 
The direct application to law model fails to mitigate the core objection, however.  
The effect of this sort of application will invariably lead to a result that diminishes private 
autonomy.  If the law that regulates private relationships must comply with constitutional 
rights, then, by extension, the conduct of private individuals and entities as permitted by 
private law must also comply with constitutional rights.  In the previous scenario, the 
testator was technically not burdened with a direct constitutional obligation not to 
discriminate.  The testator’s freedom to dispose of his property was nevertheless curtailed 
because the freedom conferring rules of private law were subject to constitutional control.   
This sort of direct application also does not necessarily ameliorate the practical 
manifestation of the core objection.  The abrogation of a rule of private law may create a 
gap in the law, which, in turn, will require the courts to remedy the now-deficient part of 
private law.  The act of developing private law can of course take a variety of forms, 
which include modifying existing rules or inserting whole new causes of action and 
defences into private law.  Even outside constitutional law adjudication, the traditional 
judicial development of private law carries risk.  Courts have historically shown an 
unwillingness to alter the law, given the process is fraught with so many uncertainties.53  
The discriminatory testament can illustrate this point.  In South Africa, the freedom to 
testate is not an expressly conferred right.  It rather derives from the large cluster of 
freedoms that flow from the right to property, which includes the freedom of owners to 
dispose of their possessions in the manner they best deem fit.  The concern is therefore 
                                                      
52 Curators Ad Litem to Certain Potential Beneficiaries of Emma Smith Educational Fund v The 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 2010 (6) SA 518 (SCA) para 42; Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 
(1) SA 580 (CC) para 97. 
53 Du Plessis (n 1) paras 53, 58–59. 
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that a constitutional challenge to the freedom of testation would mean challenging the 
broader right to property. While this concern may be exaggerated, there is some evidence 
to support the view that some of the rules and freedoms contained in private law cannot 
be easily deleted.  There are a handful of cases where the courts, after declaring certain 
rules of succession invalid for permitting discriminatory testaments, have had to perform 
extensive rewiring on large parts of the laws.  This was necessary because those 
impugned succession laws were so intertwined in many principles and rules of private 
law that made a simple deletion impossible.54  In addition to all of the usual problems and 
objections that arise when courts assume a law-making function, the output must also 
pass constitutional muster.  That is, courts will have to find a way to strike an appropriate 
balance between conflicting rights (e.g. freedom of testation/property v freedom against 
discrimination).  The application to law model remains silent on this law-making process. 
The law-making power of the judiciary introduces an additional objection.  A 
defining feature of any horizontal application dispute is a request to the courts to rewrite 
laws without any legislative input.  In a constitutional system premised on the separation 
of powers, horizontality threatens to usurp the primary responsibility and power of the 
legislature to serve as the main institution for law reform.55  The application of rights to 
private law increases the authority of the courts to regulate private law, which, over time, 
may curtail the capacity of the legislature to strike their own balance between interests.56  
It bears repeating the discussion in chapter one that explains why the legislature serves as 
the primary institution responsible for law-reform.  The legislative law-making process 
benefits from policy research, political oversight and monitoring of implementation, the 
allocation of public funds to support new programmes, the involvement of the public in 
decision-making, the political compromise between sensitive interests, and the ability to 
easily revise laws to correct unanticipated consequences.57  These benefits are either 
absent or significantly limited in any comparable judicial law-making process. 
                                                      
54 Bhe (n 52) paras 101–36. 
55 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 36; Mighty Solutions v 
Engen 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para 39. 
56 See Chris Sprigman and Michael Osborne (n 51) 46–50. 
57 Du Plessis (n 1) para 80. 
–78– 
3.2 Indirect application  
Indirect application is the middle ground between direct application and no application.  
The model grew in popularity around the globe as a means to address the objections 
levied against direct application.  In contrast to using rights as a means to impose limits 
on either private conduct or law, indirect application entails the use of constitutional 
values as a tool to interpret and develop the common law from within.  The courts 
typically implement this model of horizontal application by infusing constitutional values 
into the open-textured and value-laden concepts found within private law.  For example, 
in the law of contract, the courts employ the notion of ‘public policy’ to deny the 
enforcement of an egregious contractual agreement.  In the law of delict, the concept of 
the ‘legal convictions of the community’ is the primary tool through which civil liability 
for damaging private conduct is either extended or restricted.  The indirect application 
model asks that these concepts be viewed through a constitutional prism.  Ostensibly, this 
model allows private law to develop gradually in line with the values underlying the 
Constitution, resulting in minimal disruption and uncertainty.  However, whether the 
application of constitutional values meets the objections raised against horizontality is 
debatable.  Constitutional values are intangible tools, making legal reasoning difficult.  
Not only is the legal source from where they originate unclear, but values are also without 
a clear duty-bearer.  Even if these problems are set aside for the moment, the 
development of the law still requires the courts to resolve any constitutional values that 
may come under conditions of conflict.  In the law of contract, for example, the value of 
autonomy will clash with the value of equality and the courts must decide how best to 
reformulate private law rules to protect both interests.  Indirect application also does not 
offer a workable framework on how to solve clashing rights.  In fact, given that the courts 
are stuck with the exact same law-making problem that direct application causes, there is 
no guarantee that the indirect application of values will lead to a result that is both 
incremental and deferential to the law-making function of the legislature. 
The prophecy of the legal advisors proved correct.   The theoretical models are 
inappropriate for a South African context. They are poor predictors of future outcomes, 
which is mostly due to the fact that each of the models fails to adequately address the 
concerns they profess to solve.  Constitutionally protected freedoms are inevitably 
limited, while the courts are faced not only with the dilemma of resolving competing 
interests but also with criticisms that they have usurped legislative law-making authority.  
All of the models eventually funnel to the same problem.  The next chapter — which 
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performs an analysis on the constitutional text and some of the seminal decisions on each 
of these theoretically distinct pathways — reinforces this conclusion.  They do indeed 
lead to a similar result.  This is because each pathway requires the courts to readjust 
private law rules and principles, and, given that the same judicial skillset is used to solve 
rights in conflict, a similar balancing process and outcome ensues regardless of the 
different starting points. 
Given that none of the law-making frameworks mooted during the drafting of the 
South African Constitution are fully workable, the courts would have to develop their 



























THE BALANCING PROCESS 
 
This chapter introduces the ‘balancing process’, which is the main framework 
used by the Constitutional Court to resolve conflicting constitutional right 
norms in horizontal application disputes. 
 
1 Balancing as the law-making process 
A South African Constitutional Court judge recently remarked that the debate over 
horizontality is ‘to some extent’ about the balancing exercise.1  This chapter strengthens 
that hypothesis: judicial balancing is what the debate is all about.  If all constitutional 
right norms are assigned equal normative force and each of their scopes is interpreted 
broadly — which certainly is the case in South Africa — then it is inevitable that right 
norms will eventually clash and compete against one another.2  And, to resolve conflicts, 
courts must develop and apply some sort of framework that guides the evaluation and 
weighing of competing interests so as to determine the conditions under which one right 
norm may be limited to secure another.  A comparative survey supports this strengthened 
hypothesis.  Virtually all of the leading jurisdictions on the horizontal application of 
rights have applied balancing frameworks to adjudicate conflicting right norms.3  The 
                                                      
1 De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church 2016 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 77 (van der 
Westhuizen J). 
2 Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights (CUP 1993) 203–10.  See chap 5, sec 1.  
3  Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Positive and Horizontal Rights’ in Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds), 
Proportionality (CUP 2017) 219, 239–40.  The author notes that the seminal decisions of Lüth and 
Jerusalem Community Jewish Burial Society failed to apply the formulaic proportionally analysis, 
and rather reduced the decision-making process to one of balancing the conflicting rights (or 
values) within each case.  See also the discussion of Mephisto (1971) 30 BVerfGE 173 and 
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importance of balancing must be stressed.  If it is accepted that the horizontality debate is 
indeed about balancing, then it follows that the judicial balancing of constitutional rights 
informs the law-making process through which the courts exercise their mandate and 
powers to rebuild private law in accordance with the Constitution.  
 The strengthened balancing hypothesis must be qualified, however.  The 
worldwide attraction to the idea of balancing appears rooted within an implicit 
assumption that balancing promotes two core aims of any legal system.  The act of 
balancing conjures up the image of a scale, which deceptively suggests that rights in 
conflict can be solved with both the certainty of a mathematical formula and the justness 
of a fair compromise.  Whether balancing can deliver on this promise is doubtful.  
Though the topic of judicial balancing has received increased academic attention in recent 
years, there remains a dearth of robust analytical scholarship on this central component of 
modern constitutional law.  What are the exact mechanics of the balancing exercise?  
Most formulations of the balancing exercise converge on the notion that the process aims 
to compare the benefits gained and the harms inflicted by a particular measure, but this 
formulation still does not tell us very much.  The legal methodology including the elusive 
measuring standard for evaluating the benefit:harm ratio is all too often described in 
vague and abstract terms.  The immense difficulty of formulating balancing structures and 
guidelines is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that courts have at times hedged their 
capacity to develop a complete theory that instructs the operation of the balancing 
exercise.  The Constitutional Court, for instance, has cautioned that there are certain 
‘problems based on contradictory values that are so intrinsic to the way our society 
functions that neither legislation nor the courts can “solve” them with the “correct” 
answers’.4  In these difficult cases, the court proposed, the role of a judicial officer is to 
‘do as well as they can with the evidential and procedural resources at their disposal’.5 
It is for this reason that the strengthened balancing hypothesis fails to provide 
much guidance on how courts exercise their law-making powers, and the hypothesis must 
                                                                                                                                                            
Deutchland-Magazin (1976) 42 BVerfGE 143 (1976) in Peter Quint, ‘Free Speech and Private Law 
in German Constitutional Theory’ (1989) 49 Maryland Law Review 247, 290–323.  In these cases, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court held that ordinary courts must balance conflicting rights 
within the structures of private law, which is an exercise that must have regard to the relevant 
circumstances of the case. 
4 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 38, which quotes the 
minority judgment in Abortion II (1993) 88 BverfGE 203.  For similar remarks, see De Lange (n 1) 
para 79; Thint v National Directors of Public Prosecution 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 231; Prince v 
President of the Law Society 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) paras 155–57. 
5 Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 4). 
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be modified.  While we may accept that balancing is the general adjudicative framework, 
the more important question is how exactly is the balancing exercise conducted.  In sum, 
the debate over the judicial horizontal application rights distils to the sort of balancing 
exercise applied to resolve rights under conditions of conflict.   
This chapter introduces the balancing framework adopted by the South African 
Constitutional Court.  It does so by analysing three streams of horizontality.  The first is 
rights-based application which is grounded in section 8 of the Constitution; the second is 
value-based application in accordance with section 39(2); and the third is protective state 
duties which stems from section 7(2).  The analysis shows that these differing start points 
are of no appreciable difference to the eventual outcome of a dispute, as a similar type of 
law-making process ensues regardless of the ground upon which the dispute is pleaded.  
The court declines invitations to treat one constitutional right as automatically 
outweighing another.  In other words, the court rejects fixed rules.  Rather, in situations 
where a clash of constitutionally protected interests arises, the court adopts a form of — 
what will be termed — the ‘balancing process’.  The defining function of the balancing 
process is to allow for a flexible and contextual evaluation of the specific facts and 
surrounding circumstances of the case at hand to determine the prevailing interest.  
Significantly, the balancing process is woven into private law rules and principles.  The 
process therefore operates within the pre-existing law, which has the important benefit of 
adding a degree of structure and predictability to a decision-making process that may 
otherwise be at risk of becoming too abstract and haphazard for judicial application. 
That the process for evaluating constitutional right norms is written into private 
law may appear to suggest that the influence of the Constitution is limited and 
constrained to the extent that pre-existing private law is able to accommodate the 
Constitution.  To be clear from the outset, private law does not curb the influence of the 
Constitution.  Or, at the very least, it should not.  Such an outcome would disobey a 
central tenet of the South African constitutional democracy, which is that all subordinate 
sources of law derive their force and validity from the Constitutional Court.6  It is the 
Constitution that controls private law, and not the other way round.  The Constitution 
imposes an external pressure on private law, and, where necessary, the courts must break 
and remould the private common law so as to allow constitutional norms to flow through 
                                                      
6 Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44.  See chap 5, sec 1. 
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it.7  Or, if the courts believe it unwise to rebuild the common law, the courts must locate 
new remedies in other subordinate sources of law.8  Part C of the thesis provides an 
example this latter option.  
 
2   Rights-based application: section 8 of the Constitution  
Section 8 of the Constitution reflects a modified version of the direct application model, 
and incorporates elements from both the application to law and application to conduct 
models.  Section 8(2) reads: 
A provision in the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent 
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by the right. 
Although the provision authorises the application of rights to private individuals and 
entities, it offers little to no guidance on how to determine whether a particular 
constitutional provision binds a private individual or entity.9  While some constitutional 
rights expressly impose a duty upon private individuals and entities, this alone is 
inconclusive.  Nearly every constitutional right is capable of an interpretation that extends 
obligations to non-state actors given that rights are formulated in an open-textured and 
aspirational manner.  The other extreme is also a possibility.  If one assumes that the core 
‘nature’ or purpose of rights is only to guard individual freedoms against state 
interference, then no constitutional right can bind a private individual or entity.10  
Whether or not a particular constitutional provision binds a private individual or entity 
therefore depends on how widely or narrowly the scope of the right is interpreted.  In 
accordance with the general principles of constitutional interpretation, this process is 
influenced by the textual formulation of the right, the historical and normative reasons for 
the provision, and the political context in which the right is interpreted.  More 
                                                      
7  See AJ van der Walt, ‘Legal History, Legal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional 
Democracy’ (2006) 12 Fundamina 1, 9–10.  
8 See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) para 66 (the court must develop new 
remedies when the Constitution stretches the common law beyond recognition’). 
9 See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Subcommittee (Theme Committee 4, 
Fundamental Rights), Draft Bill of Rights – Volume One, Explanatory Memoranda, 9 October 
1995, 274.  The advisory legal team noted that the word ‘bind’ gives no indication as to the extent 
of application, and further advised that the judiciary should be given a ‘clear indication not to apply 
the Bill of Rights artificially to relationships to which the Bill of Rights cannot be applied’. 
10 Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2012) 36. 
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specifically, the enquiry necessitates an investigation into the ‘intensity’ of the right, the 
potential for the conduct of a non-state entity to interfere with the right, the 
appropriateness of limiting one freedom to safeguard another, and the enhanced capacity 
of government (as opposed to the courts) to solve conflicting rights.11 
The remaining provisions of section 8 guide the enforcement of section 8(2).  If a 
constitutional right is found to ‘bind’ a private individual or entity, section 8(3)(a) 
instructs the courts to ‘apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right’.12  In essence, and in instances where the 
legislature has not already done so, the Constitution anticipates that the development of 
the common law is the means through which the constitutional obligations of private 
individuals are given legal effect.  Section 8 therefore creates a hybrid between the two 
sorts of horizontal application models.  A finding that a constitutional provision binds a 
private individual or entity serves only as a trigger mechanism, which, in turn, requires 
the courts to develop private law so as to give practical effect to the right.  Section 8(3)(b) 
continues to read that a court may develop the common law in a manner that infringes a 
constitutional right provided the limitation is justified in accordance with the section 36 
rights-limitation clause. 
The case of Khumalo v Holomisa13 
In this matter the Constitutional Court was called upon to decide whether the law of 
defamation complied with the Constitution.  The legal question raised was whether the 
requirements needed to sustain a claim for defamation unduly encroached upon the 
media’s right to free expression.14   
In accordance with the common law, a defamation claim succeeds where there is 
the (i) wrongful and (ii) intentional (iii) publication of a (iv) defamatory statement that (v) 
                                                      
11 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) paras 39, 165. 
12 Constitution s 8(2)–(3) must be read alongside Constitution s 172, which mandates the courts to 
declare invalid any conduct or law inconsistent with the Constitution. 
13 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
14 Constitution s 16(1):  
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes 
(a) freedom of the press and other media;  
(b)  freedom to receive or impart information or ideas. 
(c)  freedom of artistic creativity; and  
(d)  academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
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concerns the plaintiff.  The plaintiff need however only prove the last three requirements.  
If a plaintiff establishes that a defamatory statement concerning him was published, the 
requirements of wrongfulness and intention are presumed.  The onus then shifts to the 
publishing defendant to prove the absence of either wrongfulness or intention.  The 
intention to publish is virtually indisputable when the defamatory statement is contained 
in a newspaper publication.  Media defendants are therefore required to show that the 
publication was not wrongful.  Wrongfulness is a judicial determination into whether it is 
reasonable to impose liability for the damaging conduct.15  This determination is based on 
the value-laden considerations of the public and legal convictions of the community, 
which, in a constitutional era, must be interpreted in accordance with constitutional 
norms.16  Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the common law recognised three 
main defences to rebut wrongfulness: truth and public benefit, fair comment, and 
privileged occasion.  To escape legal liability for defamatory statements that are classified 
as factual averments, the media would accordingly need to prove that the statement is 
both true and in the public benefit. 
 The common law therefore favours defamed litigants, because they need not 
prove falsehood.  The media rather assumes the risk of not being able to prove the truth of 
a defamatory publication.  It was the operation of these rules, and the resultant bias in 
favour of the defamed litigant, that the media contended stood in contrast with the 
Constitution.  They argued that the law of defamation effectively creates a self-censorship 
on publication since truth is at times difficult to prove.  In other words, media houses are 
reluctant to publish material if it is difficult or perhaps even impossible to prove the 
truthfulness of a statement before a court of law even though the information falls within 
the public interest.  The court accepted this point.17  The pre-Constitution rules of 
defamation created a ‘chilling effect’ on the publication of information in the public 
interest because it hampered the constitutionally protected interests of both the media to 
impart information and individuals to receive such information.18   
                                                      
15 Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
para 20; Fetal Assessment Centre (n 8) para 67. 
16 Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC) para 53; Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 
274 (CC) para 122. 
17 Khumalo (n 13) para 38. 
18 ibid paras 22, 39. 
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 The court hooked the dispute onto section 8(2) of the Constitution, and did so by 
adopting a paradoxical reasoning.  The judgment shows no attempt to interpret either of 
the two most applicable rights in this matter as binding a private individual or entity, 
namely freedom of the press or the right of a politician to have his human dignity 
respected.  Rather, in order to establish jurisdiction, the court invoked the constitutional 
rights of individuals who were not a party to the dispute: the right of each person to free 
expression, which includes the right to receive information and ideas.19  The judgment 
records three motives for protecting expression.  The ability to receive and impart 
information and ideas (i) secures and advances human dignity and autonomy; (ii) enables 
individuals to make responsible political decisions, which supports the democratic project 
of the Constitution; and (iii) enhances the capacity of individuals to participate in public 
life.20  The court observed that the media is a ‘key agent’ in ensuring that these rationales 
of the right are realised.21  The ‘ability of each citizen to be a responsible and effective 
member of our society depends upon the manner in which the media carry out their 
mandate.’22  The media will either strengthen the functioning of democracy or harm the 
goals of the new constitutional order.23  This led the court to conclude that the media are 
duty bearers of the right to freedom of expression, and that this duty is owed to all 
individuals. 
Given the intensity of the constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential 
invasion of that right which could be occasioned by persons other than the state or 
organs of state, it is clear that the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal 
application in this case as contemplated by section 8(2) of the Constitution.24  
In essence, the court burdened the media with a constitutional obligation in order to (as 
will be shown below) heighten the level of constitutional protection afforded to them. 
Having satisfied itself that the matter fell within the purview of a section 8(2) 
application, the court proceeded to investigate whether the common law should be 
                                                      
19 Constitution s 16(1)(a)–(b).  See Khumalo (n 13) paras 22, 24, 34. 
20 Khumalo (n 13) para 21. 
21 ibid para 22. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid para 24. 
24 ibid para 33.  See also NM v Smith 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) paras 132, 136.  In a minority opinion, 
O’Regan J held that the section 14 right to privacy binds private individuals and entities.  The right 
to privacy entitles each person to choose what private information is disclosed publicly, and that 
state and non-state actors alike are under an obligation to respect this component of the right. 
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developed.  To secure the right to free expression, and to eliminate the risk of a ‘chilling 
effect’ on the publication of matters that are of political or public importance, the media 
argued that the common law of defamation should be developed to require the defamed 
plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statement is false.  The scope of the proposed rule 
was however limited.  The shift of onus would only apply in circumstances where the 
plaintiff was a political official or politician and the subject of the defamatory publication 
concerned a matter of public importance or interest.  In sum, the media argued for a 
watered-down version of New York Times v Sullivan.  In that case, the United States 
Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to the United States Constitution —
which protects the freedom of speech of the press — as preventing public officials from 
succeeding in defamation claims unless the statement is both false and published with 
‘actual malice’.25  In prescribing this high threshold, which renders it nearly impossible 
for a public official to succeed in a defamation claim, the Supreme Court weightily tilted 
the scale in favour of free speech over other countervailing private interests such as the 
protection of individual reputation.  Returning to Khumalo, the media did not advocate 
the ‘actual malice’ standard, but they did argue that public officials must prove a 
defamatory statement as false in order to succeed.  They therefore advanced the 
contention that freedom of political speech requires an elevated protection in South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
The media’s proposed approach proved unpalatable for the court.  Freedom of 
expression is neither absolute nor is it a right that enjoys a preferential status.  On the 
other side of the equation are countervailing interests, including the constitutionally 
protected value of human dignity. 26   Human dignity encapsulates self-worth and 
reputation.27  The Constitution safeguards the human dignity of each person, and there is 
no justification for automatically withholding this protection in the context of a public 
                                                      
25 New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254, at 280.  The United States Supreme Court requires 
‘state action’ to review laws.  In Sullivan at 265–92, the court held that a state (including state 
courts) are prohibited under the First and Fourteenth Amendment from awarding damages to a 
public official if a defamatory false statement is not published without ‘actual malice’.  See also 
Shelley v Kraemer (1948) 334 US 1 (though racially restrictive covenants are not a violation of the 
Constitution, the judicial enforcement of such a covenant would constitute a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the actions of state courts in such matters would 
be covered under the state action doctrine). 
26 Constitution s 10: ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected’. Khumalo held at paragraph 27 that the right to privacy (section 14) is connected to the 
right to have your human dignity respected. 
27 Khumalo (n 13) para 27. 
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official.28  The court held that merely shifting the onus of proof to the defamed plaintiff 
would result in a zero-sum outcome because falsehood is also difficult to prove.29  Such a 
rule would encroach upon the constitutionally protected interests of the defamed plaintiff 
in much the same way that the application of the current common law rule interferes with 
the rights of a media defendant.  To afford protection to both interests, the court 
concluded that the common law of defamation must establish mechanisms that strike ‘an 
appropriate constitutional balance between freedom of expression and human dignity.’30 
 The court found this balance to exist in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA).  In National Media v Bogoshi, the SCA introduced the concept of 
‘reasonable publication’ as the fourth main defence that a media defendant may invoke to 
rebut wrongfulness.31  The reasonableness defence permits a defendant to escape liability 
for a false and defamatory allegation where ‘upon a consideration of all the circumstances 
of the case it is found to have been reasonable to publish the particular facts in the 
particular way and at the particular time’.32  The enquiry into the reasonableness of the 
publication includes assessing the tone of the accusations, the nature of the information, 
the reliability of a source, the steps taken to verify the accuracy of the information, and 
whether the statement was political discussion.33  The Constitutional Court held that— 
[w]ere the Supreme Court of Appeal not to have developed the defence of reasonable 
publication in Bogoshi’s case, a proper application of constitutional principle would 
have indeed required the development of our common law […].  However, the defence 
of reasonableness developed in that case does avoid a zero-sum result and strikes a 
balance between the constitutional interests of plaintiffs and defendants.  It permits a 
publisher who can establish truth in the public benefit to do so and avoid liability.  But 
if a publisher cannot establish the truth, or finds it disproportionately expensive or 
difficult to do so, the publisher may show that in all the circumstances the publication 
was reasonable.34  
Finding the common law of defamation constitutionally compliant, the court 
dismissed the application.  This compliance was secured through the ‘reasonable 
                                                      
28 ibid paras 25, 43. 
29 ibid para 42. 
30 ibid. 
31 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
32 ibid at 1212G. 
33 ibid at 1212H. 
34 Khumalo (n 13) para 43. 
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publication’ defence, which, this dissertation argues, is a form of the balancing process.  
Instead of providing freedom of expression an elevated status over human dignity, or 
vice-versa, the court preferred to entrench in the common law of defamation a balancing 
enquiry that enables the specific facts and circumstances of the case to determine the 
prevailing interest.  Though guidance is provided on how to evaluate the reasonableness 
of a publication, the process remains flexible and context specific. 
One last aspect of Khumalo must be noted.  The judgment presents the balancing 
process as the only possible solution that satisfies the Constitution.  This is doubtful.  
Section 8(3)(b) of the Constitution stipulates that a court, when developing the common 
law to give effect to a constitutional right, is permitted to limit another constitutional right 
provided that the limitation satisfies section 36(1) of the Constitution.  This provision is 
the rights-limitation clause, and permits any law of general application to limit a 
constitutional right provided that the limitation is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom’.35   Conceivably, 
an approach that elevates one right above another in the abstract is permitted.  The 
Khumalo judgment remains silent however on whether or not a rule that automatically 
discounts the dignity and privacy interests of a public official is a justifiable limitation 
under section 36(1).  In failing to use the section 36 limitation clause, the Khumalo court 
established a new type of rights balancing process, one that takes place within the 
common law. 
Following the Khumalo judgment, varying forms of this balancing exercise 
continue to find traction in the law of defamation.36   The SCA crisply summarised the 
position as follows. 
In the final analysis, whether conduct is to be adjudged lawful or not depends on a 
balancing of the constitutionally enshrined right of dignity, including as it does the right 
to reputation on the one hand, and the right to freedom of speech, on the other.  This 
may involve [the reasonableness test proposed in Bogoshi].  But, the above 
notwithstanding, the well-established defences and the rules relating to each are both 
useful and convenient and in addition have the advantage of affording litigants a degree 
of certainty.  Nonetheless, in their application and development, sight should not be lost 
                                                      
35 Constitution s 36(1) is quoted in chapter 3, sec 1. 
36 For additional examples of balancing expression against privacy/dignity within the law of 
defamation, see Le Roux (n 16) paras 124–28, 171; The Citizen v McBride 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC) 
paras 79–86, 97–102, 141–153; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) paras 90–92. 
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of the constitutional values underlying [the defences’] true object which is the rebuttal 
of unlawfulness.37 
 
3   Values-based application: section 39(2) of the Constitution  
Section 39(2) of the Constitution reflects a form of indirect application.  The provision 
states, in part, that courts— 
when developing the common law or customary [indigenous] law […] must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Section 39(2) is a powerful provision.  It demands that the entirety of the human rights 
system that underpins the South African constitutional order reverberate through every 
area of the law, including those parts that are often considered as insulated from human 
right norms.  The provision provides credence — and a doctrinal basis — to the belief 
that the Constitution is not merely a formalistic legal document but that it also operates as 
an ‘objective normative value system’ that serves as a ‘guiding principle’ to all branches 
of government.38  Read alongside section 173 of the Constitution — which confirms that 
the high courts, Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional Court enjoy the inherent 
power to develop the common law taking into account the interests of justice — section 
39(2) instructs the courts to infuse the ‘pervasive normative effect’ of the Constitution 
into the common law.39 
The trigger mechanism of section 39(2) is not clear, however, at least when 
compared to the more structured framework set out in section 8 of the Constitution.40  
The provision offers zero instructions as to when the courts should develop the common 
law.  A conservative, though plausible, interpretation of section 39(2) is that the duty 
upon the judiciary to promote the values underlying constitutional rights is only activated 
once a court decides that there is a non-constitutional reason to develop the common law.  
The conditional ‘when’ supports this reasoning.  If this conservative interpretation were 
                                                      
37 Hardaker v Phillips 2005 (4) SA 515 (SCA) para 15, which was quoted with approval in Le Roux 
(n 16) para 124. 
38 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 54.  
39 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) para 15.  See Mokone v Tassos 
Properties 2017 (5) SA 456 (CC) para 68 (what the ‘interests of justice’ requires in accordance 
with section 173 of the Constitution depends on the circumstances of the case, which is an enquiry 
that can be ‘quite wide’). 
40 Theubus v S 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 27. 
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followed, it would suggest that the influence of the Constitution remains constrained by 
the internal logic and rhythm of the common law.  In accordance with this view, any 
development to the common law must take place on an incremental basis, and, at all 
times, show a high degree of respect to the law-making role of the legislature.41  The 
Constitutional Court has rejected the most conservative interpretation, reasoning that it is 
the Constitution itself that demands the realignment of private law with constitutional 
right norms.  However, the court’s case law oscillates between differing accounts as to 
when the obligation is actually triggered.  In a handful of judgments, the court has held 
that the duty upon the judiciary to develop the common law is present even if the 
litigating parties have not themselves raised the issue. 42   Other judgments hold 
differently.  Here, the court has remarked that the primary onus still falls upon the 
litigating parties to raise any request for the development of the common law from the 
outset of litigation, and, as a general rule, judges should not plead cases on behalf of 
litigants.43  It appears that the severity of the human rights violation is the most 
determinative factor.  The court’s uncertain position on the trigger mechanisms is perhaps 
best reflected in this passage from a leading judgment on section 39(2). 
It needs to be stressed that the obligation of the court to develop the common law, in the 
context of the section 39(2) objectives, is not purely discretionary.  On the contrary, it is 
implicit in section 39(2) read with section 173 that where the common law as it stands is 
deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a general 
obligation to develop it appropriately.  We say ‘general obligation’ because we do not 
mean to suggest that a court must, in each and every case where the common law is 
involved, embark on an independent exercise as to whether the common law is in need 
of development and, if so, how it is to be developed under section 39(2).  At the same 
time there might be circumstances where a court is obliged to raise the matter on its 
own and require full argument from the parties.44 
                                                      
41 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) para 31.  The conservative 
approach reflects the position of the Supreme Court of Canada.  See Retail, Wholesale & 
Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery (1987) 33 DLR (4th) 174 (SCA) paras 34, 36, 39. 
42 See Carmichele (n 38) para 39; Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA) para 5. 
43 Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) paras 63–67; Mighty 
Solutions v Engen 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para 39. 
44 Carmichele (n 38) para 39.  See also discussion on the cautious approach judicial officers should 
employ when raising a constitutional issue of their own accord, particularly if it is desirable to 
obtain legislative inputs, in Minister of Local Government, Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle 
Estate 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 39; Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) paras 38–42. 
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The scope of section 39(2) is also unclear.  While the purpose of the provision is 
to ensure that all law corresponds to the values of the supreme law, the court has 
nevertheless warned against a robust application of section 39(2).  The need to respect the 
role of the legislature as the principal institution responsible for law reform is often cited 
as a justification for judicial reservation.  Lower courts are warned to ‘take into account 
the wider consequences of the proposed changes’ to the law, suggesting that judges 
should steer away from radical and complex changes.45  This is particularly the case 
where public policy considerations present more than one compelling choice.46  There are 
times however that the court ignores its own advice.  In a recent judgment, for instance, 
the court wrote that the section 39(2) obligation is ‘extensive’.47  The provision requires 
courts to be ‘alert to the normative framework of the Constitution not only when some 
startling new development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where the 
incremental development of the rule is in issue’.48  In contradiction to some of their 
previous holdings, the court also noted that the judicial power to develop the common law 
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine as the legislature remains free to amend 
or abrogate common law rights provided their alternations do not result in an unjustifiable 
limitation of a constitutional right.49 
In addition to safeguarding the role of the legislature, section 39(2) earmarks and 
protects the function of lower courts in the rebuilding project.  The Constitutional Court 
usually declines to pronounce itself on the development of the common law unless the 
SCA and high courts have expressed an opinion on any proposed development.  This 
                                                      
45 Mighty Solutions (n 43) para 38; Masiya (n 41).  The Constitutional Court has cited with approval 
the Canadian Supreme Court decision of R v Salituro [1991] 3 SCR 654 at 666G-H, 670F-I: 
Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and 
economic fabric of the country.  Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose 
social foundation has long since disappeared.  Nonetheless there are significant 
constraints on the power of the judiciary to change the law. […]  In a constitutional 
democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major 
responsibility for law reform […].  The judiciary should confine itself to those 
incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the 
dynamic and evolving fabric of our society. 
 See DE v RH 2015 (5) SA 83 (CC) para 16; Carmichele (n 38) para 36; Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 
(3) SA 850 (CC) para 61. 
46 Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) para 57. 




restraint is of ‘particular importance’.50  The SCA has an ‘expertise in the common law’, 
and the apex court should therefore not exercise its jurisdiction without the legal question 
first being ventilated before the SCA.51  The common law is at times capable of an 
assortment of varying developments, all of which may comply with section 39(2).  It is 
therefore best to allow the SCA and high court an opportunity to evaluate what sort of 
development is the most beneficial in terms of both the internal logic of the common law 
and changing perception of values in society before the Constitutional Court conclusively 
resolves the matter.52 
The case of Barkhuizen v Napier53 
The matter investigated whether, and, if so, how, the Constitution limits the freedom to 
contract.  The Barkhuizen judgment centred upon a time limitation clause in a 
commercial insurance contract which stipulated that a claimant only has 90 days to 
institute legal action for a repudiated insurance claim.  The impugned contract insured 
against the risk of loss of a motor vehicle.  Following a motor vehicle accident, the 
insurer rejected a claim on the basis that the vehicle was not used for a private purpose as 
required in the contract.  The claimant failed to institute legal proceedings within the 90 
day time period, and only did so two years after the repudiation.  To overcome the time 
bar clause, the claimant, presumably following the methodology of direct application as 
established in Khumalo, argued that the clause was unconstitutional and therefore 
unenforceable on the ground that it was contrary to section 34 of the Constitution.  This 
provision safeguards the right to have a legal dispute resolved in a fair and public hearing 
before a court.54 
 The Constitutional Court endorsed its earlier holding that all law is subject to the 
Constitution.  This includes the private common law, which means that the validity of all 
the common law rules of contract depend on their consistency with the Constitution.55  
                                                      
50 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC) para 33.  See also 
Khumalo (n 13) para 13 
51 Amod (n 50). 
52 Carmichele (n 38) paras 56–58. 
53 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
54 Constitution s 34 (‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum’). 
55 Barkhuizen (n 53) para 15. 
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The court however proceeded to reject the direct application model for purposes of testing 
the constitutional validity of contractual provisions. 
 The primary reason for this holding, the court explained, is that the Constitution 
offers no structural methodology to identify the extent to which constitutional rights 
curtail the capacity to contract.56  The formulation of the section 36(1) rights-limitation 
clause sets out that any right may be limited provided that the limiting action is authorised 
by a ‘law of general application’ and then only to the ‘extent that it is reasonable and 
justifiable’.  The court reasoned that a contractual provision between two private parties 
cannot be classified as a law of general application.57  Though not mentioned in the 
judgment, the immediate problem that arises where the court has no structure to identify 
how constitutionally protected interests may be limited against other interests is that it 
may create the untenable position that constitutional rights become absolute in respect to 
private relationships.  Consider for a moment the facts of Barkhuizen.  If the right to 
access courts finds direct application and one accepts that the court is correct that the 
limitations clause is unusable, then time bar clauses would be outright prohibited even 
though contracting parties in the exercise of their autonomy would prefer to place this 
type of limitation on one another as a means to increase the efficiency of their transaction.  
That outcome is highly undesirable, as it would automatically negate other constitutional 
values.  As the SCA has previously held, the enforcement of contractual agreements, 
which gives credence to the exercise of personal autonomy, secures the constitutional 
values of freedom and human dignity.58  Furthermore, legal uncertainty is created when 
courts invalidate contractual agreements, an outcome that is considered inimical to the 
constitutional principles of legality and the rule of law.59  
The Barkhuizen judgment is therefore premised on a distinction between the rules 
of contract law (law) and contractual provisions (conduct).  For reasons that are not 
entirely clear, and to which the discussion in this chapter will return, the court 
summarised the problem for resolution as one not pertaining to the constitutional validity 
of the rules of the law of contract but rather one that pertains to the validity of private 
conduct (in the form of a contractual clause).  To circumvent the difficulties of applying 
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constitutional rights to contractual clauses, the court concluded that a more indirect 
approach was required to control contractual autonomy.  This should be done in 
accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution.  The appropriate method for 
invalidating a contractual clause is through the common law doctrine of public policy, as 
informed by constitutional values.60 
The pre-Constitution common law of contract  
A trite principle of the South African common law is that contractual clauses contrary to 
public policy are unenforceable.  The standard required to nullify a clause on this ground 
is notoriously high, however.  In a pre-Constitution decision, the Appellate Division held 
that the judicial power to invalidate a contractual term on the ground of public policy 
should be reserved only for the ‘clearest of cases in which the harm to the public is 
substantially incontestable’.61  Few cases met this standard.  The high threshold is partly 
due to the fact that the enquiry is purely an intrinsic test.  That is, the test is directed 
solely towards investigating whether the challenged transaction has a tendency or a 
reasonable likelihood to lead to a result that is ‘clearly inimical’ to the interests of the 
community as a whole.62  This determination is made having regard to the overall purpose 
of the contract, which is discerned from the provisions of the contract as well as the 
objective circumstances of the case at the time of concluding the contract.63  The focus of 
the intrinsic test bears repeating.  The enquiry investigates whether the contract is likely 
to cause a manifest harm to the public.64  The harm actually suffered by the contracting 
party is swept to the periphery of the enquiry, and is only relevant if it can support the 
claim that harm would be inflicted upon the community as a whole.  The Appellate 
Division decision of Sasfin illustrates this point.65  Here, the court declared against public 
policy a contractual clause that would have effectively relegated one person to the 
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position of a ‘slave’ working for the benefit of another person.  Slavery is no doubt an 
individual harm, but the analysis of the court makes it clear that the declaration of 
enforcement was grounded on the understanding that forced servitude is incompatible 
with the public interest. 
The limited scope of the intrinsic-based test resulted in a narrow construction of 
the type of clauses that are ‘clearly’ contrary to the interests of the community.  
Declarations of unenforceability were reserved for clauses that are plainly unlawful,66 
unconscionable and contrary to public morality,67 or are otherwise required to be set aside 
as a matter of social or economic expedience.68  The intrinsic test ignores the actual 
results that flow from enforcing the contract.  External considerations, meaning those 
considerations not apparent from the terms of the contract, were of little to no relevance.  
The courts repeatedly declined to consider factors such as the motives of the contracting 
parties, the circumstances under which a party elects to enforce a contractual clause, the 
identities and positions of the parties, or the general fairness of the ensuing result. 
The legal policy underpinning the intrinsic test is threefold.  First, the utility of 
contract law is premised on contracting parties performing the obligations they had 
voluntarily undertaken.  Parties arrange their activities on the understanding that certain 
consequences will flow from a contract, and the law should not frustrate these 
expectations.  This too is a requirement of public policy.  Parties should not be free to 
escape the obligations they have undertaken if they come to realise they had struck a bad 
bargain.  At the time of concluding a contract, all individuals hold a veto power over any 
possible obligation.  It is at this stage that contracting parties are required to ensure that 
their individual interests are adequately protected, and no person should anticipate 
reprieve from a burdensome obligation.  Second, the intrinsic test gravitates towards 
universal and consistent application. 69   The function of the courts is confined to 
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identifying the types of clauses that are against public policy.  The courts can, for 
example, declare against public policy contracts for the sale of illegal narcotics or those 
that result in forced servitude.  The harm these contracts have on the public interest is 
clear, and the ruling can be applied without modification in future matters.  The enquiry 
does not depend on each judge assessing whether a particular contract was unfair or 
unreasonable within the particular facts of a case.  In other words, the test aims to 
promote legal certainty by insulating the idiosyncratic views of individual judges.70  
Third, the narrow construction of the test prevents the proverbial floodgates of litigation 
from bursting open and swamping the courts.71 
The impact of the Constitution on contract law 
The scope of the public policy enquiry has expanded in the democratic era.  In a 
constitutional order that prizes human dignity, equality, and the advancement of human 
rights as part of its foundational values, it is indisputable that classical liberal notions of 
private autonomy should no longer be afforded the supremacy it once enjoyed under the 
common law.  To the extent that they clash, freedom of autonomy including the freedom 
to contract must now be weighed against other countervailing constitutional values.  In 
the words of the Barkhuizen court: 
What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must 
now be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy 
as given expression by the provisions in the Bill of Rights.  Thus a term in a contract 
                                                                                                                                                            
a claim of specific performance if doing so would be unconscionable.  The demise of the defence 
was on account of two reasons.  First, the defence was never actually part of the Roman-Dutch Law 
transplanted into South Africa.  Second, the defence was criticised for being too vague and 
discretionary.  It resisted consistent application, and the critics believed that the defence unwisely 
permitted courts to consider the fairness of contractual provisions despite the contracting parties 
having voluntarily undertaken those obligations.  See Graham Glover, ‘Lazarus in the 
Constitutional Court: An Exhumation of the Exceptio Doli Generalis?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 449, 450.   
70 A prominent example is a series of inconsistent high court judgments in the early 1990s, which all 
pertained to whether a particular type of surety agreement was against public policy.  The 
oscillating trend was halted in Wilkinson (n 64).  A high court of three judges ruled that the test 
must be applied strictly – that is, a declaration of unenforceability will only result when the clause 
is ‘clearly inimical’ to the interests of the community.  The concern of the court was that an 
expansive reading of the rule in Sasfin (n 61) would continue to lead to inconsistent results.   
71 The argument that flexibility in decision-making will invariably inundate the courts should be 
treated with scepticism.  These claims are normally not accompanied by supporting evidence.  In 
fact, flexibility in decision-making is seen in nearly every aspect of the law, and there is little 
evidence that such processes have crippled the courts.  See Fetal Assessment Centre (n 8) para 70. 
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that is inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy 
and is, therefore, unenforceable.72 
The scope of the enquiry has expanded in two ways.   First, harms to the 
community now also incorporate violations to the personal interests safeguarded by 
constitutional rights.  The enquiry has therefore become more individual-centric.  Second, 
the enquiry is no longer purely an intrinsic-based test.  Public policy now incorporates a 
second prong: the extrinsic-based test.  The law reports record a slowly growing body of 
cases where some courts have been willing to investigate whether the enforcement of an 
otherwise valid contractual provision causes a result that is inimical to the interests of the 
community.  That is, the result of enforcement leads to a situation that is classified as an 
unwarranted infringement of a constitutional value or right, 73  or is otherwise 
unconscionable, illegal or of immoral conduct. 74  The extrinsic test therefore also 
amplifies the focuses on individual harms.  The test examines the actual results that flow 
from enforcement, which requires courts to consider circumstances that are external to the 
terms of the contract.  The growth of the extrinsic-based test is partly due to the 
increasing role of good faith within the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.75  Good 
faith is a value that is said to underpin both contractual relationships and the new 
constitutional order.  The general idea promoting good faith in contractual relationships is 
that legal agreements are not individualistic acts.  The process of concluding a contract, 
and thereafter the performance of undertaken obligations, is also a means to respect the 
dignity, freedom, and equal worth of our contracting parties.76  Contracts serve to 
mutually enhance the position of both parties.  When viewed through the prism of the 
Constitution, the court has held, the underlying assumption of the law of contract is that 
parties conclude agreements in good faith and that they do so in order to obtain a benefit 
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from one another.77  Since it is assumed that parties contract in good faith, it should be 
expected that contracting parties show good faith at the time of performance as well.  The 
underlying value of good faith does not — or, at least, should not — dissipate after 
entering into a contract. 
The extrinsic prong of the public policy enquiry is still in its jurisprudential and 
doctrinal infancy, and requires further development if it is to be sustainable.78  This is 
needed because some lower court judgments have shown a strong resistance to this 
emerging prong of the test built on the ‘free-floating’ value of good faith.79  The objection 
is predictable.  The extrinsic test erodes legal certainty.  The evaluation of extra-
contractual considerations is a problematic exercise, as it remains unknown which 
considerations should be measured and what weight those considerations should be 
afforded in deciding whether to nullify the expectations of contracting parties. 
Returning to the Barkhuizen judgment: in search of relevant constitutional values 
to inform the notion of public policy in respect to time bar clauses, the court proceeded to 
extrapolate from the constitutional right to have access to courts the constitutional value 
of access to courts.  This value was determined by the primary rationales served by the 
right: democratic and orderly societies require independent tribunals to ensure the fair and 
orderly resolution of disputes.  This prevents self-help, vigilantism and chaos.80 
To determine whether a contractual clause limiting access to courts is ‘inimical’ 
to the values enshrined in the Constitution, and therefore against public policy and 
unenforceable, the Barkhuizen court prescribed the following test to mediate the 
conflicting values of contractual autonomy and access to courts: though time limitations 
are permitted they must nevertheless provide an aggrieved party ‘an adequate and fair 
opportunity to seek judicial redress’.81  This test asks two questions; an affirmative 
answer to either will result in the time bar clause being unenforceable.  The first is 
whether the contractual clause itself is manifestly unreasonable (the intrinsic test).82  This 
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enquires into the terms of the contract and requires the court to balance competing 
constitutional values.  These values are, on the one hand, the need to ensure that 
contractual agreements that were freely and voluntarily undertaken are enforced, and, on 
the other, the need to ensure contracting parties have the opportunity to seek judicial 
redress.83  Time bar clauses that provide no or extremely short time periods would fail to 
meet this requirement.  If the clause itself is found to be reasonable, the second question 
is whether it is nevertheless ‘unfair and unreasonable’ to insist on compliance given all 
the circumstances of the case and having regard to the reasons for the failure to comply 
with the time bar clause (extrinsic test).84  Though the court does not provide much 
elaboration on this point, the court held that factors outside the control of the contracting 
party would be considered.85  The extreme example provided is that it would be 
unreasonable to expect a comatose person to meet a contractual undertaking.86 
On an assessment of the facts, the court found the 90 day time limit not to be 
manifestly unreasonable and further found no acceptable reason as to why proceedings 
were only instituted two years after the repudiation.  The application was accordingly 
dismissed.  The potential conflict between the constitutionally protected values of 
autonomy and access to courts steered the court away from prescribing fixed and concrete 
rules.  Once again, a flexible balancing process, namely that time bar clauses must 
provide an ‘adequate and fair opportunity for judicial redress’, was incorporated into 
private law.87 
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4 Different start points lead to a similar outcome 
A comparison of Khumalo and Barkhuizen shows that a similar outcome ensues 
regardless of whether a rights-based or value-based approach is applied.  In both 
judgments, the court rejects arguments that seek to interpret a particular constitutional 
right norm as enjoying preference over another.  Rather, in situations where a potential 
clash of constitutionally protected interests may occur, the court adopts within private law 
a balancing process that allows the specific facts and surrounding circumstances of the 
case to determine the prevailing interest.  The process adopted in Khumalo is of course 
somewhat different to the one in Barkhuizen, which is due to the adaptable characteristic 
of the balancing process as it moulds itself into the rules and principles of private law.  
Further, each new balancing process is adopted alongside a unique set of broad factors 
that are derived from the rights (or values) implicated in the conflict.  The balancing 
process therefore assumes a wide array of structures and labels.  Yet, despite any variance 
that may be observed on account of the different legal frameworks, these balancing 
processes are established to serve a similar function.  Through sections 8 and 39(2), the 
Constitution seeks to ensure that private individuals and entities do not wield their rights 
in a manner that unduly and without a justifiable explanation encroaches upon the 
constitutionally safeguarded interests of others.88 
To further illustrate the material similarity between the outcomes in the two 
judgments, one must probe whether the Barkhuizen court’s reliance on a distinction 
between private conduct and law is useful.  In contrast to Khumalo where private law was 
reviewed, the Barkhuizen court held that the issue for resolution was not whether the rule 
of contract law was lawful but whether the private conduct (which is performed in 
accordance with a rule of contract law) was lawful.  This characterisation is mistaken.  It 
is a well-recognised principle that private law permits conduct unless it is expressly 
prohibited.  Time bar clauses are permitted because the law of contract does not prohibit 
them.  For the same reasons that the direct application to conduct model is no different to 
the direct application to law model (as set out in chapter three), the court’s artificial 
distinction between private law and private conduct is indefensible.89  There is a vital 
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distinction between the constitutional review of public and private power.  Public power 
must be bestowed in accordance with a law that affords and delineates the power.90  An 
express source of law thus enables the exercise of public power.   A litigant aggrieved by 
the exercise of public power has two options.  The litigant can either challenge the 
absence of authority (i.e. there is no law that authorises the public conduct) or challenge 
the enabling authority as incompatible with the Constitution.  In some sense, the review 
of public power in South Africa is made easier because there is always an express 
empowering provision.  This benefit is not always available in private disputes as the 
exercise of private power is permitted because there is no express law that prohibits the 
action.  However, the lack of an express rule is still part of the law, and a legal system 
that requires the horizontal application of rights must recognise this feature.91  This point 
is reinforced by the manner in which the court developed the common law, which was to 
restrict certain types of private conduct under certain conditions.  The court carved away 
at the pacta sunt servanda principle (all agreements must be complied with), and created 
an exception to contractual autonomy which requires time bar clauses to provide a 
reasonable and fair opportunity for judicial redress.  This act of developing the common 
law is similar to that witnessed in Khumalo.  In other words, the judicial process of 
translating constitutional rights and values into the private common law is dependent 
neither on whether a different provision is used nor whether an express rule existed.  The 
application of sections 8 and 39(2) both lead to the same point: a rule of private law fails 
to meet a constitutional standard, and the same law-making judicial skillset will be relied 
upon to remedy the deficiency.  The point here is that the task of judicial law-making will 
invariably be contained by certain universal factors.  Courts tend to favour incremental 
adjustments over robust acts of law reform, and new developments in the law are nearly 
always formulated in a manner that enables future courts to adapt to specific disputes. 
The similarity between Khumalo and Barkhuizen leads to an important question, 
which has received extensive debate in South African literature: is there an appreciable 
difference between rights-based application and value-based application?  The discussion 
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so far suggests not, but to confirm this answer we must venture beyond our national 
borders in order to identify the initial reason why constitutional values emerged as a tool 
of legal reasoning.  Germany and Canada were amongst the first jurisdictions to 
incorporate the indirect horizontal application model into their constitutional orders, and 
the courts in these countries did so as a way to reconcile two competing interpretations.92   
On the one hand, these foreign constitutions entrenched rights primarily as a 
means to control and limit the actions of the state.  This intention is evidenced in the 
manner that rights were formulated, as well as the fact that both national constitutions 
ignore private actors in their application clause.93  In these countries, the rights-based 
application model would violate the express commands of their respective Constitutions.  
As the German Federal Constitutional Court explained in the seminal decision of Lüth, 
there is ‘no doubt that the main purpose of basic rights is to protect the individual’s 
sphere of freedom against the encroachment of public power’ and consequently the 
device for vindicating basic rights ‘lies only in respect of acts of public power.’94   
On the other hand, however, the German and Canadian supreme courts viewed 
the purpose of constitutional rights as more than just a code for limiting state actions.  
Casting the ambit of constitutional rights in wide terms, these courts interpreted the 
underlying justification of rights to encompass the security and advancement of human 
autonomy.95  And the fulfilment of this objective should not depend on whether the state 
is directly responsible for the encroachment upon the freedom.  As the Lüth court reasons 
when permitting horizontality despite not having express constitutional authority for 
doing so, the impact of the supreme law extends beyond the realm of public law as it also 
‘erects an objective system values’. 
This system of values, centring on the freedom of the human being to develop in 
society, must apply as a constitutional axiom throughout the whole legal system […].  It 
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naturally influences private law as well; no rule of private law may conflict with it, and 
all such rules must be construed in accordance with its spirit.96   
In sum, the initial reason the judicial debate between rights-based application 
(direct) and value-based application (indirect) arose was to determine whether or not 
constitutional right norms apply to private conduct and law.97  The introduction of value-
based application granted these foreign courts a constitutional basis to answer this 
question in the affirmative.  The debate was never about the scope of right norms, nor 
was it about the extent of their application. This is because constitutional values are 
derived from the underlying purpose served by constitutional provisions, and they 
therefore add nothing new to the process of legal reasoning given that all constitutional 
provisions are interpreted in accordance with the aim they seek to achieve.98  The 
conclusion that constitutional values equate to the underlying purpose of constitutional 
rights is reflected in the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court.  In 
Khumalo the court only employed the right to freedom of expression for purposes of 
‘hooking’ the dispute onto section 8(2).  Once this procedural threshold was met, the 
court switched to balancing the values of freedom of expression against human dignity.99  
The Khumalo court employed these values that underlie constitutional rights to determine 
what constitutes the public and legal convictions of the community so as to inform and 
crystallise the requirement of wrongfulness.  This method of legal reasoning is no 
different to the law-making process followed in Barkhuizen.  As discussed above, the 
Barkhuizen court merely determined the rationales for guaranteeing the right to access 
courts in a constitutional democracy (which would normally inform the scope of the 
right) and equated these rationales with constitutional values.  Constitutional values and 
rights will therefore mimic each other.  Whether expressed as a constitutional right or a 
constitutional value, these norms are constitutional principles that aim to be realised to 
the fullest possible extent. 
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This point can be amplified.  When courts adopt value-based approaches they 
tend to emphasise that these values are not free-floating ideas which are cherry-picked 
and tweaked to match the idiosyncratic views of each judges.  The South African 
Constitutional Court recognises the Constitution as encompassing an ‘objective normative 
value system’.  That term was copied from the writings of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court.  However, in response to criticisms that values invited moral and 
subjective decision-making, the German Constitutional Court replaced the phrase 
‘objective normative values’ with ‘objective dimensions’ of rights.  It did so to 
underscore the point that values-based reasoning is not constructed on individual values 
and moral readings but rather stem from the objective and discernable criteria that 
underpin the justifications and purpose of constitutional provisions.100 
The only defensible difference between these two judgments is that the court was 
unable to find a strong enough hook in Barkhuizen to peg the matter onto section 8(2).  A 
conceivable explanation is that the court’s assessment of the duties contemplated by the 
right to have access to courts is not of a nature to bind a non-state actor directly.  
However, as this chapter argues, this matters little.  Indeed, the conclusion that there is no 
difference between these theoretically distinct models is reinforced by the observation 
that the court has not only removed the terms of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ application from 
its vocabulary in recent years, but also discusses sections 8 and 39(2) together as a unified 
framework as opposed to separate and distinct streams of horizontality.101 
One must of course be conscious of the warning not to interpret constitutional 
provisions in way that makes another provision redundant.102  Sections 8(2) and 39(2) do 
start at different positions, and their respective applications may at times be triggered by 
different stimuli.   Perhaps, in the future, the courts may come to interpret the provisions 
to serve different purposes which no doubt will affect the scope of their respective 
applications on private law.  Scholars have engaged with the difference between these 
two sections, debating as to whether section 8 or section 39(2) is the start point, the 
different doctrinal justifications on which they are premised, and which of the two 
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BCLR 202 (CC); Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC); Governing Body 
of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). 
102 Khumalo (n 13) para 31. 
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provisions afford a wider scope of application.103   In fact, untangling sections 8 and 39(2) 
from one another has become the most dominant issue debated in the horizontal 
application literature.  So much of this debate has taken place in the nebulous clouds of 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ application that it has completely smothered analysis of what the 
courts are expected to accomplish with these provisions.  To the extent these provisions 
are doing the same thing, it must be underscored that that the horizontal application 
provisions in South African Constitution are products of an intense political compromise 
amongst the negotiating parties, which is an outcome that was significantly influenced by 
the inability to anticipate fully how rights would come to bind private individuals and 
entities.104  The drafting history of sections 8 and 39(2) is discussed in chapter two, but, to 
recapitulate, there is no evidence to conclude that the parties intended these two 
provisions to create distinct and parallel pathways.  There is little to gain in squabbling 
about their differences as it does not advance the debate.   
It is far more important to ensure that the reason for entrenching horizontality into 
the South African Constitution is realised.  The South African Constitution does not 
prescribe to a philosophy of negative liberties.  It recognises equality and the 
advancement of human dignity, and requires an array of affirmative measures so as to 
ensure that certain interests are not only protected from invasion but are also actively 
realised.  It is a belief that was held by some at the time of drafting the Constitution, 
which has since grown within the political culture of South Africa: private actors are just 
as capable of infringing constitutional rights and their actions must be controlled in order 
to realise the broader objectives of the South African Constitution.  Sections 8 and 39(2) 
both aim to give effect to this goal.  The South African courts, unlike their counterparts 
from around the world, do not need to engage in conceptual gymnastics to create 
doctrinal models that justify and explain the application of rights to private individuals 
and entities.  The South African Constitution has already done this heavy lifting as it 
affirms that applicable constitutional right norms apply to private law.  The only question 
is the extent of the application, which distils to how clashing right norms are resolved.  
The answer to this question is not found in distinctions between rights and values. 
                                                      
103  For examples of this debate, see François du Bois, ‘Contractual Obligation and the Journey from 
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5 The state’s duty to protect rights: section 7(2) of the Constitution 
There is an additional method through which constitutional rights impose obligations 
upon private individuals and entities: the duty upon the state to protect rights between 
private individuals and entities.  In South Africa, this argument is grounded in section 
7(2) of the Constitution.  The provision obliges the state to protect the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.105  In accordance with this duty, and where appropriate, the state is mandated with 
an affirmative obligation to take measures including the promulgation of legislation to 
ensure that personal interests protected by a constitutional right are not impaired by the 
actions of private individuals and entities.106  The scope of the duty to protect depends on 
the constitutional right implicated, but, as a general rule, the state violates a constitutional 
right whenever it fails to enact or enforce laws or other measures that are capable of 
providing adequate protection to the interests safeguarded by the right against the actions 
of private individuals and entities.107  Though this obligation resides on the legislature to 
promulgate laws, the court may remedy any failure of the state by amending legislative 
schemes.  The outcome of this judicial-law making task is a familiar one.  The court’s 
substitution for legislative action also takes on the form of the balancing process. 
The case of Jaftha v Schoeman108 
Though it was not argued as a section 7(2) case, the Jaftha judgment can be viewed 
through the prism of the duty to protect.  The matter investigated whether a statutory 
provision authorising a writ of execution against a person’s home in order to satisfy a 
private debt was unconstitutional for failing to comply with the right to have access to 
adequate housing as safeguarded by section 26(1) of the Constitution.  The challenged 
statutory provision mandated an administrative judicial clerk to issue a writ of execution 
for the immovable property of a judgment creditor in situations where the movable 
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property of the creditor proves insufficient to cover the debt.  The writ was issued 
automatically, without any discretion, and without any judicial oversight.  The concern 
with executing a writ against immovable property is the possibility that the loss of home 
ownership translates to the loss of a place to reside; a possibility that no doubt increases 
in likelihood where the creditor is unable to secure alternative housing due to financial 
constraints and the unavailability of state housing. 
The court interpreted the housing right broadly, and held that that ‘any measure 
which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing’ limits the 
right.109  The impugned debt-enforcement provision was found to be such a measure.  The 
court turned to section 36, and investigated whether the rights limitation analysis could 
save the legislative provision.  Here, the court found that the right to have access to a 
home was not the only interest deemed worthy of protection and must be weighed against 
countervailing interests.  On the other side of the equation lay a conflicting private and 
government interest, namely the need to ensure that commercial undertakings and other 
debts are enforced in an efficient manner.  Debt enforcement is one of the means through 
which the state ensures a market economy, and it further secures the financial interests of 
the judgment debtor.  The court ultimately found that although the debt-enforcement 
provision served a legitimate purpose, it was overbroad in its reach given that it permitted 
execution in situations where it would be considered highly disproportionate.  The 
provision was consequently declared unconstitutional. 
The court was invited to prohibit the enforcement of debts through writs of 
execution against homes if the debt was below a certain limit.  The court declined the 
invitation, citing the need to protect creditors and the illogical outcome that would flow if 
creditors were forever prevented from recovering debts from owners of these excluded 
properties.110  On account of the potential clash of interests, the court remedied the 
statutory provision on behalf of the legislature by ‘reading in’ a flexible and fact-
dependent balancing process in the statutory provision.  No longer may a clerk issue a 
writ of execution for immovable property.   To accommodate conflicting interests, only ‘a 
court, after consideration of all relevant circumstances, may order execution’ against 
immovable property. 111  The court prescribed the following non-exhaustive list that lower 
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courts must consider in the application of the process: the circumstances in which the 
debt was incurred; any attempts to pay off the debt; the relative financial situation of the 
parties; the amount of the debt; whether the debtor is employed or has other sources of 
income to pay the debt; and any other factor relevant to the particular facts of the case.112   
 
6 Reasons for adopting the flexible balancing process 
Three core reasons explain the attraction to the balancing process.  The first one is 
principled, the second is pragmatic, and the last is one of constitutional efficacy. 
6.1 Conflicting principles require balancing 
Judicial balancing is a necessary component of constitutional rights adjudication because 
no feasible alternatives are available.  Robert Alexy convincingly argues that balancing is 
an unavoidable constitutional process because there is simply ‘no other rational way’ to 
justify the limitations of rights even though the balancing process leads to many other 
problems.113  Alternative options, he suggests, will produce the undesirable result of 
creating absolute rights from which no derogation is permitted.  This reason is 
identifiable in the Constitutional Court’s case law.  As Khumalo, Barkhuizen and Jaftha 
demonstrate, constitutional rights are rarely characterised as absolute guarantees and 
courts tend to avoid establishing hierarchies of rights that permit one right to trump 
another.  In the abstract, rights have equal normative force.114  It is only through the 
balancing of conflicting rights in accordance with the specific facts and circumstances of 
                                                                                                                                                            
degree of patience should be reasonably expected’ of a private landowner to provide the state with 
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113 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP 2002) 74; Robert Alexy, 
‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 ICON 572, 573. 
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the case that the court is able to ensure that interests protected by conflicting rights are 
afforded adequate protection. 
Another undesirable result may ensue if judicial balancing is not undertaken.  
Instead of providing an elevated status to one right in the abstract, the alternative option is 
to adopt a minimalistic approach to the protection of constitutional rights.  This approach 
will undermine the very purpose of entrenching a justiciable human rights framework.  In 
the context of the vertical application of rights, the legislature will enjoy an unmonitored 
power to pick the constitutional interest to favour at the expense of other interests if the 
courts opt not to undertake an evaluation of competing interests.115  This potential 
shortfall is also applicable to horizontal application matters.  The judiciary is responsible 
for the development of the common law.  If the court neither balances nor provides a right 
with an elevated status, the result will merely be that private law remains unchanged 
(with the tacit approval of the legislature) even though its current application unduly 
encroaches upon an interest protected by a constitutional right. 
Ultimately, the choice is not whether or not to prescribe a balancing test.  It is 
rather what type of balancing exercise to conduct.  The three decisions discussed above 
are examples of, what we can call, process-based balancing.  Instead of creating fixed 
rules applicable to all scenarios falling within a defined ambit, we rather let the 
complexities and nuances of the case influence the outcome.   
In contrast to process-based balancing, we can identify outcome-based 
balancing.116  This type of balancing exercise creates rigid rules that yield certain results.  
New York Times v Sullivan is an example of outcome-based balancing.  Ignoring the 
particulars of individual cases, the United States’ Supreme Court interpreted their 
Constitution to require freedom of speech to (nearly) always trump the reputational 
interests of public officials.117  This is also a form of balancing based on the rules of 
interpretation and policy concerns of that society (i.e. political speech must be robust to 
ensure a vibrant democracy, and the personal interests of public officials must always 
give way to achieve this aim).  We should be cautious before suggesting that outcome-
based balancing is problem-free, as balancing in the abstract can lead to arbitrary and 
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unpredictable decision-making.  At times there can be strong disagreement and 
uncertainty on how to weigh interests in the abstract.  The decision of Sullivan remains 
instructive here.  Scholars continue to debate to this day whether the balance struck by the 
US Supreme Court was correct.  Some argue that the media ought to have been given 
absolute protection, and others hold that the reputation of public officials who are 
attacked with false statements deserve stronger legal protection.118  Outcome-based 
balancing may produce more certain results, but the decision-making process of how to 
weigh interests in the abstract is open to criticism.  It is impossible to predict all future 
scenarios, and the mechanisms employed to weigh competing rights in the abstract are at 
times both contested and opaque.  Since Sullivan, the Supreme Court has struggled to 
define who actually constitutes a public figure.119  The ambiguity in their definition is 
attributable to the fact that the court remains unable to strike a clear balance between the 
right to free speech and a state’s interest in protecting reputation.120  Another aspect of the 
seemingly fixed Sullivan test introduces judicial discretion, and, as a result, some 
uncertainty.  The decision solidified the ‘actual malice’ standard in US defamation law.  
In doing so, the US Supreme Court pivoted the focus of public-figure defamation suits 
away from the more objective criteria of asserting whether the statement is true or false to 
a more subjective enquiry into the degree of negligence displayed by the publisher at the 
time of publishing.121  This negligence-based enquiry echoes Khumalo (the focus is on the 
intentions and actions of the media defendant, although the United States adopts a 
considerably higher threshold).  To recall Khumalo, liability will not flow if upon 
consideration of all the circumstances it was ‘reasonable to publish the facts in the 
particular way and at the particular time.’ 
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6.2 A pragmatic approach 
The contextual balancing of rights allows for a flexible, reflective, and gradual process 
through which constitutional rights and their underlying values influence the development 
of private law.  The horizontal application is a new and underdeveloped area of 
constitutional law, and the exact scope of application can be determined neither in the 
abstract nor from previous experiences alone.122  The virtue of endorsing the contextual 
balancing process as the primary means to resolve constitutional conflicts allows courts to 
refrain from prescribing fixed and untested rules for a complex and ever-changing 
society.  Rather, constitutional courts need only concern themselves with the specific 
matter at hand.  In essence, balancing tests permit courts considerable leeway to adjust its 
jurisprudence when a future dispute warrants a different outcome.  It must be added here 
that judges are often forced to adopt flexible procedures because, unlike the legislature, 
they cannot prescribe arbitrary distinctions for purposes of convenience and practicality.  
In Barkhuizen, for instance, the court was not prepared to propose an exact time period 
for a time bar clause in insurance contracts despite the fact that it is not uncommon for the 
legislature to set fixed prescription periods. 
This characteristic of the balancing process is subject to extensive criticism.  It is 
argued that a flexible and contextual ‘case by case’ decision-making process creates too 
much uncertainty in the law.  Jurists may easily agree on the need to protect constitutional 
rights and values, but may come to disagree on which interest to sacrifice when presented 
with a particular case.  The volume of dissenting opinions witnessed in South African 
constitutional rights adjudication stands testament to the fact that reaching consensus on 
the outcome of the balancing process is difficult and not always possible.123  An 
additional drawback to the ‘fact-sensitive and contextual manner’124 approach is that it 
does not easily allow for the crystallisation of rules.  Commentators may at times be left 
unsure of how a future case will be decided.  Judges investigating the same set of facts 
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will most certainly differ on what constitutes the exact parameters of a ‘reasonable 
publication’ or a ‘fair and adequate opportunity to seek judicial redress’.125  This concern 
stems from the principle of legality, which is a central component of the rule of law.126  
Rules must be sufficiently clear, and individuals must be able to predict results.127  The 
need for legal consistency pulls towards fixed rules. 
The concern over the certainty and efficiency of law is a fair one, but we should 
not take this critique too far.  The balancing process does not rip up existing law, and 
claims that the process is an amorphous exercise free from structure are exaggerated.  As 
the cases discussed highlight, the process is undertaken within an established and detailed 
legal framework.  In addition to the broad factors prescribed, the balancing process gains 
structure and a degree of predictable application from the law into which it is 
incorporated.  The process benefits from procedural rules such as evidence and onus of 
proof, as well as the more substantive rules and principles of private law that surround 
and inform the decision-making process.  Plus, the application of general principles to 
individual disputes leads over time to the crystallisation of rules.  As Robert Alexy 
highlights, the judicial practice of identifying the conditions under which one 
constitutional principle takes precedence over another is the law-making process through 
which rules are eventually crystallised.128  In the interim, and while these rules are still 
forming, we must not forget that adjudicative techniques that result in a divergence of 
opinions have never been an innate problem in that a degree of flexibility is not 
considered destructive to the rule of law.  Flexible and context-specific reasoning is seen 
across all fields of law.  They are in both the common law and legislation.  It is clear from 
the court’s jurisprudence — as well as legislative policy, which is discussed in Part C of 
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the thesis — that whatever may be lost from not setting strictly defined legal duties for 
purposes of securing legal certainty is set off against the benefits that are gained from 
adopting flexible balancing processes to resolve constitutional conflicts.  
Moreover, the task of balancing is not a new judicial function.  It fits neatly 
within the tradition of the South African common law.  Our earliest law reports document 
that the courts have always employed differing sorts of context-specific balancing 
exercises to develop the law.129  New causes of actions or defences within the common 
law are usually introduced in a manner that rejects fixed rules, showing rather a strong 
preference for open-textured rules that allow future cases to test and gradually craft the 
parameters of new common law rules.  A pertinent example of this occurrence was the 
introduction of the public policy test in contract law (which happened prior to the 
enactment of the Constitution).130  Furthermore, the ‘reasonable publication’ defence 
developed from within the common law of defamation and was only later certified as 
compliant with the Constitution.131 
Two prominent examples from the law of delict further illustrate this point.  In 
Minister van Polisie v Ewels, the Appellate Division settled a longstanding dispute when 
it held that liability could indeed flow from a failure to act.132  The apex court declined to 
prescribe a general rule as to when liability would result, merely stating that the ‘legal 
convictions of the community’ must inform whether a particular omission given the facts 
of the specific case is considered as wrongful.  At the time of the judgment, the ruling 
was criticised in certain quarters for introducing much uncertainty and ‘palm-tree justice’ 
into the law.133  Today, however, the Ewels precedent is a firmly established principle, 
and the criticisms levelled against the decision proved largely exaggerated.  Also, in 
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Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika, the Appellate Division recognised a claim 
for pure economic loss caused by false statements negligently made.134  However, to 
prevent limitless liability, the court held that liability would not arise if the defendant 
exercised ‘reasonable care’ in determining the correctness of the statement.135  That 
enquiry depends on the particular circumstances of each case.  Each of the decisions left 
it to future disputes to refine the scope of application.  The position of the courts has 
therefore always been that ‘our law is flexible enough to adapt to the needs of the 
times’.136  Judge Michael Corbett sums up this position.  The future Chief Justice wrote 
with his academic pen: 
In the last resort the judge will often be required to perform a balancing act between 
two competing values, each in itself a worthy and desirable one.  It may be freedom of 
the press versus the right of the individual not to be defamed; or the sanctity of a 
contract versus the reluctance to uphold a contract which offends against public 
policy; or the free enterprise system versus the need to restrain dishonest or unfair 
competition […].  And the balance which is struck must accord with society’s notions 
of what justice demands.  It is a fascinating but daunting task; and one which the 
courts are often called upon to perform.  And it is a process to which our Roman-
Dutch common law, based as it is on broad principle, lends itself particularly well.137     
6.3 Promotes a core constitutional objective 
Context-dependent balancing is an attractive framework because it has the propensity to 
promote accountability in decision-making.  In vertical application matters, the balancing 
exercise requires the state to provide sound justification that is based on evidence and free 
from unnecessary political rhetoric on the importance of why a social project should be 
favoured above a constitutional right.138  On this view of the balancing exercise, we do 
not prize balancing because it contains a mathematical formula to resolve conflict 
between rights.139  Rather, the virtue of balancing is that it serves as an effective 
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instrument to realise an important constitutional objective: the achievement of a ‘culture 
of justification’.140  The legality of government decision-making is based not only on the 
observance of procedural requirements but is also contingent on the quality of the reasons 
provided for those decisions.141  This rationale for the balancing process resonates in the 
court’s horizontality jurisprudence.  The exercise of private power must similarly be 
interrogated and justified whenever it infringes upon a constitutionally protected interest.  
For example, the ‘reasonable publication’ defence requires a media defendant to justify 
on the specific facts of the case as to why legal liability ought not to ensue from their 
actions despite the media’s decision to encroach on another’s dignity or privacy right.  
The law of contract, with its increasing focus on good faith, may also, and at least in 
some instances, require contracting parties to justify their actions and motives before a 
court permits contractual performance that encroaches upon an interest protected by a 
constitutional right. 
The need to justify the exercise of private power does however reveal a 
deficiency in the jurisprudence.  Chapter three demonstrated that constitutional law has 
been considerably more successful in translating the principle of public accountability 
into a workable framework.  The section 36 rights-limitation analysis is structured to 
facilitate the judicial evaluation of state actions and motives.  The law has yet to develop 
a comparable framework for horizontal application disputes, which is partly a symptom 
of a much larger problem.  Jürgen Habermas cautions that the judicial balancing of 
competing interests will in all likelihood take place ‘unreflectively’ and ‘according to the 
customary standards and hierarchies of society’.142  The fact that balancing takes places in 
line with certain established standards is of course not an innate problem because all 
societies must be premised on certain organising norms.  However, this potentially 
conservative effect of balancing is troublesome when it is used in a country, like South 
Africa, seeking to undergo a constitutional revolution that requires a reassessment of the 
underlying principles and structures of private law derived from the pre-revolution era.143  
There is a strong argument that this risk has materialised in the context of the South 
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Africa private law.144  Scholars have argued that there are instances where courts have 
merely conducted the balancing exercise in terms of the more traditional standards and 
hierarchies inherited from the Roman-Dutch common law, which is largely premised on 
classical liberal notions of autonomy and not pursuant to the more socially egalitarian 
mandate of the South African Constitution.145  In sum, the fact that we have yet to 
develop a more structured balancing analysis in horizontal application disputes is due to 
the fact that the jurisprudence remains somewhat ambiguous and scattered on the core 
reason for horizontality.  The next chapter explains how the core purpose of the 
horizontal application of rights — which is the control of private power — begins the 
process of adding more structure and predictability to the balancing process. 
 
 
                                                      
144 See Spitz (n 104) 268–85. 
145 See Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights (Juta 2010) 372–74; Michael Dafel, ‘Curbing the 
Constitutional Development of the Contract Law (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 271; Frank 
Michelman, ‘Constitutions and the Public/Private Divide’ in Michael Rosenfeld and András Sajó, 









CONTROLLING PRIVATE POWER 
 
This chapter explains how the ‘balancing process’ facilitates the core 
objective of horizontality, which is to control the exercise of private power. 
 
1 Two characteristics of right norms 
Constitutional right norms must assume two characteristics to make the judicial balancing 
process functional.  
 The scope of right norms must be inflated.  It is a trite principle of our 
constitutional democracy that all subordinate sources of law must comply with the 
Constitution.1  This includes private law.2  The Constitution does not merely flow through 
the vessels of private law, developing only to the extent that the internal logic and rules of 
private law can absorb constitutional right norms.  Subordinate private law cannot 
constrain the full application of the Constitution.  The preferred view is that of the 
Constitution imposing an external pressure on private law.  The Constitution remoulds 
private law so as to allow constitutional right norms to flow through it.   
But this feature introduces a potential problem.  As explained in chapter three, 
unlike the legislature, courts cannot select their own policy objectives to champion in 
                                                      
1 Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
2 Botha v Rich 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para 24; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 15; 
Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) paras 46, 148; Alexkor v Richtersveld 
Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para 51. 
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horizontal application disputes. 3   The courts must instead identify a legal justification 
grounded in the Constitution for limiting one right norm to safeguard another.  And, to 
this end, it would seem that the only viable solution is to inflate the scope of rights in 
order to ensure that all possible legal interests protected in private law are also afforded 
constitutional protection (even if it is only a minimal amount of protection).4  If this were 
not the case, parts of private law would be nullified automatically if it were to clash with 
a protected constitutional right.  Consider the Khumalo judgment.5  If freedom of 
expression was constitutionally protected and human dignity was not, the courts would 
have no choice but to favour the interests of the media in all disputes.  It bears noting that 
the pressing need to inflate the scope of rights offers an explanation as to why 
constitutional values are popular tools of legal reasoning in horizontal application 
adjudication.  Values allow courts to protect all those interests that are not expressly or 
adequately protected within the often-stricter boundaries of constitutional rights.6  In the 
law of contract, for example, the courts often cite contractual autonomy and legal 
certainty as principles that are embedded or derived from the Constitution.  This is despite 
the fact that there are no constitutional provisions that expressly articulate these 
principles.  
The inflation of right norms may solve one problem, but it amplifies another.  
Rights inflation drastically increases the number of legal interests that may clash, which, 
in turn, intensifies the need to locate an organising legal justification for determining 
when to a limit one right norm in order to secure another.  The second characteristic 
begins solving this problem. 
 Right norms must be viewed as internally conflicting.  The orthodox view of 
constitutional rights is premised on a relationship of imbalance. All private individuals 
and entities are afforded rights in order to protect certain fundamental interests against the 
                                                      
3 Chap 3, sec 2. 
4  See Ramakatsa v Magashule 2013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC) para 70. 
5 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
6  Another possible reason for rights-inflation is that concerns over the separation of powers do not 
feature prominently in horizontal application disputes.  For example, see Alison Young, ‘Human 
Rights, Horizontality and the Public/Private Divide’ (2009) 2 UCL Human Rights Review 159, 179–
84.  The author notes that under English law the courts have applied human rights more expansively 
in private law (as compared to when courts review legislation) partly due to the perception that 
courts do not infringing upon Parliament’s law-making territory in horizontal disputes.  
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otherwise coercive power of the state.  In this vertical relationship of power, the state is 
always the duty-bearer and private individuals and entities are always the right-recipients. 
Horizontal application forces right norms to operate somewhat differently.  We 
are now dealing with two right holders.  And at least one of the right holders — and 
sometimes both — invokes their constitutional right in order to exercise a power over 
another.  In Barkhuizen, for example, the court effectively held that the two transacting 
parties were entitled to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed freedom to contract, 
and, in doing so, were permitted to negotiate corresponding rights and duties over one 
another.  Constitutional rights norms therefore safeguard the exercise of private power.  
But that causes a tension: these constitutionally protected private powers may lead to a 
situation where private individuals and entities unduly encroach upon the rights of others.  
This is what happened in Barkhuizen.  The freedom to contract led to the curtailment of 
another constitutional right norm.  Constitutional right norms must therefore be viewed as 
internally conflicting in horizontal application disputes.  On the one hand, rights norms 
aim to secure an individual freedom (from state and non-state actors).  On the other hand, 
however, right norms need to be applied in a manner that ensures that the legal powers 
that derive from a constitutionally guaranteed freedom is not exercised in a manner that 
unduly infringes on another’s right. 
In other words, constitutional right norms come into conflict whenever one norm 
is interpreted to afford the right holder a legal power, which, in the exercise thereof, 
results in the impairment of another’s constitutional right.  The purpose of applying 
constitutional right norms to private legal relationships is therefore to impose limits on an 
otherwise constitutionally protected power so as to ensure such private power is not 
exercised in a manner that unduly and without adequate justification encroaches upon the 
rights of another.  The control of private power — which is sourced in and protected by 
the Constitution — is therefore the primary legal justification for limiting constitutional 
rights in private litigation.  Therefore, in addition to balancing rights against one another, 
the judicial balancing process must also balance the internal conflict within right norms 
(the need to protect a freedom v the need ensure that the exercise of that freedom does not 
unduly limit another’s right).  This chapter explains how this task is performed.   
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2 A bad metaphor 
It is well rehearsed elsewhere that the image of constitutional rights applying horizontally 
is a metaphor that was initially introduced as a means to differentiate the application of 
constitutional rights between non-state actors from the more orthodox ‘vertical’ 
application of rights between state and individual.7  The metaphor is a bad one.  The 
image fails to explain the case law correctly.  More problematically, the metaphor risks 
obfuscating and perhaps even crippling the primary purpose of a human rights framework 
that requires private individuals and entities to be bound by applicable constitutional 
rights. 
The entrenchment of human rights into national constitutions originally emerged 
from political philosophy as a means to provide legal protection for certain individual 
interests against the otherwise coercive power of the state.  Literature labelled this the 
vertical application of rights on account of the inherent nature of the legal relationship 
between the state and its populace.  The state exercises an unequal and asymmetrical level 
of power and control over all private individuals and entities that fall under its command.  
This subordinate relationship premised on authority permits the state to command both 
the allocation of resources in society and the behaviour of individuals.  In contrast to this 
vertical relationship of power, theory on the horizontal application of rights seeks to 
explain the method through which constitutional rights and values are interpreted to 
create obligations for private individuals and entities.  In the event of any doubt, let it be 
reiterated that this legal phenomenon is dubbed ‘horizontal’ because it denotes the 
supposed equal footing in the nature of the legal relationship between all private 
individuals and entities.  
The notion that private individuals and entities enjoy parity of power among 
themselves stems from the foundational principles of private law which all too often 
assumes that all non-state actors have the ability to interact and trade as equals.8  It is 
often thought that there are no intrinsically coercive power structures in the realm of 
                                                      
7 The origin of the term ‘horizontal application’ is traced to German legal theory.  In the seminal 
decision of Lüth (1958) 7 BVerfGE 198, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany developed 
the notion of ‘mittelbare drittwirkung’ (indirect third party effect) to distinguish an earlier Federal 
Labour Court decision that permitted ‘unmittelbare Drittwirkung’ (direct third party effect) of 
certain rights in the Basic Law.  On the unfortunate use of the horizontality metaphor in South 
Africa, see Johan Froneman, ‘The Horizontal Application of Human Rights Norms’ (2007) 1 
Speculum Juris 13, 13. 
8 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Socio-Economic Rights Beyond the Public-Private Law Divide’ in Malcolm 
Langford and others (eds), Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (CUP 2014) 63, 64. 
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private law; a private individual or entity has neither the power to coerce others to 
reallocate their resources nor the power to direct the behaviour of others.  Any form of 
economic coercion is created and permitted on account of voluntary choice (law of 
contract), wrongful conduct (law of delict), familial relations (law of family), or the 
receipt of an undue benefit (law of unjustified enrichment).  Private power in the legal 
sense — more commonly termed legal capacity — is not equated to economic or political 
power.9  This view should of course not be exaggerated.  Private law recognises that 
certain power dynamics in private relationships as unequal, and, in response, the law 
developed principles aimed at ensuring that the exercise of that power does not unjustly 
undermine legitimate private interests.10  Yet, the fact remains that we tend to view public 
law as a vertical relationship of unequal power and private law as a horizontal 
relationship of equal power.11 
The exact relationship between these two definitions of private power — that is, 
legal capacity and economic/political power — is debatable.  Some argue that the neutral 
rules of the common law are completely indifferent to the economic and political power 
wielded by private individuals and entities.12  Others suggest that there is an assumption 
that these powers are the same, or, at least, are at an acceptable level of equilibrium.13  
Another school of thought submits that the neutral private law actively promotes the 
creation of hierarchies in society.14  Proponents of this view argue that the purpose of 
public law is to ensure that citizens are treated with parity (e.g. the right to vote).  The 
purpose of private law, on the other hand, is not to create equality.  To facilitate the 
progression of both society and individual development, the rules of the common law 
create neutral rules to allow people to position themselves within a society based on their 
own efforts, convictions, talents, and, yes, luck.  Any society, so the argument proceeds, 
must be premised on certain economic and political hierarchies to facilitate economic 
development and even public debate. 
                                                      
9 Public power is usually called authority.  
10 Froneman (n 7) 19–20. 
11 See François du Bois, ‘Private Law in the Age of Rights’ in Elspeth Reid and Daniel Visser (eds), 
Private Law and Human Rights (Edinburgh University Press 2013) 12, 14. 
12 See Gramme Orr, ‘Private Association and Public Brand’ (2014) 17 Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy at 332, 337 
13 See Dikgang Moseneke, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2009) 20 SLR 3, 9–11. 
14 See Johan van der Walt, The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty (De 
Gruyter 2014) 6–7. 
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Social theory — and, of course, everyday reality — proves this legal fiction of 
equal power to be a fallacy.  Definitions on what precisely constitutes ‘power’ are 
numerous and remain contested across the fields of the social sciences.15  There is no 
need to resolve this on-going debate for our purposes.  But to establish a working 
definition, we can take comfort in the observation that the mainstream social theories on 
power converge on the notion that power is exercised by an entity whenever it enjoys the 
ability to control limited resources, and, as a consequence, the actions of another despite 
resistance in order to attain an intended result.16  Expressed in a more concise manner, 
power is the ability to exclude another against their choice from valued resources.  We 
can tailor this definition for the purpose of applying it to constitutional rights.  Power is 
exercised by an entity — whether state or otherwise — when it has the ability to control, 
and as a consequence limit, another’s access to a constitutionally protected resource. 
The application of this definition of power reveals that private individuals and 
entities often do not enjoy parity of power in their relationship.  Our social, commercial, 
and political interaction with others is predicated on hierarchical structures, which, in 
effect, permit certain private individuals and entities the power to exercise varying 
degrees of political or economic coercion over others.  Consider an example of a bank 
issuing a home loan to an indigent individual.  The bank exercises significant economic 
power over the individual given that the bank controls access to a basic resource.  The 
bank enjoys an unrestricted election on whether or not to grant the loan given that the 
proceeds derived from the loan agreement will in all likelihood result in a negligible 
increase in profits.  The indigent individual on the other hand has no similar option not to 
transact if he wishes to secure a basic human resource.  Also, if the loan is granted, the 
bank continues to exercise considerable control over the individual’s access to housing in 
the event of default.  This is not to say that structural hierarchies in society are 
automatically unjust and should not be permitted.  It is merely to demonstrate that many 
                                                      
15 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Macmillan 1974) 7.  For an overview of the various 
definitions of ‘power’ in social theory, see Mark Philp, ‘Power’ in Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper 
(eds), The Social Science Encyclopaedia (3rd ed Routledge 2004) 788–94. 
16 See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (AM Henderson and T Parsons 
tr. 1947) 152 (‘power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the probability 
rests’, it is therefore the ability to control resources and people); Robert Dahl, ‘The Concept of 
Power’ (1957) 2:3 Behavioural Science 201, 202–03 (‘A has power over B to the extent that he can 
get B to do something he would not otherwise do’); Richard Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence 
Relations’ (1961) 27:1 American Sociological Review 31, 32 (‘power resides implicitly in the 
other’s dependency’, which means that the extent to which one person exercises power over another 
is dependent on the availability of alternative means to obtain a result).    
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private relationships are defined by a disparity in power relations, and that power 
imbalances can affect access to constitutionally protected resources.  The media controls 
access to information, and employers control access to labour conditions. 
It is for this reason that the horizontality metaphor is deceptive.  Parity of power 
is a legal construct of private law.  Of course, the fiction provides benefits including most 
notably the universal application of non-ambiguous and uniform rules.  It allows the law 
to be clear, and the consequences of private actions to be certain.  Yet an honest 
assessment of social relations reveals that the legal fiction of parity of power rarely 
corresponds to reality.  In fact, as the next section shows, certain forms of power 
exercised in society by non-state entities are more akin to the ‘vertical’ power exercised 
by the state than what can be classified as ‘horizontal’ in nature.  That is, private actors 
enjoy control over a constitutionally protected interest in a manner that prohibits the right 
holder from interacting on equal terms.  This is then what this thesis reads to be the 
defining principle that guides the balancing process in horizontality disputes: the need to 
control unequal power relationships to ensure that those who wield political or economic 
power in society do not encroach without due justification upon access to constitutionally 
protected resources.17  To the extent that horizontality implies parity of power, we risk not 
recognising and implementing the purpose of entrenching a justiciable Bill of Rights that 
requires certain private individuals and entities to be burdened with constitutional 
obligations. 
   
3 The power continuum 
This section revisits the three Constitutional Court judgments analysed in the previous 
chapter.  A deeper analysis shows that the judicial balancing process is performed 
pursuant to two main metrics (which correspond to the internal conflict within right 
norms).18  The first metric is the extent of the possible infringement upon another’s right.  
The more the exercise of that power impacts the core of a constitutional right norm, the 
                                                      
17 See generally Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2012) 82 (the purpose 
of horizontal application and protective state duties is to ensure that individuals retain control over 
their actions and personal resources). 
18 See Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) para 58 
(there are two main considerations to determine whether a particular right binds a private individual 
or entity: the ‘intensity’ of the constitutional right and the ‘potential invasion’ of the right by a 
private individual or entity).  
–128– 
more there is a need to control the exercise of that power. The second metric is the 
amount of control a private individual or entity exercises over another’s constitutionally 
protected resource.  The more power that is wielded, the more there is a need to control 
the exercise of that power. 
3.1 Economic parity: Barkhuizen  
The best starting point is where the private law assumption of general economic parity is 
observed.  The case of Barkhuizen is instructive here.  Recall that in this matter the court 
held that a time bar clause is only constitutional if it permits a contracting party a ‘fair 
and adequate’ opportunity to approach a court for relief. 
In conducting the balancing process, the majority judgment highlighted two 
important features that must be considered.  The first is the relative bargaining power of 
the contracting parties (metric two).19  The need to control unequal positions of power in 
the law of contract, the court emphasised, is due to the reality of the social landscape of 
South Africa where many individuals are poor, illiterate and are generally uninformed of 
their legal rights.20  The court went as far as to note that ‘many people in this country 
conclude contracts without any bargaining power and without any understanding what 
they are agreeing to.’21 
The second major consideration is the degree of encroachment into the 
constitutionally protected resource (metric one).  The court held that any contractual 
provision that either outright denies access to a court for relief or any time bar clause that 
prescribes too short of a time period that prevents access to a court would be against 
public policy and therefore unenforceable.22  For clauses falling outside this category of 
complete restriction, the court’s reasoning suggests that the degree to which access to the 
resource is limited must be considered.  Factors that must be assessed include the 
prescribed time period, whether the contracting party against whom the time bar clause 
operates was aware of the contractual provision, and whether the information needed to 
                                                      
19 Barkhuizen (n 2) para 59. 
20 ibid para 64. 
21 ibid para 65. 
22 ibid paras 34, 54.  
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institute a legal claim falls within the knowledge of the contracting party.23  It is therefore 
a matter of degree.  On the facts of the case, the Barkhuizen majority found that the 
parties enjoyed a sufficient level of economic parity, and that the restriction to access a 
constitutionally protected resource was not of a sufficient degree to invalidate the 
exercise of contractual autonomy.24 
Barkhuizen was not a unanimous decision.  Sachs J, with whom two judges 
concurred, held that the 90 day time period violated public policy.  Taking judicial notice 
of the operation of the insurance industry, the judge held that the nature of the 
relationship between an insurer and insured is one of economic disparity given that 
insurance companies enjoy significant economic domination in society as they ‘play an 
important part in public life’.25 
Insurance for car users is not a luxury but part and parcel of every-day life, a virtual 
necessity for many vehicle owners.  The insurance industry deals with members of the 
public who come off the streets and place their faith in the solvency, efficiency, 
probity and integrity of the insurers. […] Its public service character is reflected in 
self-regulation as an industry, and the appointment of an Ombudsman.  Insurance thus 
has become a necessity for large sections of our society, it is not a personal 
indulgence.  […] The public interest in promoting fair dealing in insurance contracts 
so as to protect the relatively vulnerable individuals contracting with large, specialists 
business firms, is accordingly strong.26  
Sachs J made this statement in the context of standard form contracts (which contained 
the impugned time bar clause).  The potential shortfall with these types of contracts, the 
judge held, is that ‘far from promoting autonomy, they induce automatism’ as they are 
based solely on the will of the supplier of the service.27  The solution is not however to 
prohibit time bar clauses.  They serve legitimate aims such as the reduction of transaction 
costs.  Rather, standard form contracts issued by an economically dominant private entity 
providing a service that is of a public nature ‘should appropriately be regulated to ensure 
                                                      
23 ibid para 66. 
24 For a similar analysis and result, see Gbenga-Oluwatoye v Reckitt Benkiser 2016 (12) BCLR (CC) 
paras 21–25 (the court refused to invalidate an agreement that limited access to a court because the 
parties had ‘approximate equality of bargaining power’ and the agreement had worked for the 
benefit of the party seeking to invalidate it). 
25 Barkhuizen (n 19) para 146.  
26 ibid para 144. 
27 ibid para 155. 
–130– 
standards of fairness in an open and democratic society’.28  This regulation is found in a 
judicial determination as to whether the contractual— 
provision at issue and the extent to which, in the context of the contract as a whole, it 
vitiates standards of reasonable and fair dealing that the legal convictions of the 
community would regard as intrinsic to the appropriate business firm/consumer 
relationships in contemporary society.29  
The minority judgment found the time bar clause to be an unreasonable and unfair 
dealing for an array of reasons.  These include that the clause: wholly favoured an 
economically dominant insurer without providing the insured with a directly 
corresponding benefit; prescribed a time period that was less than ten per cent of the 
prescription period usually allowed for contractual claims; allowed the insurer to keep the 
premium already paid while erasing the claim; and was accomplished with no obligation 
on the insurer to inform the insured party of the time bar clause at the time of 
repudiation.30   In essence, the concern of the dissenting judge can be summarised as 
follows: the impugned time bar clause formed part of a standard form contract that was 
written for the main benefit of an economically powerful institution that not only 
restricted access to a constitutionally protected resource to a severe extent but also 
restricted access to a necessary public good (motor vehicle insurance). 
Its bears highlighting that the disagreement between the majority and minority is 
due primarily to an evaluation of the facts and not the law.  In fact, the majority judgment 
concluded by noting that many of the concerns regarding power imbalances raised by the 
minority are valid legal considerations.  Their conclusions diverged because the majority 
believed that the admitted evidence did not permit the court to invalidate the contract.31 
3.2  Economic power over a core freedom interests: Jaftha 
From an example of general economic parity we move to the Jaftha decision where the 
court recognised a relationship of unequal economic power in relation to the access of a 
constitutionally protected resource.  As detailed in the previous chapter, the court 
remedied an unconstitutional statutory provision by prescribing a balancing process that 
                                                      
28 ibid para 146. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid para 183. 
31 ibid paras 87–88.  
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requires courts to assess all relevant circumstances before permitting a home to be sold in 
execution.  The court noted that the task of balancing aims to ensure that a home is not 
sold for a debt in instances where it would be considered ‘grossly disproportionate’ to do 
so.32  This, the court stated, ‘would be so if the interests of the judgment creditor in 
obtaining payment are significantly less than the interests of the judgment debtor in 
security of tenure in his or her home, particularly if the sale of the home is likely to render 
the judgment debtor and his or her family completely homeless’.33  The judgment 
therefore suggests that an affluent creditor will not be able to secure the execution of a 
home for purposes of satisfying a trifling debt in instances where the debtor would be 
rendered homeless. 
 Though the court does not prescribe an exhaustive list of factors that must be 
taken into account during the enquiry, there are two notable factors that are discernable 
from the court’s reasoning.  Reflecting the court’s general approach, the economic power 
exercised over an individual in relation to a constitutionally protected resource (metric 
two) as well as the degree to which the exercise of that power limits the resource are 
salient features (metric one). 
There is ample experience to suggest that debt enforcement procedures without 
adequate safeguards lead to dire consequences for the weaker party, and the facts of the 
Jaftha case are apposite to illustrate this point.  The two homeowners each had their 
homes sold in accordance with the challenged debt enforcement provision for failing to 
repay a measly loan amount of no more than R250 (£14) plus interests and costs to a 
financially secure creditor.  To highlight the plight of the homeowners, it should be 
mentioned that both women were unemployed and had acquired title over their homes 
with the assistance of a state-subsidised housing programme.  They were therefore 
precluded from receiving a similar housing benefit in the future.  Thus, there is a need to 
ensure that adequate protection is afforded to the most vulnerable in society in respect to 
the enjoyment of their home.  Mokgoro J, writing for a unanimous court, noted the 
following.   
I emphasise that the underlying problem raised by the facts of the case is not greed, 
wickedness or carelessness, but poverty.  What is really a welfare problem gets 
converted into a property one.  People at the lower end of the market are quadruply 
                                                      
32 Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 56. 
33 ibid para 34. 
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vulnerable: They lack income and savings to pay for the necessities of life; they have 
poor prospects of raising loans, since their only asset is a state-subsidised house; the 
consequences of the inability to pay, under the law as it stands, can be drastic because 
they live on the thresholds of being cast back into the ranks of the homeless in 
informal settlements, with little chance to escape; and they can easily find themselves 
at the mercy of conscienceless persons ready to abuse the law for purely selfish 
reasons.34 
The importance of safeguarding a person’s security of tenure to home in a constitutional 
democracy, the court reasoned, is on account of the fact that having a home, ‘even under 
the most basic circumstances, can be a most empowering and dignifying human 
experience’.35  A home secures for each person a sphere of privacy, fosters the conditions 
that allow for intimate private relationships to develop, and, if owned in a market 
economy, provides individuals with capital to transact with others and pursue their 
conception of the good life.36  In many ways, a home signifies and financially secures the 
core of human autonomy. 
It should however be noted that the creditor, even if indigent, may well lose 
access to their home. There may well be situations where the enforcement of the debt, 
however trifling, is required to secure the livelihood (and autonomy) of the judgment 
creditor.37  Moreover, debt enforcement is a means to hold individuals accountable for 
their decisions.  The protection of autonomy includes holding one responsible for the 
choices that are made pursuant to the exercise of autonomy.  Accordingly, if a debtor 
acted recklessly in entering into a credit agreement or if they willingly mortgaged their 
property to secure a debt, it may well be appropriate to order the execution of a home.38 
3.3 Political power of the media: Khumalo  
Independent media houses, which are of course motived at least in part by financial 
incentives, command a central and influential role in the political arena of any 
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38 ibid paras 41, 58.  See Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC) paras 50–54. 
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democracy.39  In Khumalo, a unanimous Constitutional Court went so far as to label 
media organisations as ‘extremely powerful institutions’ on account of the fact that they 
enjoy the power to control access to a necessary resource in a constitutional democracy.40  
As mentioned earlier, Khumalo held that the media wields a significant amount of control 
over the ability of individuals to access and disseminate information and ideas, which is a 
protected resource in terms of section 16(1)(b) of the Constitution.  Individuals in turn 
rely upon this information to form opinions, to regulate their own lives and direct their 
interactions with others, and to make political choices.  Needless to say, and to paraphrase 
the court, the ability of individuals to make informed decisions depends on the manner in 
which the media exercises their constitutional mandate.  As the court tells us, the media 
will either ‘strengthen’ a democratic culture or ‘imperil’ the goals of the Constitution 
depending on the level of rigour and reliability with which they perform their duties.41  In 
clear terms, the court once more suggests that it is the imbalance of power in relation to 
the control of a protected resource that guides the balancing process (metric two). 
We should pause here to identify the reason why the court concludes that the 
media ‘are both bearers of rights and bearers of constitutional obligations in relation to 
freedom of expression’.42  Section 16(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees in express 
terms the ‘freedom of the press and media’.  It is however of interest to note the 
justifications the court offers as to why there is this need to protect the activities of the 
media in a constitutional democracy.  The judgment does not suggest that the underlying 
rationale of the right to freedom of expression is to secure the autonomy or other 
patrimonial interests of media houses.  It is rather bestowed primarily as a means to 
enable the realisation of other constitutional rights and values.  The media’s right to free 
expression is therefore a conduit right.  The end that is to be achieved is the ability of 
individuals to ‘make responsible political decisions and to participate effectively in public 
life’.43  In the context of horizontal application matters, the reasoning of the court 
                                                      
39 It bears noting that the level of power exercised by media outlets in South Africa over necessary 
information is heightened given the fact that there are no more than ten media outlets that own all 
of the major news organisations in the country. A recent study indicates that approximately 95 per 
cent of the print media is owned by four companies. See Issa Sikiti Da Silva, ‘SA Media Ownership 
and Control in South Africa’ (Biz Community 5 March 2010). 
40 Khumalo (n 5) para 16. 
41 ibid para 21. 
42 ibid para 20. 
43 ibid para 21. 
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therefore leaves no other conclusion except that the right of the press to free expression is 
safeguarded only in so far as their activities contribute towards these constitutional aims. 
 Khumalo establishes an additional reason as to why the media is a powerful 
institution within a constitutional democracy, and, accordingly, why the exercise of that 
power needs to be controlled.  No doubt the mass dissemination of information 
concerning a person has the potential to control or at least influence the enjoyment of two 
related constitutional rights.  The right to a reputation and the public’s estimation of your 
worth based on your achievements is protected by the right to have your human dignity 
respected.  Another interest is also potentially implicated.  The right to have a personal 
sphere of autonomy and intimacy free from both state and non-state interference is also 
curtailed when the media reports on the private life of individuals.   
In determining whether publication was reasonable, a court will have regard to the 
individual’s interest in protection his or her reputation in the context of constitutional 
commitment to human dignity.  It will also have regard to the individual’s interest in 
privacy.  In that regard, there can be no doubt that persons in public office have a 
diminished right to privacy, though of course their right to dignity persists.44    
The importance of protecting an individual’s privacy is therefore also a 
measurement of degree.  The Khumalo court does not elaborate on the ‘diminished’ right 
to privacy of public officials, but an earlier judgment of the court defines the degree to 
which the privacy of one individual can be limited by the constitutional rights of others 
(metric one). 
In the context of privacy […] it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her 
family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion 
by conflicting rights of the community.  This implies that community rights and the 
rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby 
shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of 
civil society.  Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person 
moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social interaction, 
the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.45 
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4 A skeleton theory of balancing 
Chapter four demonstrated that the court initially presents the balancing process as a clash 
between two competing rights.  However, once the balancing process is established, the 
court no longer pits two distinct rights against one another.  The court rather engages in 
two types of evaluations that are internal to each of the conflicting right norms.  Before 
outlining these internal evaluations, it must be conceded that what follows is only a 
skeleton theory of general principles.  The range of rights and interests is too diverse, 
social problems are multifarious, and there is perhaps an insufficient amount of case law 
on this matter at the present time to formulate a more detailed and concrete description.  
Another factor guarding against a more complete account is the Constitutional Court’s 
warning that some problems in our society are too complex for neat and clear legal 
solutions.46 
The first internal metric evaluates the impact a particular measure has on the 
enjoyment of freedom in the exercise of human autonomy.  In all three judgments 
discussed, the court assesses the relative importance of safeguarding the autonomy of the 
private individuals and entities concerned.  For the majority in Barkhuizen, the 
enforcement of the time bar clause had no impact at all on the core of the autonomy of the 
insured, and, indeed, the enforcement of the contractual provision was viewed as a means 
to protect the exercise of autonomy.  The Jaftha decision reveals a change in 
circumstances.  Debt enforcement may negatively impact the core of human autonomy.  
Losing access to a home not only removes shelter but also severely diminishes the 
enjoyment of human dignity and privacy.  The reasoning in Jaftha reveals another reason 
why the court would not enforce the execution of the home.  The action of the indigent 
debtor was not due to autonomous choices, greed, or carelessness.  Entering into these 
agreements to secure basic human needs was necessitated due to their impoverished state. 
In essence, the court seeks to evaluate and plot the freedom interests of the 
disputing parties along a continuum of freedom.  This range commences where the need 
to protect autonomy is weak and intensifies to a point where the need to protect autonomy 
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is virtually absolute.  Writing in the context of protecting the right to privacy, the court 
indicated the basis on which this need-to-protect-freedom continuum moves: 
A very high level of protection is given to the individual’s intimate personal sphere of 
life and the maintenance of its basic preconditions and there is a final untouchable 
sphere of human freedom that is beyond interference from any public authority. So 
much so that, in regard to this most intimate core of privacy, no justifiable limitation 
thereof can take place. But this most intimate core is narrowly construed. This 
inviolable core is left behind once an individual enters into relationships with persons 
outside this closest intimate sphere; the individual’s activities then acquire a social 
dimension and the right of privacy in this context becomes subject to limitation.47 
This metric is common in the constitutional rights review of legislation, as the section 36 
rights-limitation analysis similarly investigates the degree to which the infringing act 
impacts the core of the right.48 
The second internal metric is unique to private disputes.  This metric evaluates the 
amount of private power exercised by a private individual or entity over the constitutional 
right of another, and, more specifically, the need to control the exercise of that power.  Of 
the decisions discussed, Khumalo is the clearest example of a ‘powerful institution’ that 
controls access to a resource required for the cultivation of human autonomy, and for 
participation in public and political life.  In this situation, the need to monitor the 
activities of this non-state entity is the strongest.  Barkhuizen is an example of two 
entities entering into a commercial transaction.  The relative economic positions of the 
parties, though of course not precisely equal, were of a sufficient equilibrium to warrant 
against interference in the contract.  This scale can also be visualised on a continuum. 
These two continuums are correlated to one another.  Broadly stated, to control 
the exercise of power, which typically results in the imposition of an obligation, the court 
believes it is compelled to discount the freedom interests of the private individual or 
entity.  When plotted on a graph, as shown in Figure 5 below, these two continuums 
reveal an exponentially inverted relationship.  We can call this the power-freedom curve.  
This curve plots the exercise of power, which, in a constitutional framework, displays the 
level to which an entity controls access to a resource that is required for the realisation of 
a constitutionally protected interest. 
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Figure 5: The power-freedom curve 
 
At the far right of the graph is where we exercise the least amount of economic or 
political power. This is also where the need to protect the core of our autonomy is the 
strongest, which is most often considered to be the privacy of one’s home.  Moving to the 
middle of the graph is where we begin to interact with our community. We enter into 
commercial contracts with one another, which provide us with a degree of economic 
power over others (we control the actions of another and they control ours).  Only a few 
individuals and entities are plotted on the top end of the graph.  Here is where individuals 
actively participate in civil society, or where a private entity’s economic power is so high 
in that they exercise a monopoly or near-exclusive control over the protection of a 
constitutionally protected resource or interest.  Their autonomy interests in this capacity 
are the weakest, and the need to control their actions is the strongest. 
It needs emphasis that the power-freedom curve does not denote an automatic 
cause-and-effect relationship.  It is correlated, however, in that the court aims to diminish 
the autonomy interest before it is prepared to burden a private individual or entity with an 
obligation.  In doing so, the court aims to negate one of the major criticisms directed 
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against the horizontal application of rights.  That is, the application of rights to private 
individuals and entities reduces autonomy and freedom interests, which is 
counterintuitive under a liberal constitutional order.  
The law reports record four justifications that warrant reducing the need to protect 
freedom.  That is, to plot the interest on the left of the x-axis.   
§ First, the constitutionally protected interest of a potential duty-bearer is located 
at the periphery of the constitutional right, which means that it is afforded less 
protection than an interest at the core of the right. 49   
§ Second, the right is interpreted as a conduit right.50  That is, the right is used 
primarily to realise other constitutional objectives.  We provide freedom to these 
institutions to facilitate the realisation of these aims, but the state may 
legitimately intervene when they fail to regulate themselves in a manner that is 
not conducive to achieving these aims.  Khumalo is a good example.  Recall the 
paradoxical reasoning of the court.  The court expanded the constitutional 
protection afforded to the media by recognising that the proper functioning of 
the media is an essential means to realise another set of constitutional objectives, 
that is, to inform citizens.  Beyond the realisation of these aims, the need to 
protect the freedom of the media is weak.  The media could for instance not 
claim strong constitutional protection for news stories built on falsehoods, which 
are published with the aim to increase profits. 
§ Third, the activity of the private individual or entity straddles the definition of an 
‘organ of state’, in that the entity exercises a function or power that is akin to a 
public function or public power but does not meet all the requirements of an 
‘organ of state’ as defined by section 239 of the Constitution (i.e. the power or 
function must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution or national 
legislation).51   
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§ Fourth, the right is framed as imposing only a negative obligation.52  A negative 
duty on a private individual and entity to refrain from harm-inducing conduct is 
often viewed as not directly encroaching on the freedoms of other individuals, 
even if the duty has the consequence of diminishing freedoms. 
The other disputing party can similarly be plotted on the graph.  It is now their 
positions relative to one another that broadly suggest the nature and extent of a possible 
obligation.  The fact that one non-state actor is placed higher on the graph than another 
non-state actor does not automatically mean that the weaker party’s interests prevail.  As 
demonstrated in this paper, the court seeks an appropriate justification for the 
encroachment on a right.  The level of justification required appears contingent on the 
disparity in the position of the parties.   
To recapitulate, horizontality forces the courts to dissect constitutional right 
norms into two main components.  First, a constitutional right safeguards a claim to a 
particular interest.  Second, constitutional rights are also power-conferring.  In protecting 
certain freedoms to engage in activities, rights bestow powers on private individuals and 
entities.  Viewed from this perspective, and in the context of horizontal application, we 
can say that constitutional rights come into conflict whenever a right is interpreted as 
affording the right holder a legal power, which, in the exercise thereof, results in the 
impairment of another’s constitutional right to claim a particular interest.  The purpose of 
applying constitutional rights to private legal relationships is therefore to impose 
appropriate limits on an otherwise constitutionally protected power so as to ensure that 
that the private power is not exercised in a manner that unduly encroaches upon other 
rights.  The court has developed a broad structure to evaluate these competing 
components internal to rights.  The main take-away from the structure is that the courts 
must first diminish the right to claim a particular interest before it is willing to recognise 
an obligation.  To be clear, the structure does not create automatic trumps.  The structure 
is utilised to impose a duty to justify the infringement, as well as determine the level of 
justification required.  The duty to justify splits into two parts.  The first is procedural, 
and it pertains to the duty of the power-wielding party to collect relevant information 
prior to deciding whether to infringe on an interest safeguarded by a constitutional right.53  
                                                      
52 Government of the Republic v Grootboom 2001 (4) SA 46 (CC) para 34; Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 
(4) SA 491 (CC) para 45. 
53 Chapter eight provides further examples of this procedural duty to collect information.  The most 
notable is the duty upon landowners to engage meaningfully with unlawful occupants prior to 
–140– 
The second is substantive, and it evaluates the grounds upon which the power is 
ultimately exercised.  Consider once more Khumalo.  The media may escape liability if 
the publication of a defaming statement is reasonable in the circumstances.  This would 
require the media defendant to not only demonstrate how the investigation gathered 
evidence, but also why the reasons for infringing a right are constitutionally acceptable.   
 
5 Fixed rules 
The balancing process may yield fixed rules if it is clear which interest should 
automatically prevail.  Three such instances are identified from the case law. 
5.1 No other competing interest 
An automatic trump is recognised when there is no other competing legal interest.  
Slavery is a clear example.  Section 13 of the Constitution guarantees for each person the 
right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude, or forced labour.  This right is absolute in 
private legal relationships; it is simply unimaginable to conceive of a situation where the 
courts would recognise that one private individual or entity has the right to subject 
another to acts of forced servitude.   
 Section 16 of the Constitution offers another example.  This provision protects the 
right to freedom of expression, and its importance to the practice of democracy is 
rehearsed above.  Section 16(1) expressly protects the freedom of the press and other 
media, the freedom to receive or impart information or ideas, freedom of artistic 
creativity, and academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.  Freedom of 
expression is usually evaluated along a continuum, with political speech often being 
awarded a high level of protection.  Political speech is of course not absolute.  Our courts 
have recognised that speech of an ‘inflammatory or unduly abusive kind may be restricted 
so as to guarantee free and fair elections in a tranquil atmosphere’.54  Section 16(2) of the 
Constitution however proceeds to prescribe the three types of expression that are 
excluded from any sort of constitutional protection.  Speech that (i) propagates war, (ii) 
incites imminent violence, or (iii) advocates hatred on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
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or religion in a way that constitutes an incitement to cause harm is afforded zero 
constitutional protection.  The last category of excluded speech is normally summed up as 
‘hate speech’.  Any constitutional right that is impaired by this type of speech — which 
most likely will be the right to equality or human dignity — will automatically prevail.  
In the democratic era, one of the few instances of the South African courts 
prohibiting political speech is the case of Afri-forum v Malema.55  This dispute pertains to 
an ANC politician singing a song called ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’.  The literal translation of the 
song is ‘shoot the Boer/farmer’, and the song includes the lyrics ‘these dogs rape us, 
shoot! shoot! shoot them with a gun’.56  The song was originally sung by members in the 
anti-apartheid liberation movement, including soldiers preparing to overthrow the 
apartheid government.57  The politician implicated in this dispute added the lyric ‘shoot to 
kill’ at the end of the song, which was accompanied with his hands gesturing the shooting 
of a firearm.  The song invokes strong passions on either side of the debate.  Members of 
the Afrikaans white community felt aggrieved and threatened by the lyrics.  They argued 
that the song constitutes hate speech, as it incites hatred and harm against a racial group.  
The ANC, on the other hand, claimed that the song is harmless as the meaning of the song 
is not a literal interpretation, and that it is not sung with an intention to display a desire to 
actually kill a group of individuals.  The reference to shooting or killing Boers/farmers is 
meant to symbolise the destruction of white racial oppression over the black community.  
The liberation song, the ANC contended, should be permitted as it forms part of the 
history and heritage of many people, and it is a way for citizens to show solidarity.  The 
song embodies strong emotional feelings that stem from a shared and painful history. 
Section 10 of the Equality Act prohibits hate speech.58  It defines hate speech 
broadly, which is said to be the publication, propagation, advocacy, or communication of 
words based on any of the prohibited grounds against any person ‘that could reasonably 
be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to (a) be hurtful; (b) be harmful or to incite 
harm; [or] (c) promote or propagate hatred.’ 59   Following section 16(2) of the 
Constitution which lists incitement to violence and hatred against protected groups as 
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non-protected speech, section 15 of the Equality Act states that hate speech cannot be 
saved by any justification.  In essence, any other protected interest will always trump hate 
speech.  Hate speech has the propensity to result in political disintegration and impair the 
ability of the affected groups to participate in society.60  In this matter, the Equality Court 
agreed with the legislature’s evaluation.  The court concluded that hate speech should 
assume no protection under our constitutional democracy despite the fact that in this 
instance the political speech is personally significant to a large segment of society. 
Public speech involves a participation in political discourse with other citizens, in a 
manner that respects their own correlative rights.  Hate speech has no respect for those 
rights.  It lacks full value as political speech.  Hate speech does not address the 
community in general but merely a portion of it; those who are the target group.  Hate 
speech should not be protected merely because it contributes to the pursuit of the 
truth.  If it denies the recognition of the free and reasonable rights of others it makes 
no direct contribution to the process.61  
The court found that the song demonstrated ‘an intention to be hurtful, to incite harm and 
promote hatred against the white-Afrikaans-speaking community, including the farmers 
who belong to that group’.  The song therefore constituted hate speech.  Significantly, the 
order was not only directed at the politician.  The court restrained the ANC from singing 
the song at any public or private meeting reasoning that the ANC has ‘control over the 
conduct of the persons who hold rallies in its name and on its behalf’.62   
In both the examples of slavery and hate speech, and given that there is no 
countervailing right to consider, it is fair to assume that the constitutional right imposes a 
clear and fixed obligation upon private individuals and entities.  No contextual evaluation 
of the facts of the case would have altered the outcome. 
5.2 Monopoly over core freedom interests 
AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency is a rare example of the Constitutional Court radically 
discounting the freedom interests of a private entity on account of the monopoly of power 
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the entity exercised over the constitutionally protected resources of others.63  This led to 
the court imposing an immediately enforceable constitutional duty upon a private entity.  
In accordance with section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, the state is obliged to 
provide, within its available means, appropriate social assistance to those who are 
financially unable to support themselves and their dependents.  In South Africa, where 
more than 16 million people are dependent on state grants for their livelihood, the 
importance of this right is palpable.  The right to access social security, which includes 
receiving social assistance grants, is a means to ensure that indigent persons are able to 
secure their basic human needs.  This includes resources such as food, water, shelter and 
clothing.64  As the Constitutional Court has informed us on numerous occasions, these 
basic necessities are required in order to secure the human dignity and freedom of each 
person.65  The ability of a person to exercise meaningful autonomy and participate 
effectively in community life is contingent on the fulfilment of their basic needs.66  
Though the state has the desire to do so in the future, the South African government has 
to date not developed or implemented the necessary infrastructure required to disburse 
social assistance grants in a secure and effective manner.  In order to meet its 
constitutional mandate, the state has therefore entered into contracts with private 
companies whereby the company disburses social assistance grants on behalf of the state 
to eligible individuals. 
The AllPay matter arose as a result of a tender process, which awarded a national 
contract to a private company, being declared materially irregular and as a consequence 
unlawful.  For our purposes we need not be concerned with the nature of the irregularities 
save to say that the irregularities in the bidding process prevented a fair selection process 
and that the private company was not at fault.  In terms of the rules of administrative law, 
and pursuant to the principle that a flawed tender process cannot stand, the remedy 
usually ordered in situations where the court declares a tender process unlawful is to set 
aside the awarding of the contract.67  The default remedy would however not have been 
an appropriate one in this matter because merely setting aside the contract would have 
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resulted in millions of individuals not receiving their social grants.  The state did not have 
the machinery to fill the void and it was estimated that the rerunning of the tender process 
would have taken at least a year to complete.  
In formulating the remedy to correct the unlawful conduct of the state, the court 
faced a dilemma as two competing principles suggested alternative solutions. These 
principles were the public interest in ensuring that public procurement is fair, 
competitive, and cost-efficient, on the one hand, and, on the other, the need to ensure that 
the disbursement of social grants is not disrupted.  Here, the private company sought to 
hold the country — and the court — hostage.  The entity, which had already distributed 
payments for the past two years, argued that it would have no further obligation to 
continue to disburse social assistance grants on behalf of the state if the contract was 
declared invalid.   A unanimous court rejected this threat on two grounds.  First, the 
private company is classified as an organ of state, and is therefore directly bound by the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights for the duration of the contract period.   In terms of the 
court’s power to issue any ‘just and equitable remedy’ in accordance with section 172 of 
the Constitution — which includes ‘suspending the declaration of invalidity for any 
period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect’ — 
the court could merely suspend the declaration of invalidity to permit the state to rerun 
the tender process.  Suspending the invalidity of the contract until a new tender process 
was completed was the approach ultimately adopted by the court.  
There was a second reason the court rejected the private company’s argument, 
and, for our purposes, it is the more important one.  The court held that even if the 
invalidity of the contract was not suspended, and, despite the fact that the company would 
no longer be considered an organ of state, the company would still be under a 
constitutional obligation to ‘ensure a workable payment system remains in place until a 
new one is operational’.  This was because the private company also incurred 
constitutional obligations under section 8(2) of the Constitution.68  The court repeated its 
general mantra that the general purpose of the horizontal application of constitutional 
rights is ‘not to obstruct private autonomy or to impose on a private party the duties of the 
state in protecting the Bill of Rights’ but it is rather to ensure that ‘private parties do not 
interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a right’.69  The court nevertheless held that 
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this positive obligation upon a non-state actor to continue to provide the service until a 
new service provider was appointed was an exception to this general rule.  It bears 
quoting the court at length. 
Where an entity has performed a constitutional function for a significant period 
already, […] considerations of obstructing private autonomy by imposing duties of the 
state to protect constitutional rights on private parties, do not feature prominently, if 
at all.  The conclusion of a contract with constitutional obligations, and its operation 
for some time before its dissolution — because of constitutional invalidity — means 
that the [the beneficiaries of the contract] would have become increasingly dependent 
on [the company] fulfilling its constitutional obligations.70 
The approach in AllPay is informed by the extreme situation of the case: the 
constitutionally guaranteed livelihoods of millions of people were threatened by the 
actions of a single profit-driven entity.  The level of economic and political power 
exercised by the private company over both the state and the recipients of the social 
assistance grants was colossal, and effectively amounted to a monopoly over the 
infrastructure needed to realise a constitutional right.  The state had no other option 
available.  This matter is also different from the other cases as the court was not 
concerned with a possible justification and reasons for encroaching upon the right.  The 
court simply held that, given the company had performed the state function for a 
significant period of time, the private autonomy interests of the company ‘do not feature 
prominently, if at all’.  In essence, as the power-freedom curve predicts, the court 
recognised in this situation that the private company had little autonomy interests of their 
own which could ever outweigh the need to ensure the core of the freedoms of others are 
realised. 
5.3 Choices of intimate association 
Our choices relating to intimate associations tend to be afforded a high level of 
constitutional protection, and the courts are generally unwilling to recognise 
constitutional obligations that restrict decisions of close or intimate association.  This is 
not to say that the Constitution does not permeate into certain legal areas,71 or that the 
power that individuals wield in close intimate associations cannot infringe upon another’s 
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constitutional right.  It is rather that the courts and the legislature are ill equipped to 
balance our personal decisions.  Our choice of association stems from our passions, 
emotions, and core beliefs.  Our decisions with whom to form close associations are so 
fundamental and unique to each person’s social structure and development, which renders 
these decisions incapable of a type of economic or legal analyses.  The decision of De v 
RH neatly illustrates this situation.72  In this matter, the Constitutional Court abolished the 
common law claim of a non-adulterous spouse to claim damages from the intervening 
third party.  The court accepted that there are two competing interests at stake.  On the 
one hand, the innocent spouse suffers an infringement on their human dignity when a 
third party intrudes into a marriage.  On the other hand, there is also the need to offer 
protection to the privacy and associations rights of the adulterous spouse and third party 
(even if society disapproves of their decisions).  The tiebreaker was ultimately that an 
external force such as the courts or the legislature should not intervene in this highly 
personal choice.  The law could generally encourage marriage or other forms of intimate 
relationship, but it should not penalise decisions.  Each spouse should be left to make 
their own decisions in line with their own personal convictions, and the law should not 
dissuade a spouse or third party who wishes to either terminate or commence a romantic 
relationship.73 
 There is however one clear instance in which the law must intervene in our 
intimate relationships: to prevent and punish acts of domestic violence.  The authority of 
the state to respond to abusive relationships is historically a thorny issue, because, it is 
often argued, the home is a sacred space of human existence free from external control.  
The privacy of the home therefore warrants against interference in issues of family life. 
The framework sketched above makes the legal issue over intervention far less 
contentious.  The building that makes up the family home is not a good in and of itself.  It 
rather serves as a place to realise many of our human functions, including the 
development of intimate human relationships.  The commission of acts of violence is 
simply not a constitutionally protected interest, and no person can claim that the four 
corners of their home insulate their decision to inflict abuse on another.  In fact, section 
12 of the Constitution states that individuals have the right to be free from public and 
private sources of violence.74  The duty to prevent acts of domestic violence falls upon the 
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state, but it also has ramifications in the private common law.75  The most notable is that 
the constitutional right carves out an exception to the common law rule that spouses or 
life partners may not exclude each other from the communal home.  The Domestic 
Violence Act, which was promulgated to give effect to rights of equality and security of 
the person, authorises the courts to prohibit an abusive spouse or life partner from 
entering the shared home.76 
 
6 Taking stock  
The South African Constitution assigns the judiciary a difficult law-making task.  While 
the courts retain their inherent power to develop the common law under the new 
constitutional order, their law-making power is informed by the Constitution’s need to 
control the exercise of power wielded by private individuals and entities.  This mandate 
sets up a clash.  The courts are expected to both safeguard the freedoms protected by 
constitutional rights, and, at the same time, ensure that the exercise of these freedoms 
does not unduly infringe upon the protected freedoms of others.  The Constitution 
provides little guidance on how to implement this mandate and resolve clashes.  The text 
merely instructs the courts to develop the law in a manner that gives effect to 
constitutional right norms.  In providing more structure to these provisions, the 
Constitutional Court has settled on the ‘balancing process’.  The process allows the courts 
to move away from outright protecting one right over another.  Instead, the court 
incorporates a contextual and flexible balancing process into the common law.  This 
feature renders the application of the process to individual disputes more manageable as 
the balancing process benefits from the extensive rules, procedures, and assumption that 
already exist in the common law.  In one sense, because the balancing process rejects 
fixed rules, perhaps it is fair to argue that the process purposively promotes litigation.  
The South African Constitution introduced a legal revolution, and it is only through the 
continuous judicial application of its provisions that private law can be rebuilt.  
The judicial balancing process is however not the only available tool for 
rebuilding private law.  The upcoming chapters detail another strategy of the courts, 
which developed in response to the constraints on the judicial law-making toolkit.  The 
                                                      
75 S v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) para 16. 
76 116 of 1998, s 7(1). 
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AVOIDING THE COMMON LAW: 
THE RIGHT TO ACCESS ADEQUATE HOUSING 
 
This chapter uses the case law on section 26 of the Constitution — which 
guarantees access to adequate housing — as a case study to illustrate an 
instance where the Constitutional Court avoids requests to develop the 
common law (and rather pivots towards legislative remedies). 
 
1 An anomaly in the case law 
One of the few uncontested principles in South African socio-economic rights discourse 
is that section 26 of the Constitution — which safeguards the right of each person to have 
access to adequate housing — imposes a negative obligation upon all private individuals 
and entities.1  This obligation, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly held, requires 
private individuals and entities to refrain from conduct that impairs another individual’s 
existing access to an adequate home.2  It is thus a duty to do-no-harm.  While this 
                                                      
1 Constitution s 26: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.  
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of court made after considering all of the relevant circumstances.  No 
legislation may permit arbitrary eviction. 
2  Government of the Republic v Grootboom 2001 (4) SA 46 (CC) para 34; Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para 46; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle 
Properties 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC) para 32; Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 (4) SA 491 (CC) para 45.  The 
Constitutional Court does not always expressly reference the obligation upon private individuals 
and entities, but merely states that ‘any measure’, whether taken by either a state or a non-state 
actor, that impairs or deprives a person from existing access to an adequate home is an infringement 
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interpretation of section 26 remains unchallenged in judicial and academic writing, giving 
legal effect to the obligation has proved considerably more difficult.  In a string of recent 
judgments, the Constitutional Court has refused to rule on whether or not — and, if so, 
the extent to which — the constitutional obligation necessitates the development of the 
common law.  Their refusal to do so is notable.  It stands at odds with the provisions of 
the Constitution that require the judiciary to develop the common law whenever it is 
necessary give effect to the constitutional obligations of private individual and entities, 
which, as Part B of the thesis has already demonstrated, is a law-making mandate the 
Constitutional Court usually fulfils. 
 The court’s refusal to entertain the common law question hints at a strategy of 
avoidance.  Although the court has never detailed the existence of such a strategy, the 
suspicion that the court intentionally refrains from entertaining questions on the 
application of section 26 to the common law gains further credence when one considers 
the fact that the scope of the constitutional right — and therefore the scope of the duty 
upon private individuals and entities — is in a state of flux.  The case law discussed in 
this chapter shows that the scope of the right deflates when the obligation is applied to the 
common law, and inflates when the obligation is interpreted within statutory schemes. 
The deflated reading views section 26 predominantly as a procedural right, which 
is an instruction directed at the decision-maker (i.e. judges).  In other words, the 
constitutional right requires the judiciary to oversee any legal process that may result in 
the loss of an adequate home.  The benefit of an independent legal procedure is clear.  
The forced removal of a person from their home is amongst the most distressing human 
experiences, and is likely to have a drastic impact on the evictee’s livelihood.  Judicial 
supervision ensures that these harsh consequences only proceed as a measure of last 
resort, as the purpose of the procedural right is to identify whether the home occupier 
holds any possible legal defence that could either deny or delay eviction.  From this 
perspective, the housing right is a mechanism to protect any pre-existing right — whether 
found in the common law, customary-indigenous law, or legislation — that permits the 
continued occupation of the property.  The importance of this procedural safeguard must 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the right.  See Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 
744 (CC) para 78; Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) paras 33–34; Governing Body of the 
Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) para 58.  The Supreme Court of 
Appeal has also recognised the negative obligation upon private individuals and entities.  See 
Standard Bank v Saunderson 2006 (9) BCLR 1022 (SCA) para 12; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle 
Properties [2011] 3 All SA 535 (SCA) para 26. 
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be stressed.  Individuals at risk of eviction are likely to be among the most economically 
impoverished in society, and their poor socio-economic status means that they are 
unlikely to obtain effective legal advice and representation.  Mandatory judicial oversight 
mitigates the adverse effects poverty has on the ability of indigent persons to secure their 
rights.  The process requires courts to assume a more active role in housing eviction 
litigation, and may require judges to enquire into the facts of the case even if the parties 
do not raise potential points of dispute.3  The scope of protection afforded by the narrow-
procedural reading of the obligation is however limited.  If the matter is duly brought 
before a court of law, and the court is satisfied that there are no legal defences available 
to the home occupier, a court enjoys no discretion to refuse an eviction application.  This 
is the case even if the soon-to-be evictee would be rendered homeless.  The housing right 
simply does not compete against other substantive legal rights.  An ownership right, for 
instance, would always trump the need to be housed.  In sum, the deflated-procedural 
reading of the obligation means that section 26 cannot assist home occupiers who enjoy 
no common law, customary-indigenous law, or statutory right to reside on the property.4 
The inflated reading of the obligation includes the procedural component of the 
right but balloons to safeguard an occupier’s interest in having uninterrupted access to an 
adequate home.  That is, section 26 generates a sort of substantive legal interest that 
stands independent of other laws.5  These substantive protections may, in appropriate 
circumstances, offset the legal rights of another person.  The inflated-substantive reading 
of the obligation means that the duty to do-no-harm is not purely inhibitory as the 
application of the obligation to the common law may lead to restrictions on ownership 
and contract rights to guard against occupants becoming homeless.6  The ambit of the 
                                                      
3  See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 32, 36; The 
Occupiers, Shulana Court v Steele 2010 (9) BCLR 911 (SCA) para 12. 
4  For a scholarly analysis receptive to the narrow reading, see AJ van der Walt, Constitutional 
Property Law (3rd edn, Juta 2011) 522 (the author argues that the negative component of section 26 
only provides a defensive right; the housing right places only certain limits on the right to evict but 
does not bestow a sort of substantive property right). 
5  For support of the expanded reading, see Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights (Juta 2010) ch 
7 (the author criticises judgments that decline to apply the substantive component of socio-
economic rights to the common law, arguing that these judgments run against the transformative 
goals of the new constitutional order). 
6  See Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) paras 50–51; Occupiers of Erven 87 & 88 Berea v 
De Wet 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC) para 65. 
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expanded-substantive reading is somewhat murky however.7  The case law that applies 
this reading has yet to offer a comprehensive analysis on the precise scope of the 
substantive interests that section 26 protect.8  Despite the elusiveness of a concrete 
definition, the most expanded reading of the negative obligation suggests that any legally 
sanctioned act that causes a retrogressive effect on an individual’s existing access to an 
adequate home is an infringement of the housing right.  It is therefore not only evictions 
that violate the section 26 housing right.  Any act that diminishes the legal right to reside 
— for example, the termination of a lease agreement or the attachment of residential 
property to satisfy a debt — is a measure that infringement upon the constitutional right.   
The analysis ahead shows that while the Constitutional Court favours the inflated-
substantive reading within its own case law, it has never sought to confirm or correct the 
deflated-procedural reading of the obligation employed by lower courts.  When the apex 
court is invited to develop the common law — and either confirm or correct the deflated-
procedural reading — the court opts to convert the matter into a legislative dispute.  In 
doing so, the Constitutional Court effectively condones the use of the narrow reading for 
purposes of the common law.  Home occupiers are nevertheless afforded more 
substantive protection when the court converts a common law dispute into a legislative 
one.  In sum, the pivot from the common law to legislation is a strategy to move away 
from the deflated-procedural reading towards the more inflated-substantive reading of the 
obligation. 
 
                                                      
7  The narrow-procedural and expanded-substantive readings of the obligation are perhaps best 
viewed as a range of options situated on a spectrum.  The discussion maintains the binary approach 
to demonstrate the avoidance of the common law and pivot towards legislation. 
8  Perhaps one will never be forthcoming.  The inflated reading stems from the positive obligation of 
socio-economic rights, which the Constitutional Court has resisted giving a fixed interpretation.  
See chap 8, sec 4. 
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2 Eviction case law 
The negative component of section 26(1) of the Constitution is delineated, though not 
exhaustively, by section 26(3). 9   The subsection prohibits arbitrary evictions, and 
provides that no person may be evicted from their home unless a court orders their 
eviction after having considered ‘all of the relevant circumstances’.10  The early case law 
on section 26(3) focused on whether or not this constitutional provision altered the 
common law.  The pre-Constitution common law rule on land-ejectment orders is clear in 
its formulation and unequivocal in its application.  A judge enjoys no discretion to refuse 
to grant an ejectment order if (i) the plaintiff proves ownership of the property and that 
the defendant is in occupation of the property and (ii) the defendant fails to prove a lawful 
reason for occupation, for example, a lease agreement or a statutory right.11  After the 
enactment of the Constitution, the question was whether ‘relevant circumstances’ include 
more than a clear legal right to reside.  In other words, does section 26(3), read with 
section 26(1), only protect a procedural right prior to eviction or does the right generate 
substantive protections that can offset the legal rights of a property owner? 
2.1 The deflated-procedural reading (as applied to the common law) 
Early high court judgements offered split opinions.  Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 
favoured the inflated-substantive reading.  The high court held that section 26(3) of the 
Constitution altered the common law to the advantage of the occupier.12  In addition to 
proving ownership and unlawful occupation, the property owner must now also allege all 
relevant circumstances as a condition to an ejectment order.  The court held that it was 
unnecessary to speculate on the circumstances that should be regarded as relevant to this 
substantive enquiry, but suggested that courts could take guidance from relevant 
legislative schemes to identify pertinent factors (e.g. poverty and ensuing hardship).13  
The opposite conclusion was reached in Betta Eindomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh.14  Here 
the high court held that section 26(3) is confined to vertical application disputes.  The 
purpose of section 26(3) is only to ensure that the state does not enact legislation that 
                                                      
9  Grootboom (n 2) para 34. 
10  Constitution s 26(3). 
11  Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 476 at 479.  See also Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) at 20A. 
12  2000 (1) SA 589 (C) at 596H. 
13  ibid at 596I–J, 599B–C. 
14  2000 (4) SA 468 (W). 
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interferes with ownership and the possession of a home.  The constitutional right 
therefore does not change the common law.  In addition to restricting the application of 
the provision, the court held that the right only aims to prevent ejectment when the home 
is ‘truly and by all standards’ the home of the occupier.15  Section 26(3) offers zero 
protection to unlawful occupiers.  The Bette Eindomme court stressed that an inflated 
reading of section 26(3) would restrict ownership rights and impose inequitable 
obligations on landowners.  It could not have been the intention of the drafters of the 
Constitution, the high court concluded, that a landowner would have to provide housing 
to the general public.16  The legislature would have to make itself clearer if the intention 
is indeed to limit the common law right of ownership.17 
The Supreme Court of Appeal overruled both Ross and Bette Eindomme in the 
judgment Brisley v Drotsky, which to this day remains the black-letter common law 
position.18  Brisley stems from the decision of a landowner to cancel a residential lease 
agreement on account of unpaid rent.  The high court issued an eviction order at the 
request of the landowner, but, on appeal, the unlawful occupier argued that the high court 
failed to consider ‘all of the relevant circumstances’ as required by section 26(3) of the 
Constitution.  The occupier contended that the high court should have considered her and 
her child’s poor socio-economic status.  Though this argument is not fully explained in 
the written judgment, the presumable logic of this contention is that a court should deny 
or delay an ejectment order whenever an eviction from a home would have a detrimental 
impact on the evictees’ livelihoods.  In rejecting the conclusion of Bette Eindomme, the 
SCA held that section 26(3) is indeed capable of finding horizontal application.  There is 
no sound reason, the SCA opined, as to why the provision that ‘[n]o one may be evicted 
from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances’ cannot or should not apply to private 
                                                      
15  ibid at 472I–J. 
16  ibid at 473A–E. 
17  ibid at 475D–G.  See also Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) at 805A–807B.  The high court 
supported the passage in Betta Eindomme that held that the Constitution has not altered the 
common law right of ownership.  Section 26(3) is therefore only a procedural right, and applicable 
only where the occupation was at all times unlawful.  An occupier holding over on a lapsed lease 
agreement was therefore not protected. It is only a valid common law or other statutory defence to 
the rei vindicatio that is a relevant factor. 
18  2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
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individuals and entities who seek to evict an unlawful occupier in accordance with the 
common law.19 
The scope of protection is narrow, however.  The SCA concluded that the 
provision is only a procedural right.  That is, section 26(3) only safeguards the right to a 
legal procedure of judicial oversight prior to an eviction from privately owned land.  The 
SCA noted that section 26(3) does not list the circumstances that are relevant to this 
enquiry.  Adopting an interpretation that can only be described as shallow and perhaps 
even inscrutable — the judgment merely states without more that the ‘generally 
applicable law should be looked to’ — the court concluded that ‘relevant circumstances’ 
could only mean those circumstances that are considered ‘legally’ relevant.20  In other 
words, ‘relevant circumstances’ include only legal rights that are contained in statutes, 
common law, or customary-indigenous law.  The law entitles the landowner to the full 
use of their property, and a court has no discretion under section 26(3) to refuse to grant 
an ejectment order if the owner is legally entitled to one.  The constitutional right 
therefore only prevents the eviction of a lawful occupier.21  Section 26 affords no sort of 
substantive right that would authorise the continued unlawful occupation of a property.  
This is even in a situation where the ejectment results in homelessness.  Quite simply, the 
SCA said in outright terms, the personal circumstances of the evictee or the availability of 
alternative accommodation are irrelevant to this judicial enquiry.22  The court thus 
proceeded to overturn the holding in Ross that the evaluation extends beyond established 
legal rights in subordinate sources of law.  The SCA fortified this procedural reading of 
the obligation by continuing to suggest that the personal socio-economic status of an 
evictee may perhaps become ‘legally’ relevant in a scenario where the legislature has 
expressly empowered the courts with a discretion to refuse an eviction order on 
considerations of fairness and justness.23 
The SCA views section 26(3) as no more than a codification of a common law 
rule of procedure that requires an owner to follow due legal process to regain possession 
                                                      
19  ibid para 40. 
20  ibid para 42.  
21  ibid para 43. 
22  ibid paras 41–42.  Compare the minority judgment of Olivier JA in Brisley para 87 (considerations 
of reasonableness and fairness may at the very least require the temporary suspension of the 
eviction order in appropriate circumstances). 
23  Brisley (n 18) paras 42, 45.  The SCA confirmed this approach in City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 40. 
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of their immovable property.  It is an established principle of civil procedure that a 
landowner is precluded from using force or other acts of intimidation to remove an 
unlawful occupier.24  A lawful eviction is conditional on a court of law ordering an 
ejectment, which is an order usually issued when a property owner proves that the 
occupier enjoys no contractual or statutory right to occupy.25  The principle that property 
owners should not take the law into their own hands is given expression in the common 
law remedy of the mandament van spolie.26  In the context of property evictions, this 
remedy aims to prevent landowners from depriving an unlawful occupier from their 
existing access to a residence without acquiescence or judicial order.27  It is for this 
reason that the SCA’s deflated-procedural reading of section 26(3) is of no appreciable 
effect, except to confirm that the pre-Constitution common law is consistent with the 
Constitution.  Brisley and Bette Eindomme therefore establish a distinction without a 
difference.  Interpreting section 26(3) as only protecting a right to a judicial procedure 
leads to the exact same outcome as if the court had held that section 26(3) finds no 
horizontal application.  On account of both the shallow legal reasoning as well as the 
more general tendency of the courts not to develop the common law in accordance with 
socio-economic rights, it is difficult not to draw the inference that the willingness of the 
Brisley court to read section 26(3) as finding horizontal application was only on account 
of the fact that it would not add to or detract from the common law.  More specifically, 
the horizontal application of the right would effectively neither impose an obligation on a 
private individual or entity nor limit any existing right at the common law.28  
                                                      
24  See Boompret Investments v Paardekraal Concession Store 1990 (1) SA 347 (A) at 353C–D; Yeko 
v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A) at 739G–H. 
25  Graham (n 11). 
26  The maxim of the remedy is summed up as ‘spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est’ (possession must 
be returned before a court will enquire into who owns the property).  
27  See Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceramics 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) at 532G–533F; Fredericks v Stellenbosch 
Division Council 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) at 116H–117A. 
28  If this inference is correct, Brisley stands open to attack.  A claim that a constitutional provision 
should be interpreted by referencing subordinate sources of law is constitutional heresy.  
Constitutional rights test the validity of the rules contained in statues, the common law, and 
customary-indigenous law.  The scope of the right cannot depend on whether these subordinate 
sources of law already comply with these rights.  Any concerns that stem from a particular 
interpretation of a constitutional right should rather be dealt with at the limitation or remedy phases. 
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2.2 The inflated-substantive reading (as applied to legislation) 
The Brisley judgment’s comparison of section 26(3) to an imagined legislative scheme 
that authorises judicial discretion on grounds of equitability was neither coincidental nor 
hypothetical.   Three days prior to handing down Brisley, the SCA delivered judgment in 
Mkangeli v Joubert (Brand JA authored Mkangeli and co-authored Brisley).29  Mkangeli 
adjudicated a dispute pleaded under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA).30 
ESTA was enacted pursuant to two constitutional rights.  Section 25(6) of the 
Constitution, read with section 25(9), obliges Parliament to enact legislation that provides 
legal security or comparable redress to individuals and communities whose land tenure is 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws.31  The Act also aims to give 
effect to section 26 of the Constitution.  Though the preamble of the Act does not 
expressly reference the housing right, the Constitutional Court has read ESTA to form 
part of the state’s obligation under section 26 of the Constitution to provide and protect 
access to adequate housing reasoning that security of tenure is intended to guard against 
homelessness.32 
ESTA protects occupiers who had once received consent to reside on rural or 
peri-urban land, and the Act grants these occupiers two tiers of protection.  First, ESTA 
restricts the power of the landowner to rescind the consent to reside.  Section 8 of ESTA 
prescribes that a landowner may only terminate the right to reside on lawful grounds 
(which, for the most part, are grounds established in common law) and furthermore 
‘provided that such a termination is just and equitable’.  This equitability determination 
must have regard to ‘all relevant circumstances’, but should include: (i) the fairness of the 
agreement; (ii) the conduct of the parties that gave rise to the termination; (iii) the 
comparative hardship that would be experienced after termination; (iv) the existence of a 
reasonable expectation to renewal; and (iv) the fairness in the procedure employed to 
terminate the right to reside, including whether the occupiers should have had an 
opportunity to make representations.  Relevant circumstances are therefore not limited to 
pre-Constitution private law rights, but also extend to relevant interests that flow from the 
need to be housed. 
                                                      
29  2002 (4) SA 36 (SCA).   
30  62 of 1997. 
31  See discussion in chap 2, sec 3. 
32  Molusi v Voges 2016 (3) SA 370 (CC) para 23. 
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Second, if the decision to terminate the consent to reside is just and equitable, 
ESTA also restricts the capacity of the landowner to obtain an eviction order.  It grants 
both procedural and substantive safeguards.  The procedural protections require the 
landowner to notify the occupiers and municipality of the intention to apply for an 
eviction order.  The notice, which must be given at least two months prior to instituting 
an application, must be in writing and disclose the grounds on which the eviction is 
based.33  Then, before issuing an eviction order, a court must request a designated officer 
to submit a report that evaluates relevant circumstances.34  This leads to the substantive 
protections.  ESTA provides that a court may only evict a protected occupier if it is ‘just 
and equitable to do so’.35  This is a discretionary enquiry, although the Act prescribes 
non-exhaustive factors that a court must consider.  Depending on when occupation first 
took place, these broadly phrased factors include: (i) the availability of suitable 
alternative accommodation, and the efforts that were taken to find such accommodation; 
(ii) the interests of the person in charge of the land and the occupier of the land, including 
the ‘comparative hardship’ that would ensue following ejectment; (iii) the period of 
occupation; (iv) the fairness of the agreement that allowed initial occupation; and (v) the 
reasons for the proposed eviction.36  
The central question raised in Mkangeli was whether ESTA only applied to an 
eviction application at the instance of a landowner, or whether a non-owner was also 
required to follow the procedures of the Act to evict a protected occupier.  The non-
owners in this matter argued that ESTA should not be applicable as doing so would limit 
their common law property rights.  For example, the right to curtail acts of nuisance that 
disrupt adjacent property.  The SCA rejected the argument.  The corollary of the 
comprehensive protection afforded to protected occupiers is that the legislature ‘intended 
to impose extensive limitations’ on the common law rights of property owners and other 
third parties.37  The SCA went onto note that the ‘common law affords the strongest 
protection against unlawful occupation to the owner of land’ and it is ‘therefore difficult 
                                                      
33  ESTA s 9(2).  The Act requires notification of the provincial office of the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform.  The notification requirement is complied with if the notice to 
apply for an eviction has been given to all required parties at least two months before the hearing of 
the application.  
34  ibid s 9(3). 
35  ibid ss 10(3), 11(1)–(2). 
36  ibid ss 10(3), 11(3). 
37  Mkangeli (n 29) para 17. 
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to imagine why the Legislature would so severely curtail the rights of owners of land, but 
refrain from imposing any restrictions on the rights of third parties who seek the eviction 
of an unlawful occupier from land that does not belong to them’.38  Owners and non-
owners alike must point towards factors to show that the eviction of a protected occupier 
is ‘just and equitable’ in the circumstances.  ESTA therefore carves away at the strong 
protection the common law affords property owners. 
2.3 Position of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court has yet to entertain the question on the extent to which section 
26(3) restricts the common law right to an ejectment order.  The Constitutional Court was 
however presented with an opportunity to either confirm or correct the Brisley court’s 
procedural reading of section 26(3) in the recent decision of Molusi v Voges.39  In this 
matter, the landowner instituted action for the eviction of six occupiers.  On appeal to the 
apex court, the question litigated was whether the procedural and substantive 
requirements for an eviction order under ESTA were satisfied.  The nub of the complaint, 
which the apex court upheld, was that the SCA granted an eviction order that was 
effectively based only on common law grounds (the court found that the SCA had 
focused mainly on the rei vindicatio – the common law action for protecting ownership).40  
The purpose of ESTA, the Constitutional Court held, is ‘to improve the conditions of 
occupiers on farm land and to afford them substantive protection that the common law 
remedies may not afford them’.41  ESTA achieves this purpose by altering the common 
law right to terminate an agreement as well as the common law right to an eviction order 
to the benefit of the protected occupiers.42  
                                                      
38  ibid para 23. 
39  Molusi (n 32). 
40  ibid para 45.  The court held at paragraph 39 that— 
  ESTA requires that the two opposing interests of the landowner and the occupier need 
to be taken into account before an order for eviction is granted.  On the one hand, there 
is the traditional real right inherent in ownership reserving exclusive use and protection 
of property by the landowner.  On the other, there is the genuine despair of our people 
who are in dire need of accommodation.  Courts are obliged to balance these interests.  
A court making an order for eviction must ensure that justice and equity prevail in 
relation to all concerned.  It does so by having regard to the considerations specified in 
[ESTA] which make it clear that fairness plays an important role. 
41 ibid para 7. 
42  ibid paras 34–37. 
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Though the court was not investigating whether section 26(3) necessitates the 
development of the substantive rules of the common law, the court’s obiter holdings 
appear to suggest that Brisley may perhaps be correct.43  Or, at the very least, there is no 
pressing need to overturn Brisley (because, as will be shown later on, the court views 
legislation as the more appropriate means to resolve these types of disputes).  In the 
Molusi matter, the Constitutional Court criticised the Supreme Court of Appeal for 
effectively applying common law principles to an eviction dispute.  The Constitutional 
Court’s criticism was not that the SCA applied a common law rule that failed to reflect 
constitutional norms, but rather that the SCA failed to apply a legislative’s framework 
that aims to give effect to constitutional rights.44  The court differentiated common law 
remedies from statutory remedies by noting that in Brisley the SCA— 
with reference to section 26(3) of the Constitution, held that the circumstances a court 
is required to consider can only be relevant if they are ‘legally’ relevant.  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal correctly distinguished this case from Brisley because, here, 
the ‘ejectment against an unlawful occupier [is] limited by the provisions of ESTA’, 
and because ‘reliance on the common law does not exonerate the owners from 
compliance with the provisions of … ESTA’.45 
In sum, on the question as to whether section 26(3) altered any substantive rules 
of the common law, the eviction judgments display a distinction between the respective 
roles of the legislature and judiciary.  Brisley, which focused on the common law, held 
that no substantive rights were generated.  Mkangeli, in comparison, held that legislative 
provisions that are enacted to comply with the state’s constitutional obligations generate 
substantive (statutory) rights that may limit property rights.  The distinction created in 
Brisley and Mkangeli echoes through the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the 
application of the section 26 adequate housing right to private legal relationships.46  
Given that the apex court permits lower courts to read the scope of the obligation 
narrowly for purposes of its application to the common law, the right is forced to assume 
a deflated-procedural reading when applied to non-statutory law.  It morphs, however, 
into a more inflated-substantive reading when applied within a legislative framework.  
Here, section 26 generates substantive protections that may offset common law property 
rights.   
                                                      
43  ibid paras 26, 43. 
44  ibid para 30. 
45  ibid para 19. 
46  See also Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea (n 6) paras 43–57. 
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The reason the Constitutional Court has yet to entertain the common law question 
is largely due to the fact that the legislature has promulgated a series of legislative 
schemes that aim to afford a certain level of protection to unlawful occupiers.  These 
legislative schemes are not discretionary, and housing eviction applications can no longer 
be entertained in accordance with the common law.47  The apex court has not however 
been able to avoid the debate in areas where the legislature failed to act.  The next two 
sections tell of such instances. 
 
3 Sarrahwitz v Maritz 
Mrs Sarrahwitz concluded a contract of sale for the acquisition of a home.  The purchase 
price was set at a relatively meagre R40,000 (around £2,000).  Yet, like the grim 
economic reality that paralyses millions of South Africans, she was unable to finance the 
transaction with her own savings and income.  Mrs Sarrahwitz convinced her employer to 
lend her the funds, and, with this cash in hand, she paid the full purchase price in a single 
transaction.  She took occupation of her home shortly thereafter.  Out of no fault of her 
own, and despite a number of futile requests that it be done, the property was never 
registered onto her name in the deeds office.  Ownership was therefore never 
transferred.48   The troubles started when, four years after concluding the contract of sale, 
the seller was sequestrated.  As a result, Mrs Sarrahwitz’s home fell into the insolvent 
estate.  The common law provides the trustee of an insolvent estate with a discretion in 
respect to all uncompleted contracts.  The trustee must elect to either perform or terminate 
the contract, which is an election that must be made having regard to the general interest 
of all the creditors.49  In this matter, the trustee opted to terminate the contract.  In the 
exercise of this discretionary power, Mrs Sarrahwitz’s legal rights diminished drastically.  
She went from enjoying a contractual claim for the transfer of ownership to merely 
becoming an unsecured concurrent creditor.50  Her position was made far worse when the 
                                                      
47  See Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea (n 6) para 53; Machele v Mailula 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC) 
para 15. 
48  Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, s 16 (land ownership is conveyed by means of a deed of transfer 
that is attested or executed by the Registrar of Deeds). 
49  Glen Anil Finance v Joint Liquidators, Glen Anil Development Corporation 1981 (1) SA 171 (A) at 
182D–H; Goodricke & Son v Auto Protection Insurance 1968 (1) SA 717 (A) at 724.  Some authors 
prefer the view that trustees do not have the power to terminate a contract, but rather only the power 
to exclude a claim of specific performance.  See Robert Sharrock and others, Hockley’s Insolvency 
Law (6th edn, Juta 1996) 62.  
50  Glen Anil (n 49) at 182G–H. 
–164– 
insolvent trustee favoured another, presumably larger, creditor.  The next step was clear.  
Mrs Sarrahwitz would likely be evicted from her home, and was at risk of becoming 
homeless.  
Mrs Sarrahwitz launched a high court application to secure the continued 
possession of her home.  She requested an order directing the trustee to transfer the 
property onto her name, which was a claim grounded on section 22 of the Alienation of 
Land Act (Land Act).51  Section 22 falls under the chapter ‘Sale of Land on Instalments’.  
The chapter is the principle legislative framework for the sale of residential properties 
that are sold in instalments, and it provides the minimum requirements with which these 
instalment agreements must comply.  This includes, amongst other requirements, 
consensus on the applicable interest rates and the dates on which instalment payments are 
due.  Section 22 of the Land Act governs the situation where the seller becomes insolvent.  
The provision is a consumer protection provision, and it aims to increase the legal rights 
of home purchasers against the claims of other creditors.  The provision provides that a 
purchaser of residential immovable property who had bought the property on two or more 
instalments may demand transfer of ownership in the event that the seller becomes 
insolvent.  Transfer of the property is however subject to the purchaser paying all 
outstanding amounts to the insolvent estate.  Section 22 of the Land Act therefore limits 
the otherwise discretionary common law powers of insolvent trustees. 
The problem for Mrs Sarrahwitz, the high court confirmed, was that she could not 
claim the protection afforded by the Land Act.52  Section 22 only applies to instalment 
sale agreements, which the Act defines as agreements composed of at least two separate 
instalment payments.  Mrs Sarrahwitz had paid the full purchase price in a single cash 
transaction.  In accordance with the residual rules of the common law, the high court 
concluded, a cash purchaser enjoyed no right to claim ownership should the insolvent 
trustee elect to terminate the sale contract.  The law therefore extended protection to one 
group of home purchasers, but not another.  To remedy the difference in treatment, Mrs 
Sarrahwitz petitioned both the high court and thereafter the SCA for leave to appeal.  She 
argued that the common law is unconstitutional to the extent that it precludes a financially 
vulnerable person who had paid the full purchase price in a single transaction to claim 
ownership against an insolvent estate in situations where the purchaser was at risk of 
                                                      
51  68 of 1981.   
52  Sarrahwitz v Maritz [2013] ZAECGHC 10, unreported judgment, 7 February 2013 para 12. 
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homelessness.  She therefore contended that the common law (pertaining to the 
discretionary powers of trustees) should be developed to protect cash purchasers of 
homes in the same way that section 22 of the Land Act protects instalment sale 
purchasers.  The argument rested on a number of constitutional rights, including the right 
to access adequate housing.  Both the high court and SCA dismissed the petition. 
3.1 The pivot away from the common law 
The Constitutional Court granted leave to appeal, but not on the ground requested.53  The 
court also concluded that the plea to develop the common law should be dismissed.  The 
reason provided was not that it was inappropriate to introduce this question on appeal, 
which was the ground on which both the high court and SCA relied.  Rather, the court 
held, it was unwise to entertain a request for the development of the common law if the 
high court and SCA had not offered an opinion on the matter.  In support of this 
proposition, the court cited earlier case law that established the general principle that the 
apex court should refrain from developing the common law until the High Court and 
Supreme Court of Appeal have had opportunity to investigate whether the common law is 
in need of development. 54   This principle, the court emphasises, is of ‘particular 
importance’.55  The lower courts enjoy an expertise in the application of the common law, 
and the Constitutional Court benefits from their views as to whether, and, if so, how, the 
common law ought to be developed.  The apex court will therefore decline to entertain 
questions on the development of the common law as a court of first and last instance.56 
The rule is not inflexible, however.  In the past, the court has recognised that in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ it would adjudicate a request without the considered opinions 
                                                      
53  Sarrahwitz (n 2). 
54  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 53; Amod v Multilateral 
Motor Vehicle Accidents Funds 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC) para 33. 
55  Amod (n 54).  See also Mighty Solutions v Engen Petroleum 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para 43–44; 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC) para 104. 
56  Crown Restaurants v Gold Reef City 2008 (4) SA 16 (CC) paras 5–6; Lane and Fey v Dabelstein 
2001 (2) SA 1187 (CC) para 5.  See also Bruce v Fleecytex Johannesburg 1998 (2) SA 1143 (CC) 
para 8; S v Bequinot 1997 (2) SA 887 (CC) para 15. The decision of Crown Restaurants is 
particularly relevant.  The court was called upon to consider whether constitutional values require 
the reintroduction of the exceptio doli generalis as a defence to a claim of specific performance.  
The court dismissed the case on the ground that the argument was introduced on appeal. 
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of the lower courts. 57  Further, and in matters not considered exceptional, the failure of a 
litigant to invite the high court or SCA to pronounce itself is not automatically fatal.  In a 
few cases, the court remitted disputes back to the high court to consider whether the 
common law should have been developed.58  The ground for doing so is based on section 
39(2) of the Constitution, which requires the courts to develop the common law in a 
manner that ‘promote[s] the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’.59  The 
provision enjoins the courts to be alive to the possibility of developing the common law 
to meet constitutional norms.  This general mandate is not discretionary, and applies even 
if the parties had not expressly requested such an intervention in their initial pleadings.60  
The Constitutional Court’s decision in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers 
illustrates the potential operation of the section 39(2) mandate.61  The main issue for 
resolution was the development of the common law of contract in light of constitutional 
values, but, like Sarrahwitz, the argument was only introduced on appeal.  The court split 
7-4.  The minority judgment held that the common law may require developing, and 
concluded that it would have sent the matter back to the high court for reconsideration.  
The majority of the court was sympathetic to the argument for development, but 
ultimately dismissed the case.  The majority held that the potential violation of a 
constitutional right in the matter was not serious enough to warrant overriding the general 
rule that litigants should formulate their cause of action from the outset.62   
 Based on the court’s previous history, the options appeared threefold for the 
Sarrahwitz court.  The court could recognise the matter as an exceptional circumstance 
and entertain the matter as a court of first and last instance, dismiss the case for failure to 
plead the cause of action from the outset, or remit the matter back to the high court on the 
basis of section 39(2).  Remittance seemed a viable option.  The Sarrahwitz judgment 
highlights many factors that have in prior decisions justified sending the matter back to 
                                                      
57  Crown Restaurants (n 56).  Though the court did not employ the language of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, a possible example is Ramakatsa v Magashule 2013 (2) BCLR (CC).  In this 
matter, and without assistance from the high court or SCA, the court effectively developed the 
common law rules of contract pertaining to the internal organisation of political parties in 
accordance with section 19 of the Constitution.  This matter was urgent. Further, the legal 
development did not involve policy complexities, which probably made the court less nervous 
about entertaining the application as a court of first and last instance.  
58  Carmichele (n 54). 
59  Constitution s 39(2), quoted in chap 4, sec 3. 
60  Carmichele (n 54) para 39; Mighty Solutions (n 55) para 44. 
61  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
62  Sarrahwitz (n 2) para 76. 
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the high court for additional argument.  The main factor being the severe impact the high 
court judgment would have on the livelihood of the purchaser, namely homelessness.  In 
addition, the Chief Justice remarked that the high court had indeed failed to meet the 
general mandate imposed upon the courts to ensure that the common law complies with 
constitutional norms.63 
None of these options were adopted.  The court instead issued an order directing 
the cabinet minister responsible for the administration of the Land Act be joined to the 
proceedings.64  The court thereafter requested the parties (including the minister) to 
address the question as to whether the Land Act is unconstitutional for its failure to 
extend protection to purchasers whom had paid the full purchase price in a single 
transaction.65  The procedural novelty of these orders must be highlighted.  Sarrahwitz  is 
the first time the court converted a request for the development of the common law into 
the judicial review of legislation.66  What makes this procedural pivot away from the 
common law even more extraordinary is that the court took this decision without 
soliciting any arguments, and the judgment remains silent on their reasons for doing so.67 
3.2 The inflated-substantive reading 
The new legal question allowed the court to apply (more effortlessly68) the earlier 
judgment of Jaftha v Schoeman.69  This judgment is discussed in chapters four and five, 
but, to recapitulate, Jaftha declared unconstitutional a statutory provision for failing to 
allow judicial oversight and discretion over the execution of a judgment debt against a 
                                                      
63  ibid para 29. 
64  Sarrahwitz v Maritz, Case CCT 93/14, Order dated 7 August 2014.  
65  Sarrahwitz v Maritz, Case CCT 93/14, Directions dated 8 August 2014, para 7. 
66  The court’s order also defies their previous case law.  The Constitutional Court has on numerous 
occasions held that a litigant wishing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute must plead the 
case from the outset of litigation, and must establish a proper basis for invalidity in both the notice 
of motion and pleaded facts.  A belated reference in the heads of argument or oral arguments is 
insufficient.  See Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SA 505 (CC) paras 
39–40; Shaik v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2004 (3) SA 599 (CC) paras 
24–25; Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2001 (2) SA 338 (CC) para 22.     
67  It was not necessary to develop the common law or review legislation in order to protect the home 
occupier.  The insolvent trustee withdrew from the dispute (on the instruction of the other creditor 
who was funding the litigation).  See Sarrahwitz v Maritz, Case No 93/14, Affidavit of Hermanus 
Maritz, signed 16 October 2014.  As there was no longer any opposing claim, the court could have 
merely ordered the transfer of ownership. 
68  This claim is explained in section 4 below.  
69  Jaftha (n 2).  
–168– 
home.  The decision is widely cited as the leading case on the negative obligation of the 
housing right, and it stands for the proposition that the negative component of the right 
must be afforded an expanded interpretation.  That is, the obligation protects both 
procedural and substantive interests and the ambit of protection is not confined to 
evictions.70  The net of section 26 is cast wide enough to protect against the loss of an 
ownership or contractual right if that common law right is used to secure access to an 
adequate home.  The Jaftha judgments records four reasons for adopting an expanded 
scope of the right (at least in the context of legislation).71 
First, the housing right advances human dignity.72  The ability to live in your own 
home is amongst the most dignifying human experiences.  Even if the home is simple and 
perhaps even inadequate, enjoying the comfort of a personal space in which to reside 
increases self-worth.  This is because a home does not only secure the basic human need 
for shelter.  The walls of a home carve out for each person a sphere of privacy in a 
tumultuous world, which fosters the conditions required for the cultivation of our most 
intimate human relationships.73 
Second, international law requires more than a procedure.74  South Africa is a 
signatory to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 
and article 11(1) of the ICESCR enshrines the right to adequate housing.75  In the General 
Comment on ‘The Right to Adequate Housing’, the United Nations Committee on 
                                                      
70  ibid para 13 (the court effectively rejected the reasoning of the high court that section 26 of the 
Constitution is not infringed by the loss of an ownership right). 
71  The analysis of the four reasons is adapted from my earlier work in Michael Dafel, ‘Curbing the 
Constitutional Development of Contract Law’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 271. 
72  Constitution ss 1(a), 10 (the Constitution lists human dignity as a foundational value of the South 
African constitutional order, and also guarantees the right of each person to have their human 
dignity respected and protected).  See Grootboom (n 2) para 23 (‘there can be no doubt that human 
dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied to those who have 
no food, clothing and shelter’).  
73  On the connection between the right to privacy and the home, see Mathale v Linda 2016 (2) SA 461 
(CC) paras 36–37; Gaertner v Minister of Finance 2014 (1) SA 442 (CC) paras 47–48; Residents of 
Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) para 354; NM v Smith 2007 (5) 
SA 250 (CC) paras 132–34; Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 67.  In Port Elizabeth 
Municipality (n 3) the court held at paragraph 17 that a home— 
is more than just a shelter from the elements.  It is a zone of personal intimacy and 
family security.  Often, it will be the only relatively secure space of privacy and 
tranquillity in what (for poor people, in particular) is a turbulent and hostile world.   
74  Constitution s 39(1)(b) (courts must consider international law when interpreting the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights). 
75  UN General Assembly, ICESCR, 16 December 1996, United Nations Treaty Series, vol 993 page 3. 
–169– 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights wrote that a core aim of the negative component of 
the right is to protect security of tenure.  This conception of the right means that article 
11(1) does not stop at prohibiting arbitrary evictions.76  Security of tenure includes the 
‘right to live in security, peace, and dignity’.77 Adopting the view of the General 
Comment, the Jaftha court recognised the ‘need not to give the right to housing a 
restrictive interpretation’ 78 .  This flows from the fact that in a market economy 
individuals secure their housing tenure through a combination of ownership and 
contractual rights.  The rules that govern these legal relationships — many of which are 
found within private law — should therefore reflect the need to afford each person a 
sufficient amount of protection to ensure uninterrupted access to an adequate home.   The 
court quoted the General Comment: 
Tenure takes a variety of forms, including rental (public and private) accommodation, 
cooperative housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing and informational 
settlements, including occupation of land or property.  Notwithstanding the type of 
tenure, all persons should possess a degree of tenure which guarantees legal protection 
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats.79 
Third, the reasons a person may become an ‘unlawful’ occupier is not inevitably 
due to acts of greed, recklessness, or a general disregard for the law or the rights of 
others.80  Poverty is the problem.  Unlawful occupiers are often the most financially 
vulnerable individuals in society, and their occupation of another person’s property is 
usually on account of enjoying no viable alternative.  Their vulnerable position stems not 
only from a lack of income and savings.  Indigent persons lack a sense of meaningful 
autonomy.  Their weak economic status means that they are unable to conclude credit 
agreements with financial institutions, and, in some instances, they are at risk of being 
subjected to cruel and selfish acts of exploitation.81  Instead of penalising their actions, 
their impoverished financial situation requires the law to treat them with compassion and 
assistance.  The painful reality is that many individuals have no real option but to enter 
commercial agreements in order to secure access to a home.  They do so knowing the 
                                                      
76  UNCESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art 11(1) of the Covenant), 
13 December 1991, E/1992/23. 
77  ibid para 7. 
78  Jaftha (n 2) para 24. 
79  ibid.  
80  ibid para 30. 
81  ibid.  
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immense difficulty that they will have in complying with their agreements, and as well as 
the consequences that will flow should they fail to meet their undertaking.  Many of the 
cases litigated before the courts reflect this experience.  As the Jaftha court noted, what 
‘is a really a welfare problem gets converted into a property one’.82  
Fourth, there is no pressing need to restrict the scope of section 26 in the abstract.  
Constitutional rights adjudication in South Africa is, for the most part, composed of two 
stages.  It commences with rights interpretation, and, if a violation of the right is found, 
the adjudication moves to investigating whether the infringement is justifiable.  The 
advantage of the two-stage approach is that courts are at liberty to interpret rights broadly.  
Any legitimate reason to limit the protections of the housing right can rather be justified 
in accordance with the section 36 rights limitation analysis.83  It will therefore be left to 
the individual circumstances of each case to determine the extent to which a law of 
general application should permit the reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right. 
Sarrahwitz applied the Jaftha holding, and the court once more afforded the right 
a wide interpretation (in the context of a legislative framework).  The court reaffirmed 
that any measure (including those that are taken by private actors) that deprives a person 
from existing access to their adequate home is a violation of right.  Echoing the reasoning 
in Jaftha, the wide interpretation is necessitated due to the social reality of South Africa.  
The high levels of poverty and homelessness, the inability of the poor to secure home 
loans, and the importance of having a home all point towards providing as much 
protection as possible to individuals who already enjoy access to a home.84  The negative 
obligation therefore does not just protect against arbitrary evictions.  The right is also 
violated, the court continued, when a measure would ‘effectively’ render a person 
homeless.85  In this matter, the exercise of the insolvent trustees’ common law powers 
was such a measure.  Mrs Sarrahwitz was unemployed and had little prospects of raising 
a new source of income.  The refusal to transfer ownership meant that in time she would 
be left without a place to reside, which is a situation that is made even more shocking 
given that she had paid the full purchase price. 
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 Sarrahwitz departs from Jaftha in one material respect.  Whereas the Jaftha court 
required the housing right to be judicially weighed against competing interest within the 
particular circumstances of the case, the Sarrahwitz court was prepared to elevate the 
housing right over other competing rights.  The Sarrahwitz judgment reasoned that it is 
‘difficult to conceive of an instance where the refusal to transfer a home to a vulnerable 
purchaser, who has paid the purchase price in full, coupled with real risk of becoming 
homeless, would not outweigh the advantage to creditors of the seller’s insolvent 
estate’.86  The negative component of the housing rights automatically trumps all other 
concurrent claims on the estate.  The court provided this group of vulnerable occupiers an 
uncommon feature in court’s jurisprudence on the application of constitutional rights to 
private legal relationships: a fixed right. 
 The remedy requires noting.  In what may be fair to label as one of the most 
extensive ‘reading-in’ to a statute in its history, the court cured the under-inclusiveness of 
the Land Act by severing two words and adding no less than 76 new words to the Act.87  
The cumulative summary of these amendments means that any vulnerable occupier, 
which the court defined as ‘a purchaser who runs the risk of being rendered homeless by 
a seller’s insolvency’, who entered into a contract of sale for the acquisition of a 
residential property, and has paid the purchase price in full within one year from the 
conclusion of the contract, may demand transfer of the property in the event of the 
seller’s insolvency.  The striking extent to which the court altered the scope of the 
legislative scheme is made appreciable by the fact that the court had to delete ‘on 
instalments’ from the legislative chapter heading.  In accordance with the new provisions 
to the Land Act, the court ordered the insolvent trustee to transfer ownership of the 
property to Mrs Sarrahwitz. 
                                                      
86  ibid para 64.  
87  The minister conceded that the Act was unconstitutional and proposed much of the wording that the 
court ultimately inserted into the Act.  Not too much should be read into this concession, however.  
The minister is primarily responsible for implementing (and defending) the Land Act.  It is 
questionable whether a minister can concede so much without the approval of either cabinet or the 
legislature.  This is particularly the case given that the concessions of the minister meant that main 
purpose of Chapter 2 of the Land Act was altered.  The legislative chapter was initially promulgated 
to protect one type of vulnerable home purchasers and not another.  The judgment mentions that the 
initial legislative purpose was to extend protection to vulnerable home purchasers, but the text of 
the Act does not reflect that intention.  The impugned provisions rather formed part of a much 
larger legislative framework aimed at regulating all instalment sale agreements of residential 
properties, regardless of the wealth of the purchaser. 
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 The Sarrahwitz judgment contains no hints as to why the court felt compelled to 
convert a plea for the development of the common law to the judicial review of 
legislation.  The decision to substitute the cause of action was made in chambers, and the 
judgment offers no explanation for the procedural pivot away from the common law.  In 
fact, the judgment fails to disclose that it was the members of the court that raised the 
legal question upon which case was decided.  The court’s decisions makes more sense 
however when viewed against their earlier decision in Maphango, and the debate that 
erupted in the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal over how expansively 
the scope of the negative obligation should be interpreted when applied to the common 
law.  
 
4 Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties  
The matter stemmed from a decision of a landlord to terminate residential lease 
agreements with the sole aim of securing higher rentals.  Following renovations to an 
apartment building located within the inner city of Johannesburg, which was supported 
with subsidies received from the state, the landlord believed that it was financially 
necessary to increase the rent payable on each of the existing lease agreements by 
between 100 to 150 per cent.  The drastic increase, the landlord calculated, was necessary 
to cover the costs of the renovations and realise an appropriate rate of return on the 
investment.  The immediate problem with this financial strategy was that the lease 
agreements contained rent-escalation clauses.  The agreements limited the annual increase 
to 15 per cent.  To circumvent the rent-escalation clauses, the landlord terminated the 
lease agreements.  This was done pursuant to a provision in the agreements that allowed 
either the landlord or tenant to terminate the agreements on reasonable notice.  The 
landlord thereafter offered new lease agreements to the tenants.  The new agreements 
were materially no different to the terminated agreements, except that the rent more than 
doubled.  The tenants refused to sign the new agreements.  A large majority of the tenants 
were financially vulnerable, and faced the prospect of becoming homeless as they could 
not afford the increased rentals.  The tenants’ refusal to accept the new agreements led the 
landlord to institute an application for their eviction.88  
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The tenants defended the application on the ground that the lease agreements 
were not lawfully terminated, and, as a result, they were not unlawful occupiers.  The 
crux of the argument was that the termination of a lease agreement given the particular 
circumstances of the case was contrary to public policy, and, accordingly, unenforceable.  
The argument was built on the housing right.  The tenants contended that the decision to 
terminate a lease agreement for the sole purpose of increasing the rent violated section 
26(1) of the Constitution.  The infringement of the right, in turn, rendered the exercise of 
the contractual power against public policy.  The argument was somewhat convoluted, 
but, in essence, the tenants argued that section 26(1) of the Constitution should restrict the 
bare contractual power of a landlord to cancel a residential lease agreement.  To 
understand why this argument enjoyed prospects of success, it is necessary zoom out 
from the Maphango matter for a moment and expand upon the discussion in chapter four 
that details the impact of the Constitution on the common law of contract.  
4.1 The impact of the Constitution on contract law 
Chapter four illustrated how the Constitution expanded the public policy enquiry to 
incorporate the extrinsic-based test.  This prong of the test focuses on the results that flow 
from enforcement, which requires courts to assess whether circumstances that are 
external to the contract caused a result that is inimical to public policy (which includes 
infringement upon constitutional right norms).89  Though it is unclear to what extent the 
threshold of the public policy enquiry has grown, it bears pointing to the high watermark 
of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the capacity of constitutional values to 
deny the enforcement of an otherwise objectively valid contractual provision.  In the 
matter of Botha v Rich, the parties concluded an agreement for the sale of commercial 
land. 90   The purchaser undertook to pay the purchase price over sixty monthly 
instalments.  The seller would in turn transfer ownership of the property once the full 
purchase price had been paid.  The agreement also provided that if the purchaser fell into 
breach of contract, the seller would be entitled to cancel the agreement, and, as a penalty, 
the purchaser would forfeit to the seller all of the payments that had been effected under 
the agreement. 
                                                      
89  For an example of how the access to adequate housing right informs the intrinsic-based prong of the 
public policy enquiry, see Mottel v Altmarr Properties [2013] ZAWCHC 115, unreported 
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The purchaser paid approximately three-quarters of the purchase price over a 
period of three and a half years, but subsequently defaulted on the monthly instalments 
for more than sixteen months.  During this period, and while remaining in breach of the 
agreement, the purchaser requested the seller to transfer the property in accordance with 
section 27(1) of the Land Act.91  The statutory provision aims to enhance the protection 
of land purchasers, and it permits the purchaser to demand the transfer of ownership if at 
least half of the purchase price has been paid.   Sellers are also protected:  the provision 
provides that the transfer of ownership is conditional on the registration of a mortgage 
bond over the property to secure the balance of the purchase price and interest due.92  
Section 27(1) therefore only affords a partial benefit to a purchaser.  Though ownership is 
transferred, the property remains liable for immediate execution should the purchaser fail 
to pay the instalments. 
The seller ignored the request for transfer.  Eight months later, and after the seller 
demanded payment of the arrear instalments, the purchaser offered to pay all of the 
outstanding amounts.  The tender was however conditional on the transfer of property 
onto her name.  The seller once more did not respond to the request for transfer.  Instead, 
and relying on the right to terminate in the event of breach, the seller instituted 
proceedings in the high court for an order declaring the contract cancelled.93  The 
purchaser defended the action, and argued that it would be contrary to public policy, and 
consequently unenforceable, to enforce the cancellation clause given the circumstances of 
the case.  The purchaser thus relied on the extrinsic-based prong of the public policy 
enquiry.  It was argued that the a contractual power to cancel an agreement ought not be 
enforced in a situation where the purchaser had (i) paid more than half of the purchase 
price, (ii) would not be entitled to claim any restitution for the payments already effected 
due to the forfeiture clause, and (iii) demanded the transfer of property pursuant to the 
statutory right afforded by the Land Act but nevertheless refused by the seller.  In 
addition to the defence, the purchaser instituted a counter-application, and requested an 
                                                      
91  Land Act (n 51). 
92  Botha (n 90).  This is the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, which differs from that of the 
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order directing the seller to transfer the property in accordance with section 27(1) of the 
Land Act.  The Full Court of the High Court dismissed both the defence and the counter 
application.  It found that the enforcement of the cancellation clause was not against 
public policy.  The exercise of the contractual right to cancel was neither unreasonable 
nor unfair, and it violated no other right.94  The high court declared the contract cancelled 
(which meant the seller retained ownership and the three-quarters of the purchase price 
already paid).  The SCA dismissed an application for leave to appeal. 
A unanimous Constitutional Court overturned the high court decision. The 
Constitutional Court held that section 27(1) of the Land Act is a ‘contractual right implied 
by law’, and, as a result, the statutory provision did not rebut the presumption that 
obligations in a bilateral contract are reciprocal.95  This interpretation is important, as the 
provision does not superimpose a statutory right over the contractual rights of the parties.  
A purchaser of land is therefore only permitted to exercise the ‘implied’ contractual right 
if they were not themselves in breach of contract.  A purchaser could not demand transfer 
in accordance with section 27(1) of the Act until all arrear instalment payments were 
paid.  This was the situation before the court.  The purchaser remained in breach, and, 
accordingly, the seller was under no obligation to transfer the property.  This was not the 
end of the matter however.  
The court proceeded, in effect, to apply a new contractual defence.  All law, 
including the common law of contract, is subject to constitutional control.  Judicial and 
academic writing on this topic has, for the most part, been confined to investigating the 
extent to which constitutional rights (or values) restrict the private power to contract.  The 
Botha judgment reframed the debate.  The starting point is not whether a particular 
constitutional right may nullify an obligation voluntarily undertaken.  In other words, the 
primary purpose of constitutional rights should not be viewed as a means restrict the 
power of contract.  On the contrary, the law of contract is a legal instrument that 
promotes the realisation of core constitutional values.  The protection of human autonomy 
is at the centre of our constitutional order, and the law of contracts is a tool that enables 
individuals to choose how best to advance their own interests.  The corollary of the 
freedom to pursue is responsibility for our decisions, and the law should therefore give 
effect to contractual undertakings.  The protection of autonomy is also not the only 
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–176– 
applicable constitutional value.  Contracts are not purely individualistic acts.  The act of 
concluding a contract, and thereafter the performance of undertaken obligations, is also a 
means to respect the dignity, freedom, and equal worth of our contracting parties.96  
Contracts serve to mutually enhance the position of both parties.  When viewed through 
the prism of the Constitution, the court held, the underlying assumption of contract law is 
that parties conclude agreements in good faith and that they do so in order to obtain 
benefits from one another.97  
The performance of contractual obligations therefore promotes the realisation of 
constitutional values, and courts will accordingly enforce contractual undertakings.  The 
principle of reciprocity — that is, a contracting party does not need to perform until the 
other party has met their undertakings — gives effect to the underlying value of good 
faith at the time of enforcement.98  The principle of reciprocity cures selfish acts, as it 
ensures that individuals do not pursue their own contractual interests without regard to the 
interests of the other party.99 
The principle of reciprocity falls squarely within this understanding of good faith and 
freedom of contract, based on one’s own dignity and freedom as well as respect for 
the dignity and freedom of others. 
The court recognised however that the ‘rigid’ application of the principle of 
reciprocity may in some instances lead to an injustice.100  That is, the enforcement of an 
agreement may undermine the underlying value of good faith.  If this should happen, the 
court concluded, the principle of good faith requires a flexible application of the principle 
of reciprocity to ensure fairness between the parties.101  Botha was such an instance.  The 
rigid application of the principle of reciprocity in this case, a unanimous court concluded, 
would result in a disproportionate sanction.  The purchaser would lose the property, and 
forfeit the three-quarters of the purchase price paid.  The effect of permitting the seller to 
cancel the contract would also deprive the purchaser the right to transfer of the property 
under section 27(1) of the Land Act, and in the process cure the breach of contract.  The 
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court directed the seller to transfer the property, provided that all arrear amounts are paid 
and a mortgage bond is registered. 
The Botha judgment is not clearly reasoned, and it is difficult to articulate the 
precise doctrinal rule.102  The effect of the judgment is however clear from the outcome.  
The court condoned a breach of contract.  Not only was the breaching party offered an 
opportunity to rectify the non-performance, the court prevented the innocent contracting 
party from exercising a contractual right to cancel the contract, and, in doing so, 
precluded the innocent party from benefiting from a penalty clause.  The principles 
applied in this matter altered a central component of contract law: namely, that each 
person should be held to their bargain and the liabilities that flow from non-performance.  
If the consequences of the breach would lead to a ‘disproportionate’ result, the Botha 
judgment suggests, a party may well escape at least some of that liability. 103  It is difficult 
to predict at this stage how this case will be applied in future matters.  Nevertheless, 
Botha illustrates willingness on the part of the Constitutional Court to challenge the 
assumptions and policies on which pre-Constitution public policy test is premised, and to 
remodel the rules of contract law in order to meet constitutional norms. 
4.2 The deflated-procedural reading  
The Botha judgment suggests that the Maphango tenants enjoyed similar prospects of 
success.  They too requested the courts to restrict the bare power to terminate a contract.  
To recap, the tenants accepted that the termination clause was not in itself a violation of 
public policy.  Their application was grounded on the second prong of the test, arguing 
that the external circumstances in which the landlord exercised the power to terminate 
violated public policy.  The decision to terminate the lease agreements was motivated 
solely by the want to escape the rent-escalation clause, which is an act that frustrated the 
tenants’ expectation to a less than 15 per cent increase in annual rent.  The landlord also 
made no attempt to negotiate with the tenants, nor did the landlord request a fair increase 
in rentals in accordance with rental housing market legislation.104  The landlord’s decision 
was unilateral, and was a far cry from the Botha court’s articulation of the good faith 
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contracting parties are expected to show one another.  The tenants added further 
constitutional force to the public policy argument.  They argued that the enforcement of 
the termination clause would infringe upon their section 26 housing right.  Owing to the 
fact that they could neither afford new rentals nor secure an apartment of a similar 
standard, the termination of the agreement would result in homelessness or a severe 
retrogression in their socio-economic status.  The negative component of the housing 
right therefore necessitates the development of the common law in order to restrict the 
bare power of a landlord to terminate a lease agreement.  The tenants therefore appealed 
to the expanded reading of the obligation.  In the particular factual matrix of their case, 
the tenants maintained that their interests to enjoy secure access to an adequate home 
outweighed the economic interests of the landowner. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal accepted each individual step of the tenants’ 
argument as correct: section 26 prohibits private individuals and entities from interfering 
with the security of tenure of another person, and that contractual provisions that are 
inimical to constitutional values are unenforceable. 105  The SCA rejected the conclusion 
however.  In a unanimous judgment, the SCA held that the act of terminating a lease 
agreement — whether performed pursuant to a power provided for in a contract or the 
residual rules of the common law — does not infringe the section 26 housing right.   The 
SCA reasoned that a tenant only enjoys security of tenure during the period prescribed in 
the lease agreement (or, if no period is prescribed, until reasonable notice is given).  A 
tenant has no legal security of tenure outside the terms of the contract.106  The SCA 
therefore equates security of tenure provided in a contract with the security of tenure 
safeguarded by the Constitution.  It was on this point that the SCA distinguished the 
matter from Jaftha.  That decision, unlike the matter at hand, pertained to the right of an 
owner.  Ownership entails possession, and security of tenure, for an indefinite duration.  
A lease agreement is different.  Leases entail possession only until the contract is 
terminated in accordance with the agreed-upon provisions of the contract or the rules of 
common law. The SCA therefore concluded that the tenants’ security of tenure was 
‘circumscribed by the leases themselves’ and that it therefore could not be claimed that 
termination in accordance with the leases constituted an infringement of the tenants’ right 
to secure tenure.107  The practical effect of the SCA’s reasoning is that section 26 of the 
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Constitution provides no additional safeguard outside the terms of the contract.  This is a 
narrow-procedural reading of the obligation.  The SCA thus followed their earlier 
reasoning in Brisely.  The housing right only safeguards pre-existing common law rights.  
Section 26 adds nothing more.  This is even the case if the cancellation leads to a 
significant retrogression of a person’s socio-economic status, including homelessness.  
The reasoning of the SCA is difficult to reconcile with Jaftha.  The Jaftha 
decision simply does not support the claim that a tenant’s constitutional right to security 
of tenure is tied to either the lease period or ownership.  The Jaftha court only discussed 
ownership because the impugned provision in that matter authorised the execution of 
immovable property (and, for most people, immovable property is limited to residential 
property).  The loss of ownership was not the problem in Jaftha, and nothing in the 
court’s broad interpretation of section 26 depends on the occupier owning the property.108  
Simply put, section 26 does not protect ownership.  The entire purpose of the housing 
right is to ensure that the security of tenure of a home is protected, regardless of the 
context in which that home is enjoys.  This may include instances where the occupier 
owns the property, but extends to other instances including occupation without any 
private law right.  Indeed, a primary aim of section 26 is to afford a certain degree of 
tenured protection to unlawful occupiers whom have settled and build makeshift houses 
on land that does not belong to them. 
The SCA’s reasoning is difficult to accept for an additional reason.  The 
suggestion that the tenants ‘circumscribed’ their own security of tenure implies that 
individuals are permitted to waive away the exercise of their constitutional rights.109  A 
distinction must be kept between the security of tenure that a contract affords and the 
security of tenure that section 26 guarantees.  The latter is a more expanded protection, 
and, in accordance with constitutional supremacy, may trump contractual rights.  
Constitutional security of tenure is independent from the security of tenure a contract 
affords, but the reverse of this relationship is not true.  The cancellation of a contract may 
bring to an end the security of tenure rights stipulated in the contract, but it does not 
terminate your section 26 guarantees.  On the converse, however, the cancellation of a 
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lease agreement may cause the invocation of the housing security rights in terms of 
section 26.  This is precisely what the tenants in Maphango sought to do.  The SCA failed 
to appreciate this distinction.  Their failure is perplexing because the Constitutional Court 
has instructed lower courts not to presume that contractual provisions have simply waived 
away the security of tenure protections of section 26.  In Gundwana v Steko Development, 
for example, a unanimous court held that contracting parties do not waive away their 
section 26 rights upon concluding a mortgage agreement.110  
4.3 The inflated-substantive reading 
The tenants appealed to the Constitutional Court.  They contended that the SCA’s 
conclusion that section 26 does not limit the common law power of contract in residential 
lease agreements is incorrect.  Despite the fact that the reasoning of the SCA stands on 
shaky legs, the majority of the Constitutional Court in Maphango opted not to respond to 
this legal question, and, in doing so, left the holding of the SCA as the black-letter law 
position on the matter.  Instead, and once more, the court reformulated the legal question.  
The pertinent question for resolution, the majority held, was whether the Rental Housing 
Act (RHA) restricts the contractual power of a landlord to cancel a lease agreement.111 
The RHA is the principle legislative scheme for the regulation of the rental 
housing market, and the majority of the court read the Act as forming part of the 
constitutional obligations upon the state to realise progressively the right to access 
adequate housing.112  The Act defines the responsibilities of both the national and 
provincial governments, including their functions to increase the availability of affordable 
rental housing in the private market.  The Act also crystallises the duty upon the state to 
protect constitutional rights from undue interference by private individuals and entities. 
The RHA enumerates an extensive list of statutory rights for both contracting parties.  
The lessee, for instance, is entitled to demand that the lease is reduced to writing.113  
Written leases must also stipulate the amount of rent to be paid, as well as the reasonable 
escalation of the rent.114  Further provisions are made for the right to request a deposit, the 
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qualified right to inspect the premises, and the right to reclaim incurred expenditures and 
inflicted damages.115  The Act further preserves the common law right of a landowner to 
terminate the lease.  This right is however subject to an important caveat.  The RHA 
prohibits a landlord from exercising a contractual power to cancel on grounds that 
constitute an ‘unfair practice’. 116  The legislative framework defines ‘unfair practice in 
wide terms.  It encompasses any ‘act or omission by a landlord or tenant in contravention 
of the Act’ and any other ‘practice prescribed as unreasonably prejudicing the rights of 
interests of a tenant or a landlord.’117  Pursuant to the definition, the Gauteng provincial 
government prescribed ‘unfair conduct’ to include any act or omission that is ‘oppressive 
or unreasonable’.118  The formulation of the ‘unfair practice’ definition, the majority of 
the court emphasised, meant the legislative framework protects far more than just 
established statutory or common law rights.  The RHA protects those interests that 
encompass the general wellbeing of tenants and landlords.  The enquiry into whether an 
unfair practice is present therefore requires consideration into whether the impugned 
conduct negatively impinges upon any benefits, advantages, or securities currently 
enjoyed by either contracting party.119  The legislative translation of the right follows the 
more expansive reading of the housing right, as the RHA restricts the otherwise bare 
contractual power to cancel a lease agreement. 
The Act is enforced through provincial housing tribunals, and all disputes 
pertaining to an ‘unfair practice’ must be resolved through these administrative forums.120  
Each provincial tribunal is composed of three to five members.  They are appointed by 
the provincial executive, and must be experienced in the management of property, 
consumer, and housing development matters.121  The RHA also empowers the housing 
tribunal to follow a flexible procedure.  The tribunal may require the parties to first 
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attempt mediation before a complaint is heard.  The tribunal may also instruct inspectors 
and information officers to report on any matters relevant to a complaint.122    
Upon finding the existence of an unfair practice, the housing tribunal is afforded 
wide remedial power to make any order that is ‘just and fair to terminate the unfair 
practice’. 123   This includes, but is not limited to, orders that seek to discontinue 
overcrowding, unacceptable living conditions, and exploitative rentals.124  The tribunal is 
also empowered to determine a new rent amount.  This calculation must be done in a 
manner that is just and equitable to both the tenant and the landlord and takes due 
cognisance of: (i) prevailing economic conditions of supply and demand; (ii) the need for 
a realistic return on investment for investors in rental housing; and (iii) incentives, 
mechanism, norms and standards and other measures introduced by government in terms 
of the policy framework of rental housing referred in section 2(3).125  The findings of the 
tribunal constitute an order of a magistrates’ court,126 and may be taken on judicial 
review.127 
The Maphango court justified the pivot to the RHA on the basis that the tenants 
had in fact sought to protect their interests through the mechanisms of the Act.   
Following the landlord’s decision to cancel the lease agreements, but before the landlord 
instituted eviction proceedings, the tenants lodged a complaint of an ‘unfair practice’ with 
the Gauteng Rental Housing Tribunal.  The tenants withdrew their complaint after the 
landlord instituted the eviction application.  They believed this move was necessary to 
focus their financial resources and efforts to defending the eviction application.  Despite 
their withdrawal, however, the majority of the Constitutional Court concluded that the 
Tribunal’s determination as to whether the landlord’s termination of the agreements for 
the sole purpose to secure higher rentals constituted an unfair practice is a relevant 
consideration that a court should have regard to during an eviction application.  The high 
court ought to have postponed the hearings to permit the Tribunal to make such a finding.  
The court consequently remitted the matter back to the Housing Tribunal.  In defending 
this pivot away from the common law, the court conceded that none of the parties fully 
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appreciated the relevance of the RHA to their dispute.  But, as a principle of the rule of 
law, courts are not permitted to decline the application of statues, as it would permit 
litigants to ignore applicable legislation.128 
In one sense, however, the revision of the legal question is problematic.  It bears 
emphasising that the parties never requested an order that the matter be remitted to 
housing tribunal (the tenants merely argued that it was against public policy for the lessor 
to cancel an agreement for the sole purpose of securing higher rentals given that the lessor 
had the opportunity to request a redetermination of the rent with the housing tribunal).  
The parties also did not ignore the RHA.  Though the Tribunal is exclusively empowered 
to entertain allegations of an ‘unfair practice’, a contracting party is not required to 
resolve their dispute through the housing tribunal should they have an additional cause of 
action.129  In fact, although the RHA is a more simplified and cost-effective dispute 
resolution mechanism, there are good reasons for why a tenant or landlord would want to 
avoid the RHA.  The administrative tribunal is composed of non-judges, and their 
decision is not subject to appeal.130  If their pleaded arguments had succeeded, the tenants 
would have been entitled to an immediate (and stronger) substantive relief.  The RHA 
may also prove to be cumbersome process swamped down by extra-legal considerations.  
The facts of Maphango illustrate this point.  After the landlord institute an eviction 
application, the tenants were forced to defend the application before the high courts.  
Here, they raised the argument that the common law was unconstitutional.  This was a 
legal argument, and the court should have pronounced itself.  The majority of the court 
rather prolonged the process by remitting the matter back to the housing tribunal where 
the matter originally started.  This is a route that the tenants strategically opted to avoid.  
They declined to raise the argument of res judicata (the eviction application should be 
postponed until the Housing Tribunal has adjudicated the matter), and rather elected to 
plea for the development of the common law.131  It is therefore difficult to resist viewing 
the court’s decision as a tactical move to direct how the jurisprudence on this matter 
should develop. 
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4.4 Legislative policy 
The Maphango court’s pivot away from the common law has been defended as an act of 
comity, a decision that shows respect to the choices of the legislature.132  The argument 
goes that the legislature is the principle institution responsible for law-reform, and, as 
such, the courts should not unduly undermine the legislature particularly in policy 
complex matters like monetary issues and the management of limited economic 
resources.133  For reasons that are explained in chapters 8 and 9, there are problems with 
this argument.134  At this stage, the only point that needs noting is that Maphango is an 
outlier to the court’s general position on which institution is responsible for developing 
the common law of contract in line with constitutional norms.  There appears to be no 
other contract dispute where the court strategically pivoted towards legislative remedies.  
In fact, in the Botha judgment, which is the high water mark for the extrinsic-based prong 
of the public policy enquiry, the Constitutional Court ignored legislative policy.  The 
common law of contract permits parties to include forfeiture clauses in their agreements.  
In accordance with the Conventional Penalties Act, however, a court is empowered to 
reduce the penalty to an amount that it considers ‘equitable in the circumstances’ if it 
appears the penalty is ‘out of proportion to the prejudice suffered’.135  The onus to prove 
the penalty clause as excessive falls on the debtor, but the courts retain a discretionary 
power to reduce the penalty of their own accord.136  Despite the availability of a 
legislative remedy to mitigate the effects of the penalty, the Botha court was satisfied to 
apply a new defence within the common law of contract.  The court’s decision to avoid 
this legislative remedy is striking because the application of the Conventional Penalties 
Act would have resulted in less of a disturbance to the common law of contract; the court 
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could have enforced the right of the innocent party to cancel the contract but reduce the 
penalty amount to lessen the ‘disproportionate’ impact on the breaching party.137 
In addition to ignoring available legislation, the Botha court’s development of the 
common law appears to stand in contrast to the position of the legislature.  In 2001, and in 
response to certain sectors of the South African legal community believing that the power 
of courts to invalidate unfair contracts should be widened, the Law Commission 
published a draft bill that recommended bestowing on all courts a general discretion to 
amend or rescind any contractual provision if the enforcement of the provision led to an 
‘unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive’ outcome. 138   The proposed bill was 
criticised.  It was argued that such wide judicial discretion would not only lead to 
uncertainty and inconsistent application, but it would also frustrate the expectations of the 
contracting parties.139   The legislature consequently ignored the proposed the Bill.  
Instead, the legislature adopted a more a piecemeal strategy.  Post-1994, legislative policy 
has been to regulate particular contracts within their own specific legislative 
framework.140  These legislative schemes often bestow a degree of discretion on the 
courts to nullify oppressive contracts.  The exercise of the discretion is however limited, 
as the power to invalidate a contract or alter the expectations of the contracting parties 
must be made within the context and parameters of the statute.  The courts are required to 
be sensitive to the policy objectives of the act, which includes how the legislative scheme 
aims to favour and burden different groups of individuals. 
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5 Avoiding the common law 
The Constitutional Court has yet to offer a rationale for maintaining two interpretations of 
the housing right, and, until the court does so, the two distinct readings of the obligation 
will continue to frustrate doctrinal coherence.  Despite no explanation, there is a 
discernable pattern.  The Constitutional Court has shown a strong preference for the more 
expanded-substantive reading, whereas the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) oscillates 
between the narrow and the expanded reading.  The swing is not indiscriminate however.  
The jump between readings is on account of the source of law.  The SCA reserves the 
deflated-procedural reading of the obligation for disputes adjudicated in accordance with 
the common law rules of private law.  The more inflated reading is applied to disputes 
settled within a legislative framework.  This dichotomy coincides with the approach of 
the Constitutional Court.  While the court ignores the common law, the expanded-
substantive reading is followed in legislative disputes.  The existence of a strategy to 
avoid the common law is further evidenced by the fact that the court manipulates the rules 
of procedure, and it does so with the aim of swivelling the dispute away from the 
common law.  The manipulation is witnessed in Maphango and Sarrahwitz.  In both 
judgments, the court ignores the request of home occupiers to develop the common law.  
Instead, and acting on its own volition, the court proceeds to adjust procedural rules in 
order to locate a legislative remedy.  It is therefore legislation, and the not the common 
law, that grants relief to financially vulnerable home occupiers who are at risk of 
becoming homeless on account of the otherwise lawful actions of private individuals and 
entities.  The substitution by the court of its own cause of action is unusual in an 
adversarial legal system, and the court’s procedural pivot away from the common law 
requires a defensible explanation.141  Though an adequate explanation is lacking, the 
repeated manipulation of procedural rules is at the very least an indication that the court 
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A party has a duty to allege in the pleadings the material facts upon which it relies.  It is 
impermissible for a plaintiff to plead a particular case and seek to establish a different 
case at the trial.  It is equally not permissible for the trial court to have recourse to issues 
falling outside the pleadings when deciding a case. 
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intends (or feels compelled) to avoid adjudicating these disputes within the framework of 
the common law.142 
 What are the reasons that explain the avoidance of the common law?  To answer 
this question, it may prove useful to examine an instance where the Constitutional Court 
embraced the judicial law-making pathway despite political opposition.  Comparing an 
example of avoidance to an example of embrace allows for a better assessment as to when 
courts deem it necessary to seek legislative assistance. 
 
                                                      
142  Both the Constitutional Court and the SCA have confirmed that they enjoy the power to raise a new 
issue of their own accord provided that the question of law emerges in full from the established 
evidence, is necessary to resolve the dispute, and causes no unfairness to the litigant affected by the 
judicial reframing of the cause of action.  This discretionary power is employed sparingly.  See 
CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries 2009 (2) SA 204 (CC) para 68; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) 










DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW: 
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
 
This chapter uses a dispute adjudicated under section 19(1)(b) of the 
Constitution — which safeguards the right to participate in the activities of a 
political party — as a case study to illustrate an instance where the 
Constitutional Court developed the common law despite political opposition. 
 
1 Models of regulation 
The extent to which public law should regulate the internal activities of political parties is 
a dilemma that arises in every constitutional democracy.  The central function of political 
parties to aid in forming the democratic voice of the state necessitates that these 
organisations are protected by an array of political rights.  The right to freedom of 
association, for instance, typically translates into a corresponding duty on the state not to 
interfere in the internal activities of political parties. 1   In the exercise of their 
constitutional rights, however, the actions of political parties may come to frustrate and 
perhaps even threaten the conditions required for a functioning democracy because the 
competition for political power renders these organisations and their members susceptible 
to acts of autocracy and political intimidation.  This is the dilemma: how should a 
constitutional system reconcile the need to both protect and control the internal activities 
                                                      
1 For example, see UNHRC, General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, 
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art 25 of the ICCPR), 12 July 1996, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1Add7, paras 8, 25–26. 
–190– 
of political parties?  There is no clear solution.  The history of human civilisation 
provides a plethora of examples to demonstrate the potential pitfalls of any proposed 
solution.  It is for this reason that the question as to the extent to which a constitutional 
democracy should develop legal doctrine to counter the threats that political parties pose 
elicits a wide array of responses across the globe.  They range from ‘nothing at all, even if 
that leads to the downfall of democracy’2 to ‘everything, including the adoption of 
illiberal measures’.3 
 These two extremes can be conceptualised as two theoretical models, namely the 
liberal and supervisory models.  Each agrees that political parties are indispensible 
institutions for the proper functioning of a democratic society, chief of which is to 
influence and form the will of government.4  The models diverge on how best to achieve 
such a result. 
1.1 Liberal model 
The liberal model believes that each political party must be afforded the absolute freedom 
to self-regulate.  The core rationale for this approach stems from a common wisdom in 
democratic theory that public institutions should neither inhibit nor control political 
debate amongst its citizenry.  Those serving in elected office have a vested and biased 
interest in these debates, and the perennial worry is that elected officials will employ the 
machinery of the state to quell dissent and opposition.  In order to prevent such an 
outcome, the liberal model grants private individuals and entities the full liberty to speak 
                                                      
2  US Supreme Court Associate Justice Oliver Holmes wrote that it is the role of a judge to help 
citizens ‘go to Hell’ if it is indeed the wishes of the ‘dominant forces in a community’ to establish 
an authoritarian regime.  See Gitlow v New York (1925) 268 US 652 at 673; Letter from Oliver 
Holmes to Harold Laski dated 4 March 1920, reprinted in Mark DeWolfe Howe (ed), Holmes-Laski 
Letters (Harvard University Press 1953) at 248–49. 
3  In the study of ‘militant democracy’, an otherwise democratic constitutional system is permitted to 
adopt measures that revoke the political rights of those that threaten the practice of democracy. See 
Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I’ (1937) 31 American Political 
Science Review 417 at 437 (democracy must make every effort to rescue itself from fascism even if 
that is at the ‘risk and cost of violating fundamental principles’ of democracy and fundamental 
rights). See also German Federal Constitutional Court judgments on the banning of political parties, 
The Socialist Reich Party Case (1952) 2 BVerfGE 1; The Communist Party Case (1956) 5 
BVerfGE 85. 
4 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press 1945) 295.  See also 
Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General) (2003) 1 SCR 912 paras 39–40 (the value of political 
parties to a democracy is not dependent on their capacity to offer the electorate a government; 
smaller parties also have the capacity to serve as vehicles for meaningful participation in the 
democratic process). 
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and organise themselves in the so-called ‘marketplace of ideas’ in order to choose policy 
objectives and public representatives.5  Each political party will therefore enjoy the 
unbridled autonomy to select their own internal structures, choose entry and exit criteria, 
and decide for themselves the best process through which the political message of the 
party is generated.  The liberal model means that the market of political debate remains 
unregulated even in situations where the state benevolently believes that regulating the 
internal activities of political parties will increase political stability or ensure wider and 
fairer participation of citizens in the democratic process.  The liberal model erects a strict 
constitutional divide between party and state, and affords the former unqualified rights to 
free speech and political association. 
The United States best exemplifies the liberal model.  The US Supreme Court has 
on numerous occasions invalidated legislative attempts that sought to control the internal 
processes of political parties.6  For example, in Eu v San Francisco Country Democratic 
Central Committee, the court declared invalid a state law that prohibited the governing 
committees of a political party from endorsing any candidate contesting an internal 
primary election.7  The court held that such a law violates the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution on the ground that it ‘directly hampers the ability of a party to spread its 
message’.8  The aim of the legislative scheme, which was to prevent factionalism within 
political parties and prevent party leaders from confusing and unduly influencing voters, 
was held not to be a sufficient state interest to warrant overriding the freedom to 
associate.9  This approach continued in the decision of California Democratic Party v 
Jones.  Here the court struck down a referendum that would have allowed non-members 
to participate in the internal elections of political parties.10  The main purpose of the 
referendum was to ensure that the party’s candidate for public office enjoyed wide 
                                                      
5  The term was coined by US Supreme Court Associate Justice William Douglas in the decision of 
United States v Rumely (1953) 345 US 41. 
6  See also Tashjian v Republican Party (1986) 479 US 208 (a state may not prohibit a political party 
from permitting citizens who remain politically unaffiliated from participating in primary 
elections); Democratic Party v Wisconsin (1981) 450 US 107 at 126 (a law cannot compel a state 
delegate of a political party who is attending a national convention to vote in a particular manner if 
doing so would violate the internal rules of the party).  The US does not strictly adhere to the liberal 
model, as the Supreme Court has invalidated the internal choices and structures of parties on a 
handful occasions.  See, for example, Smith v Allwright (1944) 321 US 649 (a party cannot exclude 
participation on the grounds of race) 
7  (1989) 489 US 214 at 223. 
8  ibid. 
9  ibid at 227–28. 
10  (2000) 530 US 567.  
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support from the general electorate so as to prevent individuals representing extreme and 
narrow interests from emerging as the nominated candidate. The court dismissed the 
legislative concerns, and held that there could be no ‘heavier burden on a political party’s 
associational freedom’ than to compel a party to allow non-party members to participate 
in the nomination process and ultimately influence the message of the party.11 
A consequence of the liberal model is that private individuals and entities are 
entitled to use as much of their economic resources and personal efforts as they deem 
desirable to promote a political cause to those that are willing to listen to their message.  
To be clear, the liberal model does not believe that the powerful in society should enjoy 
more political leverage.  The liberal model rests on the assumption that each citizen’s 
right to vote for elected officials is sufficient to ensure parity of political participation.  It 
makes little difference, the argument goes, that certain powerful economic actors have 
more influence over political discussion as the electorate remains free to reject the views 
of the powerful when casting their vote.12  To the extent that economic influence is 
considered an unfair factor in political debate, the assumption is that political parties will 
self-regulate to ensure broad support amongst the general electorate because appealing 
only to a few narrow and financial interests will result in failure at the polls.13 
1.2 Supervisory model 
The supervisory model is critical of the assumption that underpins the liberal model: by 
itself, the right to vote is incapable of ensuring equal participation in political debate (or 
perhaps that the right to vote should not be viewed as the end of the democratic process 
but only as one way to participate in public discourse).  The predominant concern of the 
supervisory model is that an unregulated political market is not conducive to the 
establishment of an accountable and representative state.  The unbridled ‘market of ideas’ 
may appear neutral at first glance, but it may cause the entrenchment of existing political 
forces in a way that dissuades meaningful political discussion and participation amongst 
                                                      
11  ibid at 577, 581–82.  US scholars criticise Jones on the basis that affording political parties a right 
to associate free from state interference severely restricts the ability of the state to ensure that 
political parties function properly and efficiently.  See Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Private Parties with 
Public Purposes’ (2001) 101 CLR 274, 294–97. 
12  See generally Citizens United v Federal Election Commission (2010) 588 US 310. 
13  See Eu (n 7) at 227. 
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the entire citizenry.14  This risks a system of political inequality.  There is thus an 
understanding that pre-existing economic and political status wields significant influence 
over political debate, and, if left uncontrolled, it has the effect of unduly impairing the 
equal right of all citizens to fair political participation.  To counter these imbalances, the 
supervisory model deems it prudent to impose certain controls over the internal activities 
of a political association. 
The supervisory model is therefore characterised by a reduced level of protected 
autonomy interests, which, in turn, increases the scope of the state to regulate the internal 
activities of political parties.  The supervisory model does not view political parties as 
any other voluntary association, which is the case under the liberal model.  While private 
individuals may form and control the activities of political parties, the supervisory model 
focuses on the fact that political parties are created to achieve a distinctive public 
purpose: to influence and form the state.15  In doing so they do not remain self-contained 
and heterogonous associations operating solely for the private benefit of their members as 
is the case with other types of voluntary associations.16  Rather, in order to gain control of 
elected state institutions and govern public assets on behalf of an entire citizenry, the 
primary function of any mainstream political party is to propose governmental policies 
that aim to reconcile and balance all of the conflicting social interests of the many diverse 
constituencies that comprise a society.  Political parties therefore act as the intermediary 
between society and the formal structures of the state. 
The German constitutional system reflects features of this model.  The country’s 
painful past, which witnessed the coming to power of an authoritarian political party 
through democratic processes, led the post-World War II constitutional drafters to 
regulate the internal workings of political parties to ensure they operate in a manner that 
advances the democratic system envisaged in the constitutional framework.  The most 
prominent example is article 21(1) of the Basic Law.  The provision mandates that all 
parties must ensure that their internal organisations conform to democratic principles.  In 
contrast to the approach of the US Supreme Court which holds that constitutional rights 
insulate political parties from external interference, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court interprets article 21(1) to require political parties to structure themselves ‘from the 
                                                      
14  Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (The Free Press 1993) 191.  
15  Kelsen (n 4).  
16  Nancy Rosenblum, ‘Political Parties as Membership Groups’ (2000) 100 CLR 813, 825.  
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bottom up, that is, that the members must not be excluded from decision-making 
processes, and that the basic equality of members as well as freedom to join or leave must 
be guaranteed’.17  The express incorporation of political parties into the text of the Basic 
Law means that that parties are not only politico-sociological entities.  As the German 
Federal Constitutional Court has held, political parties form an integral part of Germany’s 
‘constitutional structure’ and the ‘constitutional ordered political life’.18  They therefore 
hold the rank of a ‘constitutional institution’ (but are not strictly speaking organs of the 
state).19  These institutions are therefore subject to the supervisory control of the Basic 
Law.  
No democracy subscribes exclusively to either of these approaches; there is a 
continuum between the two approaches, and jurisdictions may adopt different models for 
different aspects of internal regulation (e.g. internal party democracy and campaign 
funding).  These two models serve to illustrate the potential risks associated with 
constitutional choice between self-regulation and state-regulation.  The liberal conception 
does not trust the state, and the state should therefore be precluded from taking any 
initiatives to regulate political parties even if they purport to improve the quality of 
democracy and the effective participation of citizens in the democratic process.  The 
supervisory model does not fully trust a citizenry to self-regulate itself.  The concern is 
that certain private interests may come to establish a stronghold over the political process, 
and, in turn, state decision-making.  External regulation is therefore warranted. 
This chapter focuses on the right of ordinary rank-and-file members to participate 
in the internal activities of their political party, and it does so by tracing how the South 
African Constitution has caused a shift from the liberal to the supervisory model. 
 
                                                      
17  The Socialist Reich Party Case, quote taken from Richard H. Pildes, ‘Political Parties and 
Constitutionalism’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Edward Elgar 2011) 254, 261.  See also The Communist Party Case (n 3). 
18  The Schleswig-Holsten Vosters’ Association Case (1952) 1 BVerfGE 208, quote taken from Donald 
Kommers and Russell Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (3rd edn, Duke University Press 2012) 271. 
19  The Socialist Reich Party Case (n 3) quote taken from Kommers and Miller (n 18). 
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2 The participation deficit in the common law 
South Africa historically adopted the liberal model, which stems from the English-
speaking common law tradition of treating political parties as private voluntary 
associations.20   In accordance with the common law, political parties are viewed as no 
more than a contractual agreement amongst private individuals who undertake to organise 
themselves in the manner they consider most appropriate to acquire political power in 
order to implement their favoured policies. 21  As the Supreme Court of Appeal recently 
noted—  
A political party is a voluntary association founded on the basis of mutual agreement.  
Like any other voluntary association, the relationship between a political party and its 
members is a contractual one, the terms of the contract being contained in the 
constitution of the party.22 
At the time of forming a political party, the founders are required to create the structures 
and procedures of the association.  This is a choice left entirely to the membership of the 
party, which presumably is a decision taken on how best to organise a campaign-driven 
association.  These structures bind all members.  Once the organisation is established, a 
prospective member would have no opportunity to negotiate their terms of participation.  
In the event that members are unsatisfied with the prescribed rules of participation, their 
only option is to persuade the relevant structures to amend the rules in accordance with 
the procedure set out in party’s constitution. 
Two important legal consequences flow from the liberal model of the common 
law, both of which curtail the effective participation of ordinary rank-and-file members. 
                                                      
20  See Pippa Norris, Building Political Parties (International IDEA 2004) 20.  On the classification of 
political parties as private associations in the English-speaking common law world, see Graeme 
Orr, ‘Private Association and Public Brands’ (2014) 3 Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 332, 334–37. 
21  See Mcoyi v Inkatha Freedom Party 2011 (4) SA 298 (KZP) para 30 (‘a political party is a 
voluntary association […] founded on the basis of mutual agreement, which entails an intention to 
associate, and consensus on the essential characteristics and objectives of the association’); Wood v 
Ondangwa Tribal Authority 1975 (2) SA 294 (A) at 312G–H (a political party is an agreement of 
persons); Khan v Louw 1951 (2) SA 194 (C) at 211B–E (members in a political party are ‘bound by 
contract to one another’).  See also Bushbuck Ridge Border Committee v Government of the 
Northern Province 1999 (2) BCLR 193 (T) at 200.  Compare minority decision of Cameron J in My 
Vote Counts v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (1) SA 132 (CC) paras 113–16 (political 
parties do not sit comfortably in either the definition of an organ of state or a private entity). 
22  Matlholwa v Mahuma [2009] 3 All SA 238 (SCA) para 8. 
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First, members of a political party are not obliged to contract with individuals 
with whom they choose not to associate.  It is a cardinal principle of contract law that an 
enforceable agreement is premised on the consent of the contracting parties.  The law 
should not coerce individuals and entities to enter into an agreement, and no legal 
consequences ought to flow from a decision not to contract.  Moreover, once a binding 
agreement to associate is concluded, contracting individuals remain free to dissociate 
from one another.  Of course, if this does occur, any prejudiced individual is entitled to 
claim legal relief as permitted by either the specific terms of the contract or the general 
rules of law that find application in instances of breach of contract.  The application of 
these principles to a contract of political association however operates to the disadvantage 
of individual members. 
Snyman v Vrededorp Electoral Division Committee of the National Party of the 
Transvaal illustrates this point.23  In this matter, a political party expelled a member 
because he had allegedly campaigned against the official candidate of the party in an 
upcoming election.  The ousted member approached the court claiming that his expulsion 
was irregular on the ground that he was not afforded a sufficient opportunity to contest 
the charges.  He therefore requested the court to nullify the expulsion and order that he be 
reinstated.  The high court accepted that the amount of time afforded to prepare a defence 
was unduly short, and consequently that his expulsion was unlawful.  The court however 
declined to grant the relief sought on the basis that a court of law has no inherent 
jurisdiction under the common law to issue an order that a political party is obliged to 
associate with a particular individual.24  The court reasoned that the relationship between 
members in a political association is not based on any patrimonial or other clear legal 
interest, which would otherwise permit a court to interfere with the internal decisions of 
an association.25  Political associations are built on purely personal relationships to 
campaign for particular social objectives, which, according to the reasoning of the court, 
is an interest a court should not provide legal protection.  
It may be true that in the case of a voluntary association there is a contract to associate 
between the aggrieved member and the other members.  But such an agreement is 
strictly personal in its nature, and a Court of law will not enforce it by an order for 
                                                      
23  [1929] WLD 138. 
24  ibid at 143. 
25  ibid. 
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specific performance or by injunction.  It will not enforce the continuance of purely 
personal relations.26  
In the event that a claim for specific performance is impossible or otherwise 
considered as undesirable, contract law permits the prejudiced contracting party to claim 
contractual damages.27  But these claims are limited to the amount that is required to 
place the innocent contracting party in the same financial position had the contractual 
obligations been performed.28  In order to succeed with such a claim, the innocent 
contracting party is required to prove actual financial loss, and that the loss was both 
factually and legally caused by the breach.29   Factual causation is proved by the 
traditional condition sine qua non ‘but-for’ test, and legal causation for breach of contract 
is only present when it is proved that the damages flow ‘naturally and generally’ from the 
breach.  That is, contracting parties must have contemplated that a financial loss would 
probably have ensued in the event of the breach and that the damages are not too far 
removed from the breaching act so as to render the claim unreasonable in light of legal 
policy concerns.  The claim for damages is further narrowed by the general principle that 
an award of damages must not place any undue hardship on the defaulting party.30  As a 
result of all of this, the courts will not punish bad intentions in the form of punitive or 
nominal contractual damages. 31  The courts have furthermore declined to order damages 
to sooth any inconvenience or emotional stress.32 
                                                      
26  ibid at 143–44. 
27 Specific performance is the primary remedy for breach of contract in South Africa. Courts however 
enjoy discretion not to order performance, and will generally decline to do so in instances where 
performance is impossible, will cause undue hardship, or would require the continuation of a highly 
personal relationship like employment contracts.  See RH Christie, The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (4ed, LexisNexis Butterworths 2001) 613-15. 
28  See Holmdene Brickworks v Roberts Construction Company 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) at 687; Victoria 
Falls and Transvaal Power Company v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines 1915 AD 1 at 22.  
29  International Shipping Company v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) at 700E-701C; Holmdene (n 30) at 
687D–F. 
30  Holmdene (n 30) at 687B–C. 
31  A few pre-1920 judgments awarded ‘nominal’ damages.  See Cilliers v Papenfus and Rooth 1904 
TS 73; Solomon v The Alfred Lodge 1917 CPD 177.  The legal basis for awarding nominal damages 
has been criticised, and the courts refrain from doing so now.  See DJ Joubert, General Principles 
of the Law of Contract (Juta 1987) 247. 
32  See Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A) at 596C–597H (contractual damages 
cannot be awarded for intangible loss at the common law, but the legislature remains free to alter 
this rule); Jockie v Meyer 1945 AD 354, at 363, 367–68 (injured feelings are not recoverable as a 
remedy for breach of damages, but must be claimed in delict in accordance with the actio 
injurarum; damages for inconvenience may however be awarded if the inconvenience ‘might 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties as likely to 
result from the defendant’s breach of contract’.).  These non-patrimonial losses may perhaps be 
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The narrow basis on which the South African contract law awards contractual 
damages means that an unlawfully ousted party member cannot claim relief on this 
ground.  In accordance with these principles, the Snyman court confirmed that the 
jurisdiction of a court to award contractual damages to an unlawfully expelled member 
from an association is premised on the basis that the expulsion led to the deprivation of a 
proprietary interest or other legally recognised (and quantifiable) interest.33  The court 
held that a party member who has simply lost out on the ability to participate in the 
activities of the association is therefore not entitled to contractual damages.34  Most other 
types of clubs and associations vest their members with proprietary benefits.  A sports 
club, for instance, grants a member the right to use the premises and other tangible 
resources of the club.  It would therefore be possible for a court to remedy the loss of 
these benefits by an award of damages where a voluntary association unlawfully expelled 
a member.  In the case of a political party, however, the court held that membership to a 
political party does not vest any comparable proprietary benefit.35  Membership fees and 
the assets of the party are to be used by the governing body of the party in accordance 
with their discretion.  Individual members have no claim to these funds, and they may not 
rely on this financial interest to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.36  
The Snyman judgment established the precedent that an unlawful expulsion from 
a political association does not give rise to a legal cause of action.  The common law 
effectively affords political parties — and, more specifically, the leadership of the party 
— the unrestricted power to dissociate itself from any member, for whatever reason, and 
without any legal repercussions.37 
The second legal consequence of the liberal model is that members of a political 
party enjoy only those (contractual) rights that are sourced in either the constitution of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
actionable in delict.  See SWJ Van der Merwe and others, Contract: General Principles (4th edn, 
Juta 2012) 360.  Early judgments of the Appellate Division held that damages would only be 
awarded if the aggrieved member can show that the domestic tribunal was ‘actuated by some 
indirect or improper motive’. An association is not liable when a functionary of the association acts 
in good faith and believes it is executing the rules of the association.  See Matthews v Young 1922 
AD 492, at 508, 510. 
33  Snyman (n 23) at 144–45. 
34  ibid.  
35  ibid. 
36  ibid. 
37  See De Waal v Van Der Horst 1918 TPD 277 at 283 (a member must prove the infringement of a 
patrimonial interest as a requirement for challenging the decisions of a voluntary association before 
a court). 
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party or any other regulation that is adopted in accordance with the procedures prescribed 
in the constitution.  Accordingly, in instances where an individual member has no 
contractual right to an alternative procedure or outcome, courts would require members to 
submit to the will of the party’s governing body. 
Wilken v Brebner highlights this point.38  Here, the Appellate Division was called 
upon to assess whether members have any recourse against the majoritarian will of their 
party in a situation where decisions are taken that fundamentally curtail the interests of 
minority members.  The dispute in this matter stemmed from the governing body of a 
political party adopting a series of resolutions that amalgamated the party with a rival 
party.  An aggrieved member instituted legal action and argued that the resolutions were 
ultra vires on the ground that they deprive the minority members opposed to the merger 
of their existing membership rights.  They argued that the resolutions had effectively 
dissolved the party, and, in accordance with contract law, a decision that terminates a 
contract can only be taken by the unanimous will of the entire membership.  The lost 
membership rights, the member seemed to suggest, were sourced in the assets owned by 
the political party which must be utilised to further the main objectives of the party.  
The argument was dismissed.  The Chief Justice cautioned that courts should be 
reluctant to interfere with the resolutions passed in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in the rules of the party.39  Political parties are large and cumbersome organisations.  
The ability of a political party to function as a viable association necessitates that they are 
composed of smaller and hierarchical structures.40  The rules of the party will delegate 
powers and responsibilities to various structures within the party, and will furthermore 
create a governing body to control and monitor these structures.41  It is an implied term of 
the agreement that a member who joins a party has entrusted the management of the 
organisation to the various committees and leadership bodies created in terms of the 
constitution. 42  The legal presumption is therefore that each individual member is 
‘subservient to the various bodies appointed to carry out the object of the party’.43  A 
court will only interfere in a decision of the party when ‘it is clear that an individual 
                                                      
38  1935 AD 175. 
39  ibid at 180–81. 
40  ibid at 181.  
41  ibid. 
42  ibid at 181–83. 
43  ibid 181. 
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member of the association is entitled to demand that his voice shall be heard’ in 
accordance with the association’s constitution.44  If this were not so, the court postulated, 
the effective operation of a political party would be undermined.  The recognition of 
individual member rights not sourced in the constitution may lead not only to minority 
members holding hostage the majority of the party but may also induce disloyalty among 
members who otherwise ought to commit themselves to the party leadership.45 
The court examined the constitution of the party and found that the executive 
governing body enjoyed the exclusive power to amend the constitution, which included 
the power to decide to merge the party with another.  In contrast, the constitution did not 
in express terms afford individual members a right to either participate or object to such a 
decision.  The member ‘surrendered his own will and his own voice to the supreme 
council of the party […] and it makes no difference whether there are any party funds or 
not’.46   As a result, the presumption of subservience was not discharged and the 
application was accordingly dismissed. 
The above two cases illustrate the participation deficit found in the common law.  
As political parties were viewed solely through the prism of the common law of contract, 
the law afforded these organisations the full liberty and responsibility to self-regulate.  A 
court would therefore decline to protect a member whose participation in the organisation 
is threatened unless the terms of the contract provided otherwise.  Though, as the Snyman 
decision shows, a breached contractual right to participate would also not be vindicated.  
The common law therefore permits political parties — a term which should be as read 
synonymous with the party leadership — to structure their internal decision-making 
processes as autocratically or as democratically as the organisation considered desirable.   
Within the South African political environment, there are many instances of 
parties adopting autocratic practices.  There are many complex reasons why a political 
party operating within a constitutional democracy would opt to silence party members, 
but it is difficult not to conclude that the liberal model of the common law contributed to 
this development in South Africa.  The failure to provide legal protection to the basic 
participation interests of ordinary party members outside the terms of the contract gave 
rise to a climate that permitted the political leadership of a party scope to employ 
                                                      
44  ibid at 182. 
45  ibid at 185–86. 
46  ibid at 186.  
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autocratic practices whenever it was expedient to do so.   The common law, at least in 
effect, allows the political leadership of the organisation to assume for itself an almost 
unfettered power to control the extent to which ordinary members participate in policy 
and leadership debates. 
It would be a mistake to view the application of the liberal model as a laissez-
faire development of the ostensibly apolitical rules of contract.  Contract law allows for 
the alteration of general principles in order to protect vulnerable interests and balance 
unequal bargaining positions.  In fact, during the apartheid years, the common law courts 
imported public law review criteria into other sorts of voluntary associations to ensure 
more parity between powerful association leaders and ordinary rank-and-file members. 47  
In the context of political parties, however, the courts declined similar requests.  The legal 
reasons that justify this approach were a combination of strict compliance with the 
contractual terms, the need to protect the association interests of the organisation against 
external interference, and the fact that political participation was simply not an interest 
protected in terms of the internal logic of the private common law.  There is another 
reason that supported the continued application of the liberal model, one that is not 
mentioned in the case law.  These judgments must be read in the wider political context 
of the time.  Executive and legislative policy during the apartheid years viewed any 
political voice advocating against the programmes of the state as needless and at times 
even criminal.  As courts were bound to the laws of the authoritarian state, there was little 
to no discretion to view the protection of dissenting political voices within parties as a 
matter of legal policy.48  
The application of the liberal model continued into the constitutional era.  The 
law reports record several instances of high court decisions only intervening in internal 
party activities when an aggrieved member could show an infringement of a clear 
patrimonial interest (i.e. remuneration).  And then the courts would only provide limited 
                                                      
47  See Turner v Jockey Club 1974 (3) SA 633 (A); Marlin v Durban Turf Club 1942 AD 112.  These 
decisions held that the obligation of a voluntary association to abide by the fundamental principles 
of justice in the procedures employed by a domestic tribunal must be derived from either an 
expressly stated provision or an implied term that flows as a necessary implication of the contract.  
The obligation is therefore sourced in the contract itself.  In other words, what constitutes the 
fundamental principles of justice is not strictly grounded in considerations of unequal power 
relations or any other public law principle applicable to the public administration; though, it cannot 
be denied that administrative law has heavily influences the contents of these implied contractual 
provisions.  See Lawrence Baxter, Administrative Law (Juta 1984) 340–41. 
48  Oriani-Ambrosini v Sisulu 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC) para 49 (the apartheid regime supressed 
dissenting views as it sought to impose hegemonic control over thought and conduct). 
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protection: not a substantive interest to participate in the activities of the party but rather a 
procedural right to a fair process before a benefit is withdrawn.49  These decisions upheld 
the principle of non-external interference, believing that individual members are best 
suited to regulate their own activities.  This observation is somewhat ironic, as the 
greatest threat to political participation in the constitutional era has been almost 
exclusively internal.  There are countless news reports that show how fellow party 
members that undermine the equal participation of their compatriots.  The Constitutional 
Court sought to rectify this problem in the decision of Ramakatsa v Magashule, which is 
a decision that caused a doctrinal shift towards the supervisory model.50 
 
3 The constitutional right to internal party participation 
Ramakatsa originates from a power struggle within the ANC.  Six members of the 
governing party called upon the Constitutional Court to set aside all of the outcomes and 
resolutions of the Free State provincial conference.  More specifically, the applicants 
sought an order declaring invalid the election results of the provincial leadership of the 
conference.  Provincial leadership serves a key role within the ANC.  They manage 
branch structures falling within their respective province, and enjoy the power to send 
delegates to the national elective conference. 
The aggrieved party members complained that a series of irregularities transpired 
which effectively excluded them from participating in the nominating and voting 
procedures for the election of provincial leaders.  The irregularities included allegations 
that eligible members were excluded from participating in certain branch meetings, that 
one branch was excluded wholesale from sending delegates to the provincial conference, 
and that two branches that failed to hold elective meetings (and were therefore 
disqualified in terms of the rules of the party from participating in the provincial 
conference) sent delegates to the provincial conference.  Though not explained in the 
judgment of the court, the aggrieved members argued elsewhere that these irregularities 
                                                      
49  See Van Zyl v New National Party [2003] 3 All SA 737 (C); Mafongosi v United Democratic 
Movement 2002 (5) SA 567 (TkH); Marais v Democratic Alliance 2002 (2) BCLR 171 (C). 
50  2013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC). 
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were instigated as part of a strategy to subvert a dissenting faction within the political 
party that intended to oppose the current national leadership of the ANC.51 
Before the high court, which dismissed the case on procedural technicalities, the 
aggrieved members claimed that the failure of the party leadership not to investigate these 
objections infringed upon their right to fair administrative action.52  On appeal, the 
Constitutional Court held that it was unnecessary to entertain the matter on the ground of 
administrative action.  The court failed to offer an explanation for their avoidance of the 
question, but one can make an educated guess.  Administrative law provides no inherent 
or stand-alone right.  All of the previous case law on this question holds that a member of 
a political party must demonstrate that the political party threatened an existing right or 
patrimonial interest as a precondition to the courts reviewing the actions of the party 
under administrative law.53  In the Ramakatsa matter, in contrast, none of the litigants 
held elected positions in government nor did they receive any patrimonial benefit from 
the party.  In other words, the applicants had no more than a non-patrimonial contractual 
right to participate in the party (which, as shown above, the liberal model under the 
common law affords no actual protection). 
The applicants raised a new ground on appeal, which the court reconstructed as a 
request to develop the common law of contract in a way that recognises and safeguards 
the right of ordinary rank-and-file members to participate in the political party of their 
choice.  The argument was grounded in section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, which 
guarantees the right of every citizen to participate in the activities of a political party.  
History suggested that their plea would fail.  The initial motive for entrenching section 19 
into the Constitution was to prevent a repeat of apartheid, which witnessed the apparatus 
of government securing their power through the banning of political parties and the 
criminalisation of certain types of political speech.54  From this viewpoint, section 19 
encapsulates the liberal model of party regulation as it aims to prevent external bodies 
from implementing measures that impair the right of citizens to join and participate in the 
                                                      
51  Ernest Mabuza, ‘Constitutional Court Explains Ruling on Free State ANC Election’ (Business Day 
18 December 2012). 
52  Ramakatsa v Magashule [2012] ZAFSHC 207, unreported judgment, 26 October 2012. 
53 See cases discussed in notes 47 and 49. 
54  See Internal Security Act 74 of 1982; Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960; Suppression of 
Communism Act 44 of 1950. 
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political party of their choice.55  This explains why the high courts were initially 
unwilling to apply section 19 of the Constitution to the internal activities of political 
parties.  In Mcoyi v Inkatha Freedom Party, for example, the high court was called upon 
to determine whether ordinary members could compel their political party to convene an 
elective conference if the party leadership failed to do so.56  The court fell back on the 
common law liberal approach — including the decision of Snyman — and found that 
members only have those rights as stipulated in the contract of the association.57  
Ordinarily, members have no patrimonial or other clear right to demand that the 
governing body of a political party acts in a particular manner.  The court held that the 
constitution in the case at hand made no mention of a clear or implied right to an elective 
conference.  Members in this political party were subject to the decisions of party leaders 
on whether, if at all, to hold an elective conference.  The high court dismissed the 
application, and concluded that the inability of members to choose party leaders on a 
regular basis did not violate section 19 of the Constitution. 
In Ramakatsa, however, the Constitutional Court effectively overruled Mcoyi 
through expanding the scope of the constitutional right.58  The court held that the right 
does not only burden the state with a negative obligation not to interfere in the activities 
of political parties.  It also imposes an obligation on all political parties to facilitate the 
participation of their members within the organisation.  Section 19(1)(b) confers the right 
of political participation in ‘unqualified terms’, and it— 
guarantees freedom to make political choices and once a choice on a political party is 
made, the section safeguards a member’s participation in the activities of the party 
concerned.  [Members of a political party] enjoy a constitutional guarantee that 
entitles them to participate in [the party’s] activities.  It protects the exercise of the 
                                                      
55  Ramakatsa (n 50) para 64. 
56  Mcoyi (n 21). 
57  See also Ngiba v African People Convention [2013] ZAKZDHC 21, unreported judgment, 5 April 
2013, para 33 (a court should not ordinarily intervene unless the expelled member stands to lose a 
proprietary interest). 
58  The argument for an expanded interpretation of section 19(1)(b) is supported by section 39(1) of the 
Constitution, which requires the court to interpret constitutional rights in a manner that promotes 
the ‘values that underlie our open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and 
freedom’.  This requires that rights be ‘generously and purposely’ interpreted. Any necessary 
limitation of the right will rather be performed at the rights-limitation stage of the enquiry.  See 
Ramakatsa (n 50) para 70. 
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right not only against external interference but also against interference arising from 
within the party.59  
The Ramakatsa judgment confirmed the common law position that political 
parties are voluntary associations.  The legal relationship between members and the party 
is contractual, albeit a ‘unique’ sort of contract, and the constitution of the party as well 
as other rules adopted in accordance with the party’s constitution all form part of this 
legal agreement.60  As the contractual constitutions of political parties are the main legal 
instruments that facilitate the participation of members in the activities of a political 
party, the court reasoned that section 19 prohibits political parties from adopting 
constitutions that deny the right of internal political participation.61  In the event that the 
rules of the association fail to meet this requirement, the contractual provisions of a 
political party are ‘susceptible to a challenge of constitutional invalidity’.62  It bears 
noting here that the aggrieved members in Ramakatsa did not challenge the party rules 
for its failure to meet the participation requirements of section 19.  The rules did permit 
participation in the elective conference.  The complaint was rather that the party leaders 
failed to abide by their own contractual rules. The Constitutional Court agreed.  But, in 
reformulating the legal question for resolution, the court added constitutional force to the 
contractual remedy of specific performance.  The court held that a failure to comply with 
the contractual provisions of the association would not only constitute a breach of 
contract, but would also constitute conduct inconsistent with section 19 of the 
Constitution.63  In sum, political parties are constitutionally obliged to act in accordance 
with their own constitutions, which, at a minimum, must include procedures that facilitate 
the participation of members.   
Finding that eligible members were excluded from participating in the elective 
conference, the court concluded that the political party’s conduct was inconsistent with 
their own rules and section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution.  As the ANC offered no 
justification for the violation, the court declared the impugned elective conference 
unlawful and invalid.  
                                                      
59  Ramakatsa (n 50) para 71. 
60  ibid paras 79–80. 
61  ibid paras 73–74. 
62  ibid para 74. 
63  ibid. 
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4 Developing the common law 
The development of the common law in accordance with section 19(1)(b) of the 
Constitution is notable for three reasons. 
 First, Ramakatsa departs from the earlier judgment of Barkhuizen v Napier.64  In 
that decision, which remains the seminal judgment on the application of the Constitution 
to contract law, the Constitutional Court held that contractual provisions cannot be tested 
directly against a constitutional right.  Rather, constitutional values inform the dictates of 
public policy, which, in turn, may necessitate the modification or negation of a 
contractual term.  Chapter four shows how Barkhuizen requires courts to balance 
contractual autonomy with other constitutional values in the context of each case.  This 
approach was not followed in Ramakatsa.  The court rather concluded that the 
‘constitutions and rules of political parties must be consistent with the Constitution [of 
South Africa] which is our supreme law’, failing which they are liable to be declared 
unlawful.65  Freedom to contract was not viewed as a protected interest that could 
possibly negate the constitutional protection of section 19 in a balancing exercise.  The 
court effectively outlawed the contractual power of party members to create a voluntary 
association that permits autocratic procedures.  Although section 19(1)(b) only provides a 
procedural right to participate in the activities of a political party (which includes the 
right to participate in leadership election, and, given the legal reasoning offered in 
Ramakatsa, probably also includes the right to participate in policy debates), the effect of 
the right is that members cannot be removed from the organisation for merely expressing 
dissenting views.  Section 19(1)(b) thus guards against autocracy, and contractual 
autonomy can thus no longer be employed to silence and purge party members.  The 
common law’s position that political parties are free to disassociate themselves from a 
member without legal repercussions has thus been altered. 
The unwillingness of the Ramakatsa court to protect the autonomy interest of 
political parties in the situation described above suggests that the Constitutional Court has 
effectively redefined the right to political association.  Section 18 of the Constitution 
guarantees everyone the right to free association, and, when applied to political parties, 
                                                      
64 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
65  Ramakatsa (n 50) para 72. 
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typically means that internal party decisions are safeguarded against external interference.  
This interpretation corresponds to the liberal model of regulation, but the shift towards 
the supervisory model in Ramakatsa means that the right to political association must 
now be viewed as a conduit right.  The right serves to protect and realise other 
constitutional rights and objectives of the electoral system, which includes the right of 
rank-and-file members to participate in the internal activities of a political party.  The 
internal activities of political parties that undermine these other objectives are afforded no 
or minimal constitutional protection.66   
 Second, the conduit nature of the right to political association as reflected in the 
Ramakatsa judgment fits the power-curve theorised in chapter five.  In brief, the two 
conditions are met for the recognition of a constitutional obligation.  First, the conduit 
nature of political parties diminishes the otherwise autonomous freedom of a voluntary 
association.  Second, political parties control exclusive access to a constitutionally 
protected interest.  That is, political parties are the only vehicles through which citizens 
can stand for elected government positions (only political parties contest national and 
provincial elections and independent candidates are prohibited).67   As a result, political 
parties are placed near the top of the power-freedom curve.  This position, according the 
theory, suggests that political parties should indeed be imposed with a constitutional 
obligation, and, given that parties are plotted on the left of the power curve, it indicates 
that they are unlikely to escape their constitutional obligations in a balancing exercise 
unless a compelling justification is offered.  The Ramakatsa court could not think of one. 
Third, the recognition that members of a political party enjoy a constitutional 
right to participate — and the corresponding duty on political parties to facilitate this 
right — has come entirely at the behest of the judiciary.68  It is a position that the elected 
                                                      
66  The conduit nature of the right reflects the approach in Khumalo.  See chap 5, sec 3.3. 
67  Constitution ss 46(1)(d), 105(1)(d).  The Constitution establishes a parliamentarian system of 
government; the membership of national and provincial legislatures is determined by ‘an electoral 
system that results, in general, in proportional representation’.  The Electoral Act 73 of 1998, s 27, 
schedule 1A translates this constitutional provision into a closed list proportional representation 
system of elections.  In other words, political parties are represented in the national and provincial 
legislatures based on the proportion of votes received.  In terms of the legislative framework, each 
political party is required to submit a fixed list of ranked candidates prior to an election. The law 
does not prescribe the manner in which the party formulates their lists, and, consequently, each 
political party decides for itself how to propose and rank candidates.  In Majola v State President of 
the Republic [2012] ZAGPJHC 236, unreported judgment, 30 October 2012, the high court held the 
prohibition on independent candidates does not violate the Constitution. 
68  There are two exceptions to this observation.  The first is the few instances where some judgments 
have held that political parties fall within the purview of PAJA, though others judgments have 
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branches of government have not endorsed.  There is no recorded attempt on the part of 
the legislature to regulate the internal participation rights of party members.  The 
legislature has tacitly approved the liberal model of the common law, and it is fair to 
deduce that it is legislative policy that political parties are private autonomy associations 
that are free from external regulation.  The silence of the legislature is amplified when 
consideration is given to the extensive legislative regulation of other private entities in 
order to protect dissenting views.  Compare the legislature’s position on political parties 
to that of trade unions.  Section 23(2) of the Constitution guarantees the right of every 
worker to join and participate in the activities of a trade union.  The Labour Relations Act 
expands on this constitutional right, and specifically safeguards the right of trade union 
members to elect the leadership of their chosen trade union.69  Although political party 
members are afforded the same constitutional right, no similar legislative scheme affords 
this level of legal protection to political party members.  Further examples can be bound 
in company law.  Legislative schemes provide protection to minority shareholders against 
the prejudicial or oppressive action of other shareholders or company directors.70  And 
employees who disclose irregular and unlawful conduct are also afforded statutory 
protection.71 
On a critical but fair view, the South African political landscape suggests why the 
legislature prefers the liberal model of the common law.  The senior members of the 
national legislature — read: the leadership of political parties represented in Parliament 
— stand the most to lose by a shift towards the supervisory model.72  The prescription of 
external legislative requirement on the internal operations of political parties risks 
undermining the political power they currently enjoy in accordance with the common 
law, and they have no real incentive to undermine their current status.  There can be little 
dispute that autocratic practices within political parties entrench the dominance of party 
leaders, which, in turn, permits party leaders to solidify their role as the representatives of 
the party in government. 
                                                                                                                                                            
disagreed with this interpretation.  The other is the application of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, which is the national legislation implemented to 
give effect to section 9(4) stating that no person may discriminate on the grounds protected in the 
constitution.  The Equality Act prohibits state and non-state actors alike from taking action that 
unfairly discriminates on a protected ground. 
69  Constitution s 23(2); Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, s 6(2) 
70  Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163. 
71  Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. 
72  Kate O’Regan, ‘Political Parties: The Missing Link in Our Constitution?’ Conference on Political 
Parties in South Africa, 27 August 2015, at 5. 
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 All this is why the development in Ramaktasa is remarkable, as it was not 
necessary to invoke the protection of the Constitution to secure the interests of the 
individual members.73  The contractual rules of the ANC provide each member an express 
contractual right to participate in the elective process, and the members were therefore 
entitled to claim specific performance.  There was no pressing need to invoke section 19 
of the Constitution in order to secure the participation rights of the members.  One can 
only infer that the Constitutional Court believed that this development to the common law 
was necessary given the political landscape of the country.  Political parties are central 
and indispensable actors to a healthy and functioning democracy, and the mushrooming 
of autocratic practices within the internal activities of political parties pose a threat to the 
realisation of this constitutional objective. 
 
 
                                                      










THE BENEFITS OF RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
 
This chapter identifies three benefits of legislative remedies over judicially 
created ones, which provide an explanation for the court’s pivot towards 
legislation. 
 
1 Limits of the judicial law-making toolkit 
The previous two chapters showcase conflicting judicial attitudes.  Chapter six describes 
a Constitutional Court reluctant to develop the common law, opting rather for legislative 
advice and remedies.  Chapter seven, in contrast, paints a court unwilling to even consider 
legislative preferences.  What explains the difference?  More specifically, given that the 
development of the common law is ordinarily the default approach, what explains the 
pivot towards legislative remedies? 
The case law offers few express clues, apart from one that simmers throughout 
the jurisprudence on the horizontal application of constitutional rights.  Judges from both 
the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal have repeatedly opined (though 
not always) that the judicial power to develop the common law is somewhat constrained.  
And this simmering belief crystallises into one of two forms.  The first stems from the 
fact that the legislature serves as the primary institution responsible for law-reform, 
which, according to some arguments, requires the courts to display a degree of restraint in 
the exercise of their own law-making mandate.1  But this explanation is strained.  This 
                                                      
1  For a scholarly defence of this view, see Chris Sprigman and Michael Osborne, ‘Du Plessis is Not 
Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private 
Disputes’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 25, 50–51 (economic and social progress is best realised through 
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thesis has already argued that constitutionally guaranteed relief cannot be withheld 
merely because Parliament does not have the political will to enact appropriate laws.2  
Section 8(3)(b) of the Constitution supports this conclusion.  The provision sets out an 
unconditional instruction to the courts to rebuild private law through the development of 
the common law whenever legislation fails to give proper effect to the constitutional 
obligations of private individuals and entities.  It is perhaps for this reason that the courts 
have applied this belief of comity inconsistently.  In some cases the Constitutional Court 
has invoked the primacy of legislation to justify judicial inaction, whereas other cases 
have held that such an argument is weak because the development of the common law 
does not preclude future legislative interventions.3  Given that this belief of comity fails 
to offer a constitutionally sound justification for pivoting towards legislative remedies, it 
can be swept away for purposes of this chapter. 
The second manifestation of the constraint is that the law-making toolkit of the 
judiciary — which is primarily the development of the common law — has limits.  That 
is, even though the courts recognise the need to grant relief, the common law proves to be 
an ill-equipped framework to meet all of the demands of the Constitution.  The drafting 
history of the South African Constitution bears out this tension.  As described in chapter 
two, the horizontal application of constitutional rights was initially introduced as a means 
to protect the capacity of the legislature to implement social and economic policies 
because the drafters feared that the judiciary would be unwilling or unable to give effect 
to these envisaged laws.  The fear grew from many seeds, but one of them was that the 
philosophical underpinning and core doctrines of the common law would struggle to 
facilitate some of the economic and social goals of the Constitution including the control 
of private power. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, the chapter elaborates on the claim 
that the capacity of the judiciary to exercise their law-making mandate under the 
horizontal application provisions is limited.  It does so by splitting the constraint into 
three sub-limits (see Figure 6 below).4  Second, the chapter details how constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                            
legislative programmes; the direct horizontal application of rights should not be permitted as it 
undermines Parliament’s law-making powers).  
2 Chap 1, sec 2.2; chap 4, sec 3.  See S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 32; Paulsen v Slip 
Knot Investments 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) para 116. 
3 See Paulsen (n 2). 
4 The three limits overlap and are not exhaustive.  This chapter splits the judicial law-making toolkit 
into three to facilitate the discussion of the benefits of rights legislation. 
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rights legislation (which are those legislative schemes that give effect to constitutional 
rights in the private sphere) are likely to contain features that mitigate the limits of the 
judicial law-making toolkit.  Figure 6 sketches a roadmap for the discussion ahead. 
 
 
Figure 6: How the benefits of rights legislation mitigate the limits of judicial law-making 
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2 Benefit one: legislative balancing is more structured 
The first limit of the judicial law-making toolkit can be summed-up as a problem of legal 
uncertainty, and it distils to the observation that courts can sometimes do no better than to 
prescribe somewhat vague and abstract rules to reconcile conflicting rights.  Chapter four 
has already detailed the extent and causes of this limit.5  While imprecisely formulated 
tests and standards may be an inevitable and arguably welcomed outcome of the judicial 
balancing process, the risk remains that loosely defined tests introduce the possibility that 
judges will vacillate in their decision-making.  This no doubt erodes legal certainty, 
which, in turn, undermines the rule law, a central tenet of the South African constitutional 
order.6   
Consider the negative obligation of the access to housing right discussed in 
chapter six, and contemplate the outcome if the Constitutional Court had in fact opted to 
apply the inflated-substantive reading of the negative obligation of the housing right to 
the common law.  Writing in the seminal eviction judgment of Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers, the court anticipated the inherent complexity of 
judicially weighing property and housing rights: 
[T]he Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to 
property not previously recognised by the common law.  It counterposes to the normal 
ownership rights of possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right 
not arbitrarily to be deprived of a home.  The expectations that ordinarily go with title 
could clash head-on with the genuine despair of people in dire need of 
accommodation.  The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a 
hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an 
abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be 
dispossessed of a home, or vice versa.  Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the 
opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests 
involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.7 
The task of weighing these two substantive rights invariably invites a 
considerable amount of judicial discretion, because, in the words of the Constitutional 
                                                      
5 Chap 4, sec 6. 
6 Mighty Solutions v Engen 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para 37; Bredenkamp v Standard Bank 2010 (4) 
SA 468 (SCA) para 39. 
7 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
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Court, the overarching test cannot be any more specific than that the judiciary must 
‘balance out and reconcile opposite claims in as just a manner as possible’ taking into 
account all of the relevant circumstances of the case.8  The Constitution provides limited 
guidance on how to develop and apply a framework for resolving these two clashing 
rights, and the common law certainly provides no indications on what factors and 
situations would justify protecting the housing right over a competing property right 
given that the common law has never had to consider a right to be housed.9  The only 
viable option for the courts in this situation is to prescribe open-ended tests, and allow for 
the incremental development of the law as each new dispute moulds the test into a more 
detailed and structured framework over time.  
In the discussion that follows below, three constitutional rights legislative 
schemes are employed to demonstrate how constitutional rights legislation has the 
propensity to establish balancing frameworks that are more structured.  That is, the 
balancing process is more detailed and precise, which is a characteristic that promotes 
legal certainty and consistent application.  The discussion also shows why the judicial 
balancing processes cannot easily replicate this benefit of enhanced precision and detail.  
This legislative benefit is not always available or needed, however.  This section 
concludes by demonstrating that the judicial law-making process may well yield 
balancing frameworks that are materially no less precise than that contained in legislation. 
2.1 Revising the balancing models 
To illustrate this first legislative benefit, it is necessary to begin by revising the models of 
balancing theorised in Part B.  Chapter four identified two ways to balance conflicting 
constitutional rights, namely process-based balancing and outcome-based balancing.  The 
former avoids balancing rights in the abstract, and prefers for courts to weigh the 
conflicting interests within the context of each particular case.  The latter does the 
opposite.  Outcome-based balancing results in fixed rules.   A trump right is recognised 
for all scenarios, and little to no consideration is given to the specific circumstances of the 
case.  The advantage and drawback of each model is clear: the trade-off is between legal 
                                                      
8 For an example of a court raising concerns over wide judicial discretion in constitutional matters, 
see Johannesburg Housing Corporation v Unlawful Occupiers, Newton Urban Village 2013 (1) SA 
583 (GSJ) paras 29–52. 
9 Dubiety introduces an additional concern: open-ended evaluative exercises threaten to swamp the 
courts.  See Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) paras 34–36. 
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certainty and flexibility.  Although courts are pulled towards outcome-based balancing 
because fixed rules better promote legal certainty and predictability, the courts have also 
recognised that exact precision is not always a desirable option.10  It is impossible to 
predict all future scenarios, and bestowing a degree of judicial discretion allows judges to 
protect deserving litigants in situations where fixed rules would result in harsh outcomes.  
Chapter four illustrated the difference between process- and outcome-based 
balancing with reference to the defamation cases of Khumalo v Holomisa11 and New York 
Times v Sullivan.12  To recall, both matters investigated the extent to which constitutional 
rights should restrict the ability of a public official to claim damages for a defamatory 
statement.  In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court favoured outcome-based 
balancing.  That court interpreted the First Amendment to the US Constitution to require 
freedom of speech to (nearly) always trump the reputation interests of public officials.  In 
Khumalo, the South African Constitutional Court rejected this sort of balancing.  The 
court held that the human dignity and privacy interests of politicians also deserve 
protection, and that it must be balanced against the right to free expression in the context 
of the case.  In the event that a media defendant cannot prove that the defaming statement 
was both true and in the public interests, the court concluded, a defendant may also 
escape liability if he can prove that the publication was ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances 
of the case. 
Chapter four presented the choice between process- and outcome-based balancing 
as binary.  The choice is more accurately an array of options situated on a spectrum, 
ranging from highly flexible approaches that are sensitive to the facts and context of the 
case to approaches that indicate the interest to favour regardless of the facts.13  The 
position of any particular balancing exercise on the spectrum depends on the amount of 
discretion the enquiry affords the final arbiter of the dispute. 
The existence of this spectrum is evidenced by the fact that New York Times v 
Sullivan is not purely an example of an outcome-based balancing process.   The US 
                                                      
10 See Mighty Solutions (n 6) para 37; National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
paras 46–48. 
11 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
12 (1964) 376 US 254. 
13 For examples of balancing exercises that position closer towards the outcome-based side of the 
spectrum, see Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 (4) SA 491 (CC); Ramaktasa v Magashule 2013 (2) BCLR 
202 (CC). 
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Supreme Court qualified the bar on defamation suits by holding that liability would still 
flow if a false defamatory statement is published with ‘actual malice’.14  This enquiry is 
not purely a factual one into whether the media defendant had a reckless disregard for the 
facts.15  This narrow exception to the general rule incorporates value-laden considerations 
into the enquiry, as judges have to develop frameworks for determining who in fact 
constitutes a public official and what sort of information is of a legitimate interest to the 
public.16  Similarly, Khumalo is not purely a case of process-based balancing.  A South 
African court entertaining a defamatory lawsuit does not undertake an amorphous 
exercise of pitting freedom of expression against the constitutional rights of dignity and 
privacy.  For starters, the burden of establishing a reasonable publication falls upon the 
media defendant (Sullivan places the onus on the defamed claimant).  The Khumalo court 
further strengthened the position of the defamed claimant when it outlined the parameters 
of the enquiry (and, in doing so, reduced judicial discretion and the scope of the enquiry).  
Quoting from a dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court held— 
In considering the reasonableness of the publication account must obviously be taken 
of the nature, extent and tone of the allegations.  We know, for instance, that greater 
latitude is usually allowed in respect for political discussion … and that the tone in 
which a newspaper article is written, or the way in which it is presented, sometimes 
provides additional, and perhaps unnecessary, sting.  What will also figure 
prominently is the nature of the information on which the allegations were based and 
the reliability of their source, as well as the steps taken to verify the information.  
Ultimately, there can be no justification for the publication of untruths, and members 
of the press should not be left with the impression that they have a licence to lower the 
standards of care which must be observed before defamatory matter is published in a 
newspaper.  […] [A] high degree of circumspection must be expected of editors and 
their editorial staff on account of the nature of their occupation; particularly, I would 
add, in light of the powerful position of the press and the credibility which it enjoys 
amongst large sections of the community.17 
                                                      
14 Sullivan (n 12) at 280. 
15 See Gertz v Robert Welch (1974) 418 US 323 (the standard for liability for defamatory statements 
made against a private individual is lower than ‘actual malice’, and mere negligence is sufficient).  
16 George Christie, ‘Injury to Reputation and the Constitution’ (1976) 75 Michigan Law Review 43, 
63–64. 
17 Khumalo (n 11) para 18, quoting National Media v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1212G–
1213A. 
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2.2 The balancing framework in rights legislation 
The spectrum allows for the relative comparison of legislative and judicial approaches to 
balancing.  Part B of the thesis demonstrated that the judicial balancing process plots 
more towards the process-based side of the spectrum.  This section argues that rights 
legislation slides more towards the outcome-based end (though, to be clear, legislation is 
rarely positioned at the absolute-end of the spectrum). 
The largest difficulty with proving this claim is that it is impossible to provide an 
exhaustive overview of every legislative scheme that aims to give effect to a 
constitutional right within the private sphere.  In fact, it is even difficult to establish how 
many rights legislative schemes have been enacted since the commencement of the 
Constitution.  Parliament often invokes constitutional rights to justify the enactment of 
new laws, and, even where Parliament does not expressly do so, it is fair to argue that 
many legislative remedies give effect to constitutional rights (in the same way that many 
pre-Constitution common law rules also give effect to constitutional rights).  Therefore, 
to make the analysis manageable, only three rights legislative schemes are analysed.  
These are: the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 
(Eviction Act);18 the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(Equality Act);19 and the Promotion of Access to Information Act (Information Act).20   
Their selection is due to the history outlined in chapter two.  The debate on the horizontal 
application of rights initially stemmed from the need to ensure that the Constitution 
would not insulate private property rights against forthcoming economic and social 
policies, and the Eviction Act is amongst the most prolific legislative schemes for 
reconciling property rights and the right to have access to adequate housing.  The 
Equality Act and the Information Act are the enabling legislative schemes of the equality 
clause and the right to access information.  These two constitutional provisions are the 
only rights that expressly impose obligations upon private individuals and entities, but, in 
both instances, legislation is mandated to give effect to the right. 
                                                      
18 19 of 1998.  For other rights legislative schemes that balance the conflict between housing and land, 
see the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA); Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 
(RHA). 
19 4 of 2000.  For other rights legislative schemes that regulate the right against discrimination, see the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; National Credit Act 34 
of 2005. 
20 2 of 2000.  For other rights legislative schemes that balance the conflict between access to 
information and privacy, see the Protected Disclosure Act 26 of 2000; Protection of Personal 
Information Act 4 of 2013. 
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Figure 7 tabulates information on the three selected rights legislative schemes.  
The first part of the table identifies the relevant constitutional provision and provides an 
overview of how Parliament translated the provision into legislation.  The table thereafter 
summarises how the legislation balances conflicting rights, and it does so by splitting 
relevant balancing frameworks into procedural and substantive components.  The final 
part of the table outlines the discretionary remedial powers of the judiciary. 
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 Section 26(3) of the Constitution: 
No one may be evicted from their home, or have 
their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances.  No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions. 
Section 9(4) of the Constitution:  
No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds 
[including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language and birth].  National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination. 
Section 32(1)(b) of the Constitution: 
Everyone has the right of access to any information 
that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights. 
Section 32(2) of the Constitution: 
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to 


























The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(Eviction Act) operates as the principal legislative 
scheme for housing eviction applications. Its 
application is however residual, as it applies only to 
those eviction applications not covered by a more 
specific statutory mechanism (i.e. ESTA or RHA). 
In practical terms, the Eviction Act covers all 
residential evictions in urban areas as well as 
evictions in rural areas where the occupier never 
received consent to reside. The preamble of the Act 
reflects the purpose of the legislative scheme, as 
well as the difficulty in reconciling two clashing 
constitutional rights. The aim of the Eviction Act is 
to regulate evictions ‘in a fair manner’ by protecting 
both the section 25 right of property owners to 
apply for eviction orders ‘in appropriate 
circumstances’ and the section 26 right of unlawful 
occupiers to enjoy access to an adequate home. 
In compliance with section 9(4) of the Constitution, 
section 6 of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
(Equality Act) prohibits state and private actors 
alike from unfairly discriminating against any 
person. 
The Act defines discrimination broadly to 
encompass any act or omission — including policy, 
law, rule, practice, condition or situation — which 
directly or indirectly (i) imposes a burden, 
obligation or disadvantage or (ii) withholds a 
benefit, opportunity or advantage from any person 
on one or more of the prohibited grounds. The Act 
defines prohibited grounds to include all the 
grounds listed in the Constitution, but extends to 
include any other ground where the discrimination 
(i) causes or perpetuates a disadvantage, (ii) 
undermines human dignity, or (iii) adversely affects 
the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and 
freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to 
an expressly listed ground.  
The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000 (Information Act) gives effect to section 32 of 
the Constitution.  The Act distinguishes between 
public and private bodies.  The definition of a public 
body mirrors the definition of an organ of state as 
described in section 239 of the Constitution, while a 
private body includes: (i) any natural person or 
partnership that carries or carried on any trade, 
business or profession, but only in such a capacity; 
or (ii) any former or existing juristic person. 
Section 50 legislates that a requestor must be 
given access to any record held by a private body if 
(i) the record is required for the exercise or 
protection of any right; (ii) the procedural 
requirements of the Act are complied with; and (iii) 
access is not refused in accordance with a listed 
ground.  If the requestor is a public body, access is 
only mandatory if disclosure is in the public 
interest. 
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 Housing Eviction Act Equality Act Information Act 
 Each of the legislative schemes give effect to their respective constitutional provisions through a series of legislative remedies, which can be split into procedural 
and substantive components.  These constitutional rights legislative schemes aim to reconcile the protected constitutional right and competing interests (which often 





























In accordance with section 4 of the Eviction Act, at 
least 14 days prior to a court entertaining an 
application, a landowner (or another person in 
charge of the land) must provide the unlawful 
occupiers as well as the municipality in which the 
occupiers reside notice of their intention to seek an 
eviction.  The notice must, amongst other things, list 
the grounds on which the proposed eviction is 
sought.  The notice must furthermore inform the 
occupiers that they have the right to appear before 
the court as well as the right to apply for legal aid. 
Service of the notice must be effected in the usual 
manner, namely that each person potentially 
affected by the order must receive notice. A court 
may however prescribe a different procedure if there 
is a more convenient method available, but such an 
order is still subject to the proviso that unlawful 
occupiers must have received an adequate notice to 
the defend their case.  
Section 7 of the Eviction Act provides that the 
municipality may appoint a mediator to settle 
disputes between private landowners and occupiers 
(with the aim to resolve disputes in a time-efficient 
and cost-effective manner). 
Section 13 of the Equality Act assigns the onus of 
proof. A complainant need only establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  The onus then shifts to 
the respondent to prove one of the following to 
escape liability: (i) the alleged discrimination did 
not take place; (ii) the discriminatory conduct is not 
based on a prohibited ground; or (iii) the 
discrimination is fair. 
Complaints must be lodged before the equality 
court (which is the high court following a more 
specific procedure, as set out in the Equality Act). 
Section 20 of the Equality Act empowers the clerk 
of the equality court to refer the dispute to an 
alternative appropriate forum for resolution.  The 
decision to refer a matter must be made having 
considered all ‘relevant circumstances’ including 
the personal circumstances of the parties, 
accessibility to alternative forums, the wishes and 
needs of the parties, and the views of the alternative 
forums.  The equality court must resolve the dispute 
if the alternative forums are unable to do so. 
The Information Act prescribes a detailed set of 
procedures that private bodies and requestors must 
follow in facilitating the process of gaining (and 
refusing) access to records.  Also, as a general rule, 
a private body is permitted to levy a fee in order to 
recuperate costs associated with searching and 
preparing records. 
After lodging a request for a record, section 56 of 
the Information Act requires private bodies within 
30 days to notify the requestor of a decision. If 
access is granted, the notice must contain 
information on the fees, the manner in which access 
will be granted, and the right of a requestor to apply 
to a court for an exemption of fees.  If access is 
refused, the notice must state adequate reasons for 
the refusal (including the provisions of the 
Information Act relied upon), as well as the right to 
appeal the decisions (including the procedure) 
Section 71 protects third parties, and instructs 
private bodies to take reasonable steps to inform 
anyone to whom the record relates.  This notice 
must inform third parties on how to make 


































An eviction order may only be granted if a court 
deems it ‘just and equitable’ to do so having 
considered ‘all the relevant circumstances’. Section 
4 of the Eviction Act prescribes a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to consider.  This includes the rights 
and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons 
and households headed by women’. If occupation 
has lasted for longer than six months, the Eviction 
Act further demands an enquiry into whether or not 
alternative land or housing has been made available 
or can reasonably be made available by the 
municipality, other organ of state, or landowner.  
Although not expressly mentioned in the Act, the 
consideration into whether alternative land is 
available means that the landowner must join the 
relevant municipality to the proceedings. 
If a court is satisfied that it is just and equitable 
to grant an eviction order, section 4(8) of the 
Eviction Act requires the court to determine a ‘just 
and equitable date’ on which the unlawful occupiers 
must vacate the land, as well as a date on which 
such an order may be carried out.  This enquiry 
must also have regard to all relevant circumstances, 
including the period the unlawful occupiers have 
resided on the land. 
Section 14 of the Equality Act lists the factors that 
must be taken into account to determine whether or 
not an act of discrimination is fair.  This includes: 
(i) the context in which the discrimination occurred; 
(ii) whether the discrimination reasonably and 
justifiably differentiates between persons according 
to objectively determinable criteria, and that the 
discrimination is intrinsic to an activity that serves 
and achieves a legitimate purpose; (iii) whether 
there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous 
means to achieve the purpose; (iv) the nature and 
extent of the discrimination, including the impact of 
the discrimination on the complainant; (v) the 
position of the complainant in society, and whether 
he or she belongs to a group that suffers from 
patterns of disadvantages; and (vi) whether the 
discrimination impairs human dignity; and (vii) the 
extent to the respondent has taken reasonable steps 
to address the disadvantage and accommodate 
diversity.  It bears noting that these factors reflect 
the contents of the section 9 equality clause, the 
section 16 freedom of speech clause (which outright 
prohibits hate speech), and the section 36 general 
limitation clause.  
The Equality Act provides that measures taken to 
advance previously disadvantaged groups are not 
unfair, and furthermore stipulates that acts of hate 
speech can never be considered as fair. 
The information Act effectively creates a 
presumption in favour of disclosure, as it requires 
the holder of the information to justify refusal.  
There are seven main grounds listed upon which a 
private body must or may refuse access to 
information.  Broadly summarised, these grounds 
include private information about natural persons, 
trade secrets, information that could hamper 
commercial competition and financial interests, the 
safety of a particular individual or the public, and 
whether there is a contractual duty of confidence 
towards another individual or entity.   
However, the Information Act continues to 
provide that some of these exemptions do now 
apply when the records of information evidence a 
‘substantial contraventions’ or ‘failure’ to comply 
with law, or where there is an imminent and serious 
risk to pubic safety or the environment.  
Furthermore, disclosure is mandated when the 
‘public interest in the disclosure of the record 
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The ‘just and equitability’ remedy, as set out above. Section 21 empowers the equality court to make any 
‘appropriate order in the circumstances’, which may 
include: (i) interim and declaratory orders; (ii) the 
payment of damages, which could be for financial 
loss, the impairment of dignity, or emotional 
suffering; (iii) an order directing the prohibition of 
certain activities; (iv) an order for the 
implementation of special measures to address the 
unfair discrimination; (iv) an order for an 
unconditional apology; (v) an order for the 
discriminator to undergo an audit of policies and 
practices as determined by the equality court (vi) 
forms of deterrent punishments, including a 
recommendation to relevant bodies that a licence be 
revoked; and (vii) an order directing the National 
Prosecuting Authority to institute criminal 
proceedings. 
Section 82 of the Information Act empowers courts 
to grant any order that is ‘just and equitable’.  This 
includes confirming, setting-aside, or amending the 
decision of the private body.  The courts are also 
entitled to ‘peak’ into the records (without 
disclosing information to any person) in order to 
determine whether or not the impugned record does 
in fact contain information upon which access must 
or may be denied. 
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2.2.1 Similarity (between legislative and judicial balancing)  
The balancing framework contained within constitutional rights legislation shares a 
similar feature of the judicial balancing process.   Rights legislation also steers away from 
fixed outcomes, and instead adopts versions of process-based balancing that allow for the 
evaluation of competing interests within the facts and context of each particular case.  For 
example, the Eviction Act requires the courts to determine if it is ‘just and equitable’ in 
the circumstances to grant an eviction order.  And, should a court conclude that it is, the 
Act requires the tailoring of a ‘just and equitable’ order.21  The Equality Act similarly 
provides the courts with wide latitude to determine whether or not a particular 
discriminatory act is fair, and, if it is found not to be, the Act permits the courts to make 
‘any appropriate order in the circumstances’.22  The Information Act adopts a different 
route, but still reaches a similar outcome.  The Information Act prescribes a fixed list of 
circumstances under which a private body must or may refuse access to record.  But the 
Act continues to provide that a private body must nevertheless disclose a record whenever 
the public interest ‘outweighs the harm contemplated’ by the provisions upon which a 
private body may otherwise refuse access.23  The Information Act also enshrines the 
judicial power to craft ‘just and equitable’ remedies.24    
The repeated incorporation of broad evaluative exercises into constitutional rights 
legislation is not only on account of legislative policy.  The Constitution either demands 
or strongly encourages process-based balancing within legislation, which is due to three 
constitutional provisions.  
First, section 39(2) of the Constitution instructs the courts to interpret all 
legislation in a manner that promotes the sprit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
The provision effectively creates a statutory presumption that the legislature intends to 
promote and safeguard all constitutional rights in the exercise of their law-making role.  
The Constitutional Court has accordingly held that courts must seek to give effect to the 
values that underlie the Bill of Rights when reading legislation, and, to the extent that the 
                                                      
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  
21 Eviction Act ss 4(7), 4(8). 
22 Equality Act ss 14, 21. 
23 Information Act s 70(b).  
24 ibid s 82.  
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language of an impugned legislative scheme permits, courts must choose an interpretation 
that does not limit a right as opposed to one that does.25 
The impact of section 39(2) on rights legislation is neatly illustrated by a group of 
high court judgments adjudicated under the Eviction Act.  These judgements investigated 
whether the definition of ‘unlawful occupier’ in the Act included only occupiers who 
unlawfully took possession of the land or whether the protection of the Act included those 
occupiers who were once lawful occupiers but subsequently became unlawful occupiers.  
In other words, does the Eviction Act protect ex-tenants, ex-mortgagors, or ex-owners 
who had lost the right to ownership of their home due to the enforcement of a debt?  
Nearly all of the high court judgments answered this question in the negative.26  These 
judgements rested their conclusion on the drafting history of the Eviction Act including 
the legislature’s intended scope of the Act.  The legislature — or, more accurately, the 
ministerial department responsible for the administration of the Eviction Act — never 
intended the Eviction Act to protect occupiers who were at one stage lawful occupiers.27  
There were other legislative schemes — including ESTA and the Rental Housing Act — 
that provided protection to occupiers whose right to reside had terminated.28  Moreover, 
                                                      
25  Makate v Vodacom 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) para 89; Daniels v Campbell 2004 (4) 5 SA 331 (CC) 
para 43. 
26 See Absa Bank v Amod [1999] 2 All SA 423 (W) at 428D–430D; Ross v South Peninsula 
Municipality 2000 (1) SA 589 (C) at 599A; Betta Eindomme v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) at 
473I; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter 2001 (4) SA 759 (E); 
Sentrale Karoo Distriksraad v Roman 2001 (1) SA 711 (LCC); Esterhuyze v Khamadi 2001 (1) SA 
1024 (LCC); Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) at 801G–802B.  For judgments reaching the 
opposite conclusion, see Bekker v Jika 2002 (4) SA 508 (E) at 523D–524D; Van Zyl v Maarman 
2002 (1) SA 957 (LCC); Ridgway v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (4) SA 187 (C) at 190A–B. 
27 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment Bill [B8-2008].  
The accompanying memorandum to the Bill outlines the objects of the amendment Bill.  It notes the 
SCA decision of Ndlovu, and that it— 
was not the intention that the Act should apply to tenants and mortgagors who default in 
terms of their prior agreements with landlords and financial institutions, respectively.  
The Act should cover only those persons who unlawfully invade land without the prior 
consent of the landowner or person in charge of land.  It has thus been necessary to 
amend [the Act] to state specifically that the Act does not apply to a person who 
occupied land as a tenant, in terms of any other agreement or as the owner of land and 
who continues to occupy despite the fact that the tenancy or agreement has been validly 
terminated or the person is no longer the owner of the land. 
The Bill however lapsed before the National Assembly during its second reading.  See Proceedings 
of the National Assembly, Hansard, 21 August 2008, 157.  While it appears that the state does not 
intend to initiate a similar amendment act in the future, it bears noting such an amendment would in 
all likelihood fail to pass constitutional muster.  See Sarrahwitz judgment, discussed in note 36 
below. 
28 See minority judgment in Ndlovu v Ngcobo [2002] 4 All SA 384 (SCA): para 2 (Nienaber JA); 
para 62 (Olivier JA). 
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some of these judgments reasoned, if the legislature intended to reverse the common law 
ownership right, it should have done so in a more express manner.29  The Supreme Court 
of Appeal overturned these rulings in Ndlovu v Ngcobo.30  The court relied upon section 
39(2) of the Constitution to reconstruct the intention of the legislature.  That the 
legislature actually intended to protect only one category of unlawful occupiers is by 
itself an insufficient reason to deny statutory protection to other categories (provided the 
language of the legislative scheme permits inclusion).  The court concluded that the main 
function of the section 26 housing right is to lessen the plight of the poor, and, in that 
spirit, there ‘seems to be no reason in the general social and historical context of this 
country why the Legislature would have wished not to afford this vulnerable class the 
protection of the Eviction Act’.31 
Second, the section 36(1) rights-limitation analysis promotes judicial discretion 
within legislation.  The translation of private constitutional duties into legislation is likely 
to limit a constitutional right, and, as a result, the legislature must be able to show that the 
limitation is ‘reasonable and justifiable’ having taken ‘into account all relevant factors’.  
Legislation that does not outright limit a constitutional right — but rather creates a 
presumption in favour of one constitutionally protected interest but nevertheless affords 
the judiciary a final discretion to determine the interest to favour after enquiring into the 
facts of the particular case — is far more likely to survive constitutional review.32  It is 
difficult to justify absolute limits on a right (outcome-based balancing) when it can be 
shown that process-based balancing (which permits a degree of judicial discretion) is a 
narrower and less restrictive way to achieve the legislative objective.  This claim operates 
on a scale.  It applies more forcefully to legislative schemes that cast their objectives in 
broad terms, and, as a result, apply to a wider array of varying disputes.  Legislation that 
has a smaller scope of application is more likely to survive constitutional review; their 
limits upon rights are often narrower and it is also easier to evaluate and predict future 
results in the abstract.  Like most other constitutional rights legislation, the Eviction Act, 
the Equality Act, and the Information Act are legislative schemes that have an expansive 
scope of application. 
                                                      
29 ibid paras 61, 71 (Olivier JA). 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid para 16 (majority judgment). 
32 For example, see Opperman (n 10) (provisions of the National Credit Act (n 19) were declared 
unconstitutional for limiting judicial discretion). 
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Writing in the context of a rights legislative scheme, the Constitutional Court 
cautioned that enquiries into the scope of any constitutional obligation upon private 
individuals and entities is a complex issue, and one that cannot be reduced to a binary all-
or-nothing approach.33  The scope of any obligation is most often ‘found on a continuum 
that reflects the variations in the respective weight of the relevant considerations’.34  And, 
to this end, unless the state can produce a compelling state justification not to do so, 
rights legislation must afford a sufficient amount of protection to constitutionally 
protected interest so as to allow final arbiters (i.e. judges) latitude to reconcile clashing 
rights within the context of each particular case.  The Jaftha decision illustrates this 
point.35  Recall from the discussion in chapter four, the court declared unconstitutional a 
legislative provision that prevented the courts from considering all relevant circumstances 
prior to the sale of a home in order to satisfy a debt (the state’s interesting in promoting 
debt recovery through an automatic and expedient process was found not to be a 
compelling justification).36  
Third, section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution empowers the judiciary with broad 
remedial powers to ‘make any order that is just and equitable’ when deciding a 
constitutional matter, which, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly confirmed, permits 
the courts to consider a wide array of considerations in order to craft an effective and 
efficient remedy.37  The Bill of Rights confirms this discretionary remedial power.  
Section 38 of the Constitution reiterates that the judiciary has the power to ‘grant 
appropriate relief’ in order to remedy or prevent the infringement of a constitutional right.  
These two provisions explain why constitutional rights legislation employ the phrases 
‘just and equitable’ and ‘appropriate’ or uses comparable open-ended phrases like ‘fair’ 
and ‘reasonable’ when defining the remedial powers of the courts. 38   Parliament 
                                                      
33 Baron v Claytile 2017 (5) SA 329 (CC) para 36. 
34 ibid.  
35  Jafta v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
36  See also Sarrahwitz (n 13) para 49 (equally vulnerable persons must receive the same legal 
protection unless the state can offer a compelling justification).  At paragraph 85 of the judgment, 
the concurring opinion advises not to read the Sarrahwitz holding too broadly because doing so 
would significantly curtail the capacity of the legislature to create distinctions between different 
groups of people in the way Parliament feels best fit to meet social needs. 
37 See Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of 
Offenders 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) para 74. 
38 The two legislative schemes discussed in chapter six further illustrate the broad discretionary 
investigations and remedies contained within legislation.  ESTA only allows an eviction order if it 
is ‘just and equitable’.  ESTA and the RHA also restrict the power to contract.  These legislative 
schemes only allow a property owner to terminate a right to reside if it is ‘just and equitable’ 
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recognises that discretionary remedial powers within constitutional disputes is a 
constitutional requirement, and that any legislative scheme is liable for invalidation 
should it remove or curb this wide, flexible, and discretionary power.39   It is of interest to 
postulate here that the discretionary remedial powers of the courts have encouraged the 
ever-increasing application of constitutional rights to the South African private law.  A 
perennial concern is that the horizontal application of rights undermines human 
autonomy, which both constitutional rights and the common law aim to safeguard.  The 
wide remedial discretion of the courts ameliorates this fear to a large extent.  Even though 
a constitutional right may impose an obligation upon a private individual and entity, a 
court, after considering the particular circumstances of the case, may deem it appropriate 
to mould a remedy that effectively lessens or even removes the burden on the duty 
bearer.40 
2.2.2 Difference (between legislative and judicial balancing) 
On the other hand, however, the balancing framework contained within legislation 
departs from the judicial equivalent.  The broad evaluation of competing constitutional 
rights and other interests within legislation is built on top of a series of procedural and 
substantive components, which is a feature that nudges rights legislation towards the 
outcome-based side of the balancing spectrum.  These components take the form of (i) 
fixed requirements that must be complied with before a litigant is entitled to invoke a 
statutory cause of action or defence and (ii) factors that arbiters must consider when 
resolving a dispute.  In accordance with the Eviction Act, for example, the failure of a 
landowner to comply with notice requirements or disclose prerequisite information will in 
all likelihood result in the court denying an eviction order.41  The Eviction Act further 
provides an array of criteria that the courts must consider when deciding whether or not 
an eviction would be ‘just and equitable’ in the circumstances.  This includes the 
availability of alternative housing, the interests and needs of children, women, and the 
                                                                                                                                                            
(ESTA) or not ‘unfair, unreasonable, or oppressive’ (RHA) to do so.  Each of the legislative 
schemes provides the courts with a wide remedial power to issue any order that is ‘just and 
equitable’ given the circumstances of the case. 
39 See Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (2) SA 
415 (CC) para 97; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
para 101; Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and Industry 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) para 28; 
Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 38. 
40  See Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) para 53 (a constitutional obligation upon a private 
actor ‘may or may not arise, depending on the exercise of discretion by a court’). 
41  See Baron (n 33) paras 33, 46–47.  
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elderly, as well as the period of the occupation.  The Equality Act similarly prescribes 
mandatory procedural requirements, and furthermore lists an array of factors that must be 
considered in determining whether or not a discriminatory act is fair.42 
These legislatively prescribed procedural and substantive requirements may at 
times prove more onerous upon litigants wishing to vindicate a constitutional right, but 
they also produce two significant advantages.  First, the increased precision and detail of 
the balancing framework better guides the balancing of conflicting interests, which, in 
turn, better promotes predictable and consistent outcomes.  Second, the more structured 
balancing framework has the propensity to narrow the scope of the dispute.  Litigating 
parties need only focus on the requirements they contend are lacking or on the statutory-
prescribed factors they believe were not given adequate consideration.43  The Information 
Act can illustrate this point.  The Act lists and details all of the grounds upon which a 
private body must or may deny access to a record.  In doing so, the Information Act 
renders it relatively easy to identify whether a particular requestor is entitled to a 
privately held record. 
In contrast, although each judicial balancing process also provides factors to 
guide its application, the judicial law-making process is unlikely to produce a balancing 
framework that is as tailored, detailed and precise as the framework contained in 
legislation.  The reason for this difference is attributable to two core reasons.  First, the 
judicial law-making toolkit is smaller than that of the legislature.  The judicial authority 
to craft a balancing process — which includes identifying the factors that must be 
considered when applying the process — must be derived from constitutional principles 
alone.  In other words, when the court balances conflicting right norms without the 
                                                      
42 ESTA and the RHA also prescribe an array of requirements and guidelines to facilitate the 
resolution of the dispute.  The legislative schemes establish notice periods, the mandatory 
notification of certain actors, and the declarations of the facts and source of dispute.  They also list 
considerations that an adjudicator must consider.  This includes the reason for the occupation of the 
premises, the socio-economic status of the occupier, and the conduct of the owner of the property.  
For additional examples, see Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the Act gives effect 
to the section 23(1) constitutional right to fair labour practices by providing minimum requirements 
for employment like leave and work time as well as creating institutions and procedures for the 
enforcement of labour rights); Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (the Act gives effect to the 
rights to equality and freedom and security of the person, and defines what constitutes domestic 
abuse and legislates an array of procedures and actions for protecting spouses or partners in an 
abusive relationship). 
43 For two recent example of how ESTA narrowed the dispute between landowner and occupier, see 
Baron (n 33) (the court only had to determine whether the alternative accommodation made 
available by the municipality was appropriate); Snyers v Mgro Properties [2016] 4 All SA 828 
(SCA) (the SCA denied an eviction application as procedural requirements were not met). 
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assistance of the elected branches of government, the courts need a legal justification for 
limiting one constitutional right norm in favour of another.   Chapter five identified the 
primary source of this legal justification: although constitutional rights protect legal 
powers, these powers must be controlled to ensure that they are exercised in a manner 
that does not unduly and without adequate justification infringe upon the rights of others.   
The legislative law-making toolkit is far larger.  While legislation must comply with the 
commands of the Constitution, including section 36(1) and section 172(1)(b) as outlined 
above, the task of formulating legislative remedies is not confined to legal considerations 
alone.  As outlined in chapter one, the legislative law-making process benefits from 
public participation, government policy, and arbitrary line drawing (why, for example, 
does the Information Act require a private body to provide a decision within 30 days, and 
not 25 or 35?).44  These benefits innate to legislation allows for the creation of balancing 
frameworks that are more detailed and precise than the judicial balancing process.  
Second, the context in which the judiciary and the legislature exercise their law-making 
powers is different.  In contrast to the legislative law-making process, the judiciary only 
ever initiates its law-making powers to solve a particular dispute between a few 
individuals and entities.   The courts are thus able to prescribe broad principles and 
frameworks, and only focus on those narrow aspects of the particular case that may 
require legal development in order to resolve the case at hand.  The law is left to develop 
on a case-by-case basis, which is done with the benefit of specific facts and actual 
outcomes.  Parliament’s motivation for creating law is different.  It seeks to meet broad 
policy and legal objectives, and, in order to do so, the legislature must create sufficiently 
structured and detailed frameworks to resolve all future disputes that fall under the 
purview of the particular legislative scheme.  The legislature does not enjoy the luxury of 
tailoring laws on an ad hoc basis in order to ensure the state’s policy objectives are met 
within each particular legal dispute.  
2.3 Fixed rules in judicial law-making 
Although the legislative law-making process is better positioned to produce more detailed 
and structured balancing frameworks, the pivot towards legislation is not always needed 
to resolve conflicting rights.  The case law analysed in Part B of the thesis illustrated that 
the judicial balancing process is not invariably at risk of generating balancing exercises 
                                                      
44 Chap 1, sec 2.1. 
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that are too vague and abstract for predictable and consistent application, and, 
furthermore, that limited amounts of legal uncertainty within the judicial balancing 
process is not fatal.  The choice between legislation and the common law is therefore 
dependent on the court’s appetite for enhanced legal certainty, as well as an assessment 
on whether or not the legislature is in fact prepared to enact legislation (to date, political 
will has not proved problematic as the South African Parliament has always complied 
with judicial orders to promulgate legislation). 
It also bears noting that there are a few instances where the judicial balancing 
process yields results that are no more uncertain than legislation.  And, as a result, there is 
no need to pivot towards legislative remedies.  Chapter five identified three example of 
where judicial balancing resulted in fixed rules; namely (i) no other protected legal 
interest, (ii) monopolised power over a core freedom interest, and (iii) choices of intimate 
association.  Here, the court held that the Constitution demands a particular outcome 
regardless of the facts of the case, which means that there is no need for either the courts 
or the legislature to engage in process-based balancing.  Ramakatsa v Magashule is an 
additional example of where the judicial law-making pathway created a fixed rule.  As 
discussed in chapter seven, the court interpreted section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution to 
impose a procedural obligation upon political parties to facilitate the participation of 
members within the internal activities of the party.  Significantly, this procedural 
guarantee does not compete against any other constitutionally protected interests (the 
reasoning of the Ramakatsa judgment suggests that the Constitution affords zero 
protection to a political party’s preference for autocratic practices, which was permitted 
under the common law of contract).  Given that no political party or member can claim an 
exception to this procedural right, the Ramakatsa court was able to recognise a fixed a 
rule.  There was accordingly no need to create context-specific balancing frameworks, 





3 Benefit two: legislation contains government policy 
Incongruity is the second limit of the judicial law-making toolkit.  The private common 
law rests on the foundational belief that each individual must be afforded a sufficient 
amount of autonomy so as to allow everyone the freedom and responsibility to manage 
their own resources and pursue their own interests.  The common law safeguards this 
negative conception of freedom through a series of mostly procedurally neutral rules (i.e. 
the requirements for the creation of a legal agreement or the transfer of ownership).45  
Private law interferes in the exercise of autonomy only in those instances where it is 
necessary to hold individuals responsible for their actions or to repulse undue 
encroachments on another’s autonomy.46  The need to safeguard human autonomy is also 
a core rationale for most other constitutional rights.  And, when this shared philosophical 
DNA is present, the reframing of the common law through the prism of the Constitution 
proves a manageable task for the courts. 
But, in some instances, the underlying objectives of the common law and 
constitutional rights are too dissimilar.  As a result, the common law struggles to develop 
in a way that satisfies both the demands of the Constitution and the internal logic and 
doctrine of the common law.  The conflict between property and housing rights is such a 
case under certain conditions.  These rights clash in a politically fraught arena, where the 
underlying problem is no so much responsibility for individual actions but larger systemic 
problems of inequality and poverty.47  Consider once more the application of the 
expanded-substantive reading of the housing right to the common law.  Not only would 
the expanded scope of the obligation place considerable stress on the autonomy interests 
upon which the common law is built, the expanded reading would require judges to enter 
                                                      
45 See AJ van der Walt, Property in the Margins (Hart 2009) 17–18 (the common law is sometimes 
described as apolitical, but that is a fiction; it is just that the policy objectives of the common law 
are hidden by long-standing doctrinal rules, which proves problematic whenever the Constitution 
requires economic and social reform). See also Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 2012 (3) 
SA 531 (CC) para 151 (no longer can the value-laden content of the law be denied).  For the view 
that the common law must be free from socio-political influence (and therefore should not be used 
to remedy the ill effects of apartheid), see Johan Neethling, ‘A Vision of the Future of the South 
African Private Law – Full or Reconciliatory Synthesis?’ in Annél van Aswegen (ed), The Future 
of South African Private Law (Unisa Press 1994) 1, 3; JM Potgieter, The Role of the Law in a 
Period of Political Transition: The Need for Objectivity’ (1991) 54 THRHR 800, 802. 
46 Chap 4, sec 2. 
47  See Daniels (n 40) para 165 (the horizontal application of rights cannot be used to saddle innocent 
private persons with ‘the duty to remedy the wrongs of the state’). 
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the realm of formulating economic policy.  Access to land and housing are immensely 
complicated social problems, and there is no universal solution to the problem (consider 
the fact that elections are mainly contested over economic policies, and, more 
specifically, plans over the distribution of limited resources).  The common law is simply 
not built to accommodate this objective without significant alteration to its structure.48  
And, as the Constitutional Court has warned, ‘fundamental changes to the fabric of the 
common law and customary law are often more appropriately made by way of 
legislation’.49 
The Jaftha judgment further illuminates how the problem of incongruity 
constrains judicial law-making powers.  This decision is amongst the Constitutional 
Court’s most notable attempts to reconcile the housing right and other private law rights 
without the assistance of the elected branches of government.  To recall, despite 
arguments from the state to the contrary, the court remedied a statutory provision by 
ordering that courts had to consider ‘all relevant circumstances’ before a home is sold to 
satisfy a debt.  The court did not prescribe an exhaustive list of factors, but rather outlined 
eight broad considerations.  These factors include the individual circumstances that led to 
the incurrence of the debt, any attempts by the debtor to repay the debate, the relative 
financial position of the parties, whether the debtors enjoy another source of income to 
pay off the debt, whether the debtor voluntarily mortgaged the property, whether either of 
the parties acted recklessly in contracting for the debt, the measures taken by the creditor 
to enforce the debt, and any other factor relevant to the particular facts of the case.50  It is 
telling that all of the factors except one (relative financial position) pertain to individual 
autonomy interests and responsibility for those decisions.  Although structural inequality 
and other macro-social problems give rise to the problem, these larger economic 
complexities are absent from this judicially invented enquiry. 
But this is not a limit of the legislative law-making toolkit.  Legislation is derived 
from government policy, which is formulated based on how best to distribute and exploit 
limited resources.  The discussion that follows shows how government policy assists in 
resolving conflicting rights. 
                                                      
48 See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) para 66 (new constitutional remedies are 
preferable if the Constitution would stretch the common law ‘beyond recognition’).   
49 Mighty Solutions (n 6) para 44.  
50 ibid paras 41, 58, 60. 
–234– 
3.1 Government policy drives legislation  
How best to provide access to land — which includes providing access to goods that are 
attached to land such as housing and the provision of water and electricity — is amongst 
the most fraught debates within the South African political landscape.  And, like all other 
socio-economic rights cases, it is this politically charged backdrop that animates and 
explains the Constitutional Court’s decision in President of the Republic v Modderklip 
Boerdery.51  A private landowner instituted an eviction application for the removal of 
approximately 18 000 unlawful occupiers, and, although the order was granted in 
accordance with the Eviction Act, the state failed to assist in the implementation of the 
order.  The size of the informal settlement continued to grow at a rapid rate, and 
eventually the cost of removing the approximately 40 000 settlers outgrew the value of 
the property.  The landowner repeatedly sought the assistance of the state but to no avail.  
This led the landowner to institute action against the state for a sum of damages to 
reclaim the lost value of the property.  The SCA sided with landowner, and ordered the 
payment of constitutional damages on the basis that the inaction of the state infringed 
upon both the property rights of the landowner and the access to adequate housing rights 
of the unlawful occupiers.52  The logic of the SCA was as follows: (i) the state violated 
the occupiers’ section 26 right to access adequate housing by not providing alternative 
land for accommodation, and, in doing so, (ii) the state also breached the landowner’s 
property right as the ability of the landowner to enjoy the full use of their property right 
was now dependent on the state fulfilling their obligations under the housing right.53  
The Constitutional Court confirmed the remedy of the SCA, but did so on a 
different ground.  The court held that the inaction of the state amounted to a violation of 
the section 34 right to access courts.  The right aims to secure the rule of law, and 
requires the state not only to provide mechanisms for enforcing rights but also to take 
reasonable measures to ensure that large social disruptions do not occur when enforcing a 
legal remedy.  The inaction of the state failed both pillars in this matter.  First, the state 
effectively denied the landowner a legal remedy to which the landowner was entitled (in 
accordance with the Eviction Act).54  Second, the state failed to take reasonable steps to 
                                                      
51 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
52 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery [2004] 3 All SA 169 (SCA) paras 22, 28.  The SCA 
held that damages had to be calculated in accordance with the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
53 Modder East Squatters (n 52) paras 21–22. 
54 Modderklip (n 51) para 50. 
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manage the social problem, which could have included purchasing the property or 
relocating the unlawful occupiers when the landowner initially approached the state for 
assistance.  
The Modderklip judgement provides no clear explanation for why it was 
‘unnecessary’ to resolve the dispute through the application of property and housing 
rights, or why the doctrinal shift to the section 34 right to access courts was more 
preferable.55  But it is possible to infer the reasons.  The SCA judgment was premised on 
the state’s constitutional obligations to resolve eviction disputes in the private sphere, and 
the reasoning of the appellate court suggests how similar cases would be resolved in the 
future: a landowner would be entitled to damages from the state whenever unlawful 
occupiers fail to comply with an eviction order.  This legal precedent placed immense 
financial strain on the state, and furthermore shackled the efforts of the state to develop 
political solutions for managing the (lack of adequate) housing crisis.56  The Modderklip 
court was reluctant to follow this approach, and the judgment demonstrates that the 
Constitutional Court is unwilling to instruct the state on how it should resolve tensions 
between private property rights and access to housing.  From this viewpoint, the 
deflection in Modderklip was smart.  The court effectively ordered constitutional 
damages on the basis that the state failed to assist in the implementation of its own 
legislation, which, one can assume, is created from a government policy that seeks to 
manage the problem of unlawful occupiers settling on private property.  The Modderklip 
court did not need to develop its own framework for resolving these two conflicting 
constitutional rights.  The award for damages flowed from the finding that the state did 
not comply with its own framework for managing the dispute (i.e. the Eviction Act 
entitled the landowner in this instance to a remedy), which, in turn, created a threat of 
social instability.57 
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56 See Theunis Roux, The Politics of Principle (2013 CUP) 328–31. 
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obligations, the courts have been willing to order constitutional damages.  See MEC, Department of 
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The Modderklip judgment shows that the courts rely upon the capacity of 
government to solve tensions that arise from conflicting constitutional rights.  Another 
term for these solutions is government policy, and it is formulated on the basis of state 
research, expertise, and assumptions on how best to manage limited resources in society.  
There is no legal or political standards or framework on how government policy ought to 
be developed, and the process of government policy-making rarely produces one clear 
outcome.  Despite the uncertainty, the job of government is to evaluate and choose 
between more or less desirable options, and once decisions have been made, the state 
must translate policy into a network of legal requirements that are sufficiently clear and 
capable of consistent application.58  In comparison to the judicial law-making process, the 
government policy that drives the creation of legislation is what makes the legislative 
law-making process both unique and effective. 
Government policy has also benefited the constitutional rebuilding of private law.  
Two examples will suffice.  The first comes from the Equality Act, which shows an 
example of how past experiences enhanced the effectiveness of this legislative scheme.  
The drafters of the Equality Act reviewed antidiscrimination legislation from around the 
globe, and concluded that these acts suffered from a significant shortcoming: 59 
complaints of discrimination rarely succeed unless the discriminatory act is overt and 
unequivocal. 60   Complainants find proving discrimination difficult for a variety of 
reasons, but one of the main reasons is that it is near impossible for a complaint to explain 
a respondent’s motives and actions.  Although a shift in onus appears not to be a 
requirement of the Constitution, the Equality Act remedies this limit by substantially 
reducing the complainant’s burden of proof.61  Section 13 of the Act provides that a 
complainant need only establish a ‘prima facie case of discrimination’.62  Once this 
relatively low threshold is met, the onus shifts to the respondent.  The Act provides that a 
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Discrimination Act 4 of 2000’ (LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007) 112, 136–42. 
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complainant will have proved a case of unfair discrimination unless the respondent can 
demonstrate that (i) the discrimination did not take place, (ii) the discriminatory conduct 
was not based on a prohibited ground, or (iii) the discrimination was fair.63 
The second example is the Rental Housing Act (RHA), which must be assessed 
alongside the series of Maphango judgments discussed in chapter six.  To recall, the RHA 
serves as the primary legislative scheme for the regulation of the rental housing market.  
Its objectives are twofold.  The first is to meet the constitutional obligations of the state.  
This includes not only the duty to protect the access to housing right from undue 
interference by third parties, but also the duty upon the state to take reasonable measures 
to achieve the progressive realisation of the section 26 right (within the private market).64 
The second objective is economic, and it is to increase the availability of 
affordable housing in the private rental market.65  The South African economy suffers 
from a shortage of residential accommodation, and, for nearly a century, the state has 
enacted numerous legislative schemes to ensure that the shortage of supply does not lead 
to exorbitant rentals.  The earliest versions of rental control legislation imposed extensive 
restrictions on the contractual powers of lessors to increase rent.66  In accordance with 
one of the predecessors of the RHA, for example, the rent amount of controlled 
residential premises were ‘frozen’ at a date in the 1950s and a lessor was only permitted 
to increase the rent in certain situations.67  These situations included where there was an 
increase in property taxes, insurance costs, or the maintenance of the building.68  The 
parties to a residential lease agreement were also permitted to apply to an administrative 
board for an order to either increase or decrease the rentals.  The legislation provided a 
list of factors the board ought to consider in setting new rentals.  The most pertinent was 
that the rent control legislation limited the landowner’s return on investment.  The last 
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version of the rent control legislation provided that lessors could only receive a return of 
8.5 per cent per annum on the value of the residential building and the land.69 
Government reassessed their strategy to the housing crisis, and concluded that 
rent control legislation deters private investment in the rental housing market.  To 
promote the supply of rental housing, the RHA substituted rent control measures with a 
more flexible approach.  In the opinion of government, the RHA creates a framework that 
assists in maximising two competing considerations: (i) the need to promote an increase 
of supply in the market and (ii) the need to ensure that rental accommodation is 
affordable, particularly for the poor and previously disadvantaged. In Maphango, the 
Constitutional Court summarised the objective of the RHA. 
The Act abolished rent control legislation, but in its stead it enacted a more complex, 
nuanced and potentially powerful system for managing disputes between landlords 
and tenants.  The system expressly takes account of market forces as well as the need 
to protect both tenants and landlords.  Even-handedly, it imposes obligations on both.  
It is particularly sensitive to the need to afford investors in rental housing a realistic 
return on their capital.  The statutory scheme is therefore acutely sensitive to the need 
to balance the social cost of managing and expanding rental housing stock without 
imposing it solely on landlords.70 
Chapter seven provided an overview of the RHA.71  The Act creates housing 
tribunals whose members must be persons with experience in property, housing 
development, and consumer protection.  The tribunals are empowered to determine any 
new rental amount that is ‘just and equitable to both tenants and landlord’, which must 
take consideration of (i) prevailing economic conditions; (ii) the need for realistic returns 
on investments and (iii) policy frameworks on rental housing created by the cabinet 
minister responsible for the implementation of the RHA.72 
The Maphango court’s pivot towards legislative remedies allowed government 
policy to assist in resolving the dispute.  This contrasts with the approach of the SCA, 
which confined its analysis to whether or not the Constitution demands the development 
of the common law of contract.  The SCA answered the question in the negative, and 
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their reasons for doing so were built upon a laissez-faire economic assessment of the 
residential rental market that stood in stark contrast to the position of government.  The 
SCA noted that the landlord engaged in the ‘commendable’ business practice of 
upgrading residential apartment buildings, and it could not be expected of an investor to 
incur losses in a situation where the landlord had the contractual power to terminate the 
agreements.  This sort of reasoning found traction within the minority Constitutional 
Court judgment.  Three judges of the court suggested that the soon-to-be evicted were to 
blame for their misfortunate.73  The minority judgment argued that the tenants could have 
negotiated, if they were more aware, more favourable terms for themselves (i.e. the 
tenants should have insisted that a clause be added to the agreement to the effect that the 
landlord was not entitled to cancel the lease agreement merely to increase the rent).  This 
is a theoretical assumption of how liberal market economies operate; each individual is 
able to negotiate the best terms for the realisation of prized goods.  But the facts of the 
case suggest that the tenants had little to no economic power to negotiate better terms.  
The strangest suggestion of the minority judgment was that the landlord may have also 
been at a disadvantage in terminating the lease agreement because the landlord would be 
losing ‘good tenants [who] are not always easy to get’.74  In line with this liberal 
economic assessment of reasonableness, neither the SCA or minority judgment believed 
that the termination of lease agreements to increase the rent, or the fact that some of the 
tenants would be rendered homeless, was a factor to consider in the evaluation of whether 
the enforcement of the provision was unfair or unreasonable.  The evaluation was also not 
considered from broader social and economic policy perspectives, including that the 
landlord received a financial grant from the state (the grant was provided as part of the 
state’s economic policy to ensure a sustainable and affordable rental housing market).75   
It is fair to criticise the SCA and minority judgment for grounding their decision 
on highly unrealistic assumptions of how agreements are created between powerful 
property owners and indigent residents.  Their liberal microeconomic appraisal stands in 
stark contrast to social reality as well as the position of government (as reflected in the 
RHA which seeks to prevent landlords from exploiting poor tenants).  But these judges 
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–240– 
are fully aware of the political landscape in South Africa, and poor tenants are certainty 
not in a position to negotiate agreements.  The most charitable explanation for these 
judgments is the concern that the common law cannot accommodate the objectives of 
socio-economic rights, and, more specifically, the common law does not have the tools to 
solve complex macroeconomic problems.  Socio-economic rights and other economic 
matters are inherently about the redistribution of limited resources in society, which must 
be done through the formulation of policy objectives.  This is a task that courts struggle to 
do within the narrow confines of individual common law disputes.76 
3.2 State monitoring 
Government policy introduces an additional benefit.  Unlike the courts, the elected 
branches of government enjoy the capacity to monitor and review the implementation of 
law.77  In fact, under some circumstances, the state has the constitutional obligation to do 
so.78  Oversight contributes to the institutional knowledge of the state, which, in turn, 
further enhances the capacity of the elected branches of government to appraise and 
formulate policy objectives and plans.  
The legislature enjoys two ways to gain information on the effectiveness of a 
particular legislative scheme.  First, the legislature can create internal oversight 
committees.  Here, members of committees can invite (and, if need be, summon) 
individuals to provide evidence or produce documents.79  Second, the legislature can 
create external oversight mechanisms that are tasked with providing feedback to 
Parliament and government.   Most of the prominent constitutional rights legislative 
schemes follow the latter option.  For example, section 32 of the Equality Act instructs 
the relevant cabinet minister to establish an Equality Review Committee (ERC).  The 
membership of the ERC is composed of a senior judicial officer, the Chairpersons of the 
South African Human Rights Commission and the Gender Equality Commission, a 
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representative from civil society, an expert in the field of human rights, and one member 
from the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces.  Section 33 outlines the 
responsibilities of the ERC, which includes submitting regular reports to the Minister 
advising on the operation of the Act and whether or not the objectives of the Act and the 
Constitution have been achieved.  The ERC is also tasked with making recommendations 
on how to improve the operation of the Equality Act.  The Information Act also relies 
upon an external oversight institution.  The newly created Information Regulator is 
scheduled to takeover the responsibilities of the Human Rights Commission in respect of 
the Information Act, and is mandated to provide written recommendations to the National 
Assembly on how to improve the effectiveness of the Information Act.80 
3.3 The limited role of policy within judicial law-making 
All law stems from policy.  That is, lawmakers must firstly identify objectives that must 
be met and secondly determine how human behaviour needs to change in order to meet 
those objectives.81  The constitutional rebuilding project of private law thus requires the 
setting of objectives (the Constitution identifies broad objectives, but more specific goals 
need to be tailored), and also entails the making of evaluations and reasonable 
assumptions of how individuals interact and societies function.  And this is a task that 
must be fulfilled by legislators and judges alike.  However, in contrast to the elected 
branches of government, the ability of the judiciary to appraise evidence and formulate 
policy is limited.  As the SCA held in the context of a housing eviction dispute, even 
though courts are required to assess all relevant considerations, the capacity of the courts 
to gather and evaluate evidence is restricted: 
courts are neither vested with powers of investigation nor equipped with the staff and 
resources to engage in broad-ranging enquiries into socio-economic issues. Nor, […] 
                                                      
80 See Information Act ss 82–84, and the amendments introduced by the Protection of Personal 
Information Act 4 of 2013.  For further examples, see Prevention of Combating of Trafficking in 
Persons Act 7 of 2013 (the Act gives effect to the rights of human dignity, equality, and freedom 
and security of the person, and specifically mandates certain cabinet minister and other state 
institutions to report annually to Parliament on the implementation of the Act). 
81  For a critique of the view that the common law is depoliticised and that its development is taken 
without consideration of socio-political forces, see Dennis Davis, Democracy and Deliberation 
(Juta 1999) 131. 
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can the courts circumvent that by delegating those tasks to the sheriff, who is likewise 
ill-equipped for that task.82 
The choice between the judicial and legislative law-making pathway therefore 
depends on whether or not the judiciary is capable of gathering and evaluating the 
evidence that is necessary to resolve a dispute, including whether the evidence leads to 
one outcome or a multiplicity of options as the courts are unlikely to develop the law of 
their own accord if the latter ensues.83 
The Ramakatsa decision illustrates the role of policy in the judicial law-making 
process.  More specifically, the judgments highlights how the courts can exercise the law-
making mandate effortlessly when the constitutional objectives are clear and there is a 
sufficient amount of certainty over how to change individual behaviours in order to 
achieve the result.  Recall that the Constitutional Court only recognised a procedural right 
of members to participate in the internal activities of a political party.  This right was 
necessitated to realise specific constitutional goals.  In a narrow sense, protecting the 
participation of individual members in a political party serves the procedural 
requirements of the Constitution that government must be based on a ‘multi-party system 
of government’.84  The text prescribes that national and provincial legislatures must 
generally be composed of proportional representation.85  In doing so, the Constitution 
effectively makes political parties gatekeepers to elected office.  The supreme law forces 
any citizen wishing to stand for public office to exercise this constitutionally guaranteed 
franchise through the internal operations of political parties.  Furthermore, as a 
constitutional court judge explains, the—  
citizens’ right to participate in the activities of a political party is the route by which 
any citizen would, in a real way, be able to bring influence to bear on the way that 
representative performs her functions in the relevant legislature.  In this sense the right 
                                                      
82 City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) para 26. 
83 Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) para 57 (courts should steer away from 
making decisions when ‘public policy considerations do not chart the path of desired common law 
development with sufficient clarity’; in these instances, the role of law-reform is best left to the 
legislature). 
84 Constitution s 1(d).  
85 ibid ss 46(1)(d), 105(1)(d). 
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places an obligation on political parties to ensure that they take account of what 
members say within their structures.86 
In a broader sense, the reasoning of the Ramakatsa judgment reveals that the 
Constitutional Court believes that fostering conditions for the active participation 
between party members is a way to improve the quality of democracy.87  Internal party 
democracy not only aids in curtailing the authoritarian practices of the past.  The court 
held that the success of any political party depends on the quality of the policies it seeks 
to sell to the general electorate, and suggests that the constructive participation of every 
member is needed to ensure that these policies are able to respond effectively to the many 
economic and social issues facing the country.88  Participation also promotes political 
stability.  It requires members to tolerate dissenting views.  Access to political decision-
making structures reduces the need for persons marginalised in the political process to 
resort to violence and other non-democratic means to advance their interests in a 
community. 
It should also be noted that the obligation upon political parties is not particularly 
onerous.  The right does not entitle party members to a specific sort of process, and every 
political party is free to decide how best to facilitate participation.   
Section 19 of the Constitution does not spell out how members of a political party 
should exercise the right to participate in the activities of their party.  For good reason 
this is left to political parties themselves to regulate.  These activities are internal 
matters of each party.  Therefore, it is these parties which are best placed to determine 
how members would participate in internal activities.89  
The decision of the court not to prescribe a more specific procedure is not 
coincidental.  The non-onerous obligation also seeks to achieve (or prevent) certain 
results.  Three are mentioned.  First, imposing requirements that are too burdensome can 
prove detrimental and counter-productive to the effective operation of a political 
organisation.  The success of any political party is contingent on a certain level of 
discipline from its members.  The branding of a political party is lost on the general 
electorate if the participation mechanisms produce a multiplicity of conflicting messages.  
                                                      
86 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) para 278 
(Yacoob J). 
87 See generally Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC) para 43.   
88 Ramakatsa (n 13) para 66. 
89 ibid para 73.  
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Second, political parties are based on mutual trust and respect amongst its membership.  
No law can legislate this condition, and any imposed rule that seeks to do so can frustrate 
the operations of the party.  Third, while political parties trade in ideas, the machinery 
required to advance those ideas is expensive.  Political parties are difficult to build and 
sustain.  They require an immense amount of assets and knowledge to build a reputation 
in society and wage an effective campaign for government.  The high costs associated 
with the establishment of a mainstream political party requires protection.  It should also 
not be forgotten that internal party democracy and participation is expensive, and 
regulation would adversely and disproportionality impact newcomers and smaller parties 
who often haven’t managed to secure the financial resources and capacity to facilitate 
participation.  Added to all these concerns, the fact remains that there is no clear 
consensus amongst political scientists and social theorists about what exactly constitutes 
acceptable levels of internal party democracy; what are the exact objectives of 
participation and providing ordinary members a voice against party leaders; and how are 
these objectives how best achieved.  With these uncertainties, it is best for the law to 
provide each party with a high amount of autonomy.   In the end, it is political parties 
(and not legislators or courts) that are best placed to advance and protect their own 
interests. 
In sum, the Ramakatsa’s decision to recognise a procedural right was informed by 
a series of constitutional objectives.  These policies are also complex, and are determined 
by the judicial appraisal of experiences and assumptions of how society operates.  But the 
outcome of that policy — that is, a procedural right — could be incorporated into the 
common law without significant disruption or difficulty.  The Ramakatsa decision serves 
as an example of where the larger capacity and expertise of the government’s policy-
making toolkit would be of no material advantage to the project of rebuilding private law, 
because, as the judgment leads one to believe, the court believed it was sufficiently 





4 Benefit three: legislation clarifies the obligations of the state 
A defining feature of the judicial balancing process is that it seeks to consider all of the 
relevant factors of a case before resolving a clash of competing rights.  And, as the 
following section will illustrate, one of these factors is sometimes the actions and 
constitutional duties of the state.  But this introduces a problem for the judicial balancing 
process.  The constitutional development of the common law is usually performed in 
disputes where all the litigants are private individuals and entities.  The state is typically 
not a party to private common law cases, and, as a result, little to no consideration is 
given to the constitutional obligations of the state when the courts exercise their law-
making mandate under the horizontal application provisions.  The role of the court is 
confined to determining whether or not a private individual or entity should be burdened 
with an obligation to safeguard the constitutional interests of another.  This enquiry is 
forced to become independent of state duties and actions, which can lead to one of two 
undesirable situations.  First, the courts could undervalue the scope of private obligations.  
If there is uncertainty over the scope of the state’s responsibilities, the courts may be less 
inclined to recognise an obligation upon private individuals and entities.  For the reasons 
that follow below, the cases discussed in chapter six is an example of this occurrence.  
Second, the courts could overvalue the scope of the private obligation.  In an attempt to 
ensure the full protection and realisation of a constitutional right, the courts could 
inadvertently transfer the obligations of the state onto private individuals and entities.     
The adjudication of constitutional disputes within legislative frameworks 
mitigates this limit of the judicial law-making toolkit.  This is on account of the fact that 
constitutional rights legislation not only gives effect to the obligations of private 
individuals and entities, but it also delineates the obligations of the state, or, at the very 
least, prescribes frameworks for determining the extent of the state’s obligation within a 
particular case.  In sum, the legislative framework is better at clarifying the obligations of 
the state, which, in turn, allows the courts to be more accurate and consistent in 
articulating the scope of the obligation upon private individuals and entities within the 
context of a particular case. 
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4.1 State obligations inform private obligations  
The case law discussed in chapter six illustrates how the scope of certain constitutional 
obligations upon private individuals and entities sometimes depends on the constitutional 
duties and actions of the state.  In these cases, the central question for determination was 
whether or not private property owners should incur constitutional obligations (and 
therefore restriction on their common law property rights) to ensure that indigent persons 
are not made homeless.  When this question was raised within the common law 
framework, the courts repeatedly said no.  The application of the narrow-procedural 
reading of the obligation made clear that it was the state that remains solely responsible 
for providing adequate housing to those who cannot afford to secure this resource through 
their own means.90  The obligation to provide housing cannot be passed off to private 
individuals and entities through indirect means, and private property rights cannot be 
limited to assist the state in meeting the obligation.   
The answer changed however when the obligations of private individuals and 
entities were assessed within legislative schemes.  The scope of the private obligation 
grew, and, as a result, the courts were more inclined to hold that private property rights 
had to be limited in order to safeguard another’s access to existing housing.  Its bears 
highlighting that the Constitutional Court view of the constitutional obligation upon 
private individuals and entities did not change.  The court repeatedly held that it is only 
the state that is vested with a positive obligation to provide access to adequate housing to 
those who cannot afford to do so by their own means, and the purpose of imposing a 
constitutional obligation on private individuals and entities is not to obstruct private 
autonomy or to transfer or pass-off the obligations of the state onto private individuals 
and entities.91  What did change however was that the private obligation was interpreted 
and applied within a broader legislative scheme, a legislative scheme that delineated the 
duties of the state.  In other words, these private duties operate as support to the primary 
obligations of the state.92 
                                                      
90 Constitution s 26(2). 
91 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) para 58.  
See also Modderklip (n 51) para 44. Compare Daniels (n 47) paras 39; All Pay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No. 2) 
2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) (discussed in Chap 5, sec 5.2.) 
92  See City of Johannesburg v Blue Moonlight Properties 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) paras 97–100, read 
with Maphango (n 64) paras 32–33.  
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This offers an explanation as to why the amorphous scope of the expanded-
substantive reading of the private obligation is difficult to define.  The private duty stems 
from the positive component of the state’s socio-economic rights, which the courts have 
been unwilling to prescribe concrete duties.  In brief, the positive duty upon the state to 
provide adequate housing to those who are unable to secure the resource on their own 
means is subject to the qualifications stipulated in section 26(2).  The state is required to 
only take ‘reasonable’ measures that are ‘within its available resources’ to achieve the 
‘progressive’ realisation of the right.  In the opinion of the court, these qualifications 
dissuade against a minimum core interpretation.93  This obligation demands that the state 
design and implement a housing policy, which, amongst many other things, must make 
provision for temporary emergency housing in order to house individuals who are at risk 
of losing access to their home.94  Members of the judiciary are thus expected to decline 
any invitation to calculate a fixed and quantified set of minimum entitlements, instead 
allowing the elected branches of government to delineate the specific content of the 
right.95  The state is left to define what constitutes an adequate house, as well as the 
means through which this resource is realised.  And the role of the courts is confined to 
testing whether the state’s housing policy, including the definition of an adequate house, 
is reasonable.  As the scope of the section 26 obligations of private individuals and 
entities are informed by and dependent on the flexible and changing obligations and 
action of the state, it means that the exact scope of private obligations cannot be fixed and 
will also remain in a state of flux. 
The Constitutional Court decision of City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd illustrates the triangular 
relationship.96  A private property owner instituted an application under the Eviction Act 
for the removal of 86 unlawful occupiers from a dilapidated building located in the City 
of Johannesburg.  The corporate owner purchased the property with the aim of renovating 
the building, and argued that it could not be expected to house the occupiers.  The 
occupiers resisted the application, and contended that it would be neither just nor 
equitable in the circumstances to grant an order for their eviction.  They were financially 
vulnerable, and would become homeless if they were to be evicted.  The occupiers joined 
                                                      
93 See Mazibuko (n 78) para 66. 
94 See Grootboom (n 64) paras 40–46, 68; Blue Moonlight (n 92) paras 67, 69, 74. 
95 Mazibuko (n 78) para 66. 
96  Blue Moonlight (n 92). 
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the city to the proceedings with the aim that they could provide a solution, but the city too 
held that it was not legally obliged to provide alternative accommodation to the 
occupiers.  The city relied on their housing policy to support this submission.  The 
housing policy requires the city to provide housing assistance to vulnerable individuals 
who find themselves in a housing emergency for reasons that were beyond their control.  
But, importantly, the policy extended these benefits only to individuals who were evicted 
from state-owned land.   
A unanimous Constitutional Court held that the city’s inflexible housing policy 
was unconstitutional.  The Constitutional Court cited their seminal ruling of Grootboom 
which held that a housing programme that fails to meet the basic needs of the most 
vulnerable in society is unreasonable, and, therefore, unconstitutional.97  The court found 
that many of the occupiers in this matter were amongst the most financially vulnerable in 
society.  In assessing the reasonableness of this policy, the court concluded that it should 
make no difference as to whether the occupiers were evicted from private- or state-owned 
buildings.  The decision of the city to exclude privately evicted occupiers from benefiting 
from temporary emergency housing was unlawful, as the city’s housing policy was 
constructed on an incorrect interpretation of the national housing policy.98 
After declaring the city’s housing policy unconstitutional, the court returned to 
the eviction application.  The court concluded that the eviction of the occupiers would be 
just and equitable under the Eviction Act if the state provides the occupiers with 
temporary emergency accommodation.  The city was not in a position to provide the 
accommodation immediately, and the court recognised that the city must be given time to 
relocate the occupiers.  The court provided the state four months to do so.  The court 
recognised that this did constitute a deprivation of property, but that property rights must 
be interpreted within a constitutional framework that eviction must be just and equitable.  
Although [private property owners] cannot be expected to be burdened with providing 
accommodation to the Occupiers indefinitely, a degree of patience should be 
reasonably expected of it and the City must be given a reasonable time to comply.99 
                                                      
97 ibid paras 88–95. 
98 ibid para 95. The city was unable to demonstrate that it lacked the financial means to accommodate 
occupiers evicted from private property.  It bears noting that Blue Moonlight reflects Sarrahwitz, 
which similarly held that it was unconstitutional for the state to afford housing benefits to one 
group and not another in the absence of a compelling justification. 
99 ibid para 100 (emphasis added).  
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The ‘degree of patience’ that private property owners were required to show was 
viewed as a justifiable limitation of the section 25 right not to be arbitrarily deprived of a 
property in this matter.100  Though the Blue Moonlight read the ‘degree of patience’ as a 
justifiable limitation upon the property right, subsequent Constitutional Court decisions 
read this limitation as also flowing from the obligations upon private individuals in 
accordance with section 26 of the Constitution.101  Although the ‘degree of patience’ is 
framed as a negative obligation, it has crystallised into two duties that have curtailed 
common law rights.102  
§ A duty to engage.  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers103 is the 
leading case on the Eviction Act.  Here, occupiers settled on private property, and, 
on behalf of the landowner, the state initiated an application for their removal.  The 
Constitutional Court held that the extent to which the state engaged with the 
unlawful occupiers to find a solution is one of the relevant factors that courts 
should consider before granting an eviction order.  The failure to engage with the 
aim of finding alternative accommodation would normally result in the refusal of 
an eviction order.  Since this judgment, some high court judgments (though most 
certainly not all of them) have applied this requirement to private landowners 
seeking an eviction.104  At the very least, there is a duty on private landowners to 
join the municipality to the eviction application to ascertain the availability of 
alternative accommodation. 105  The case law under ESTA also shows that 
meaningful engagement between landowners and occupiers is a highly relevant 
                                                      
100 For further examples, see Occupiers of Skurweplaas v PPC Aggregate Quarries 2012 (4) BCLR 
382 (CC) paras 11–13; Occupiers of Mooiplaats v Golden Thread 2012 (2) SA 337 (CC) paras 17–
18 (in both matters, the court concluded that it was just and equitable to delay the granting of an 
eviction order from private property to afford the state an opportunity to provide alternative 
accommodation; a highly relevant factor in both cases was that the private property owner did not 
intend to use the property within the near future).  See also Changing Tides (n 82) para 16. 
101 See Maphango (n 64) paras 33–34; Daniels (n 47) para 53; Baron (n 33) paras 40–42.  Compare the 
minority judgment in Daniels (n 47) para 177. 
102  This analysis is adapted from Michael Dafel, ‘The Negative Obligation of the Housing Right’ 
(2013) 29 SAJHR 591, 608–13. 
103 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
104 Lingwood v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of ERF 9 Highlands 2008 (3) BCLR 325 (W); Davids v 
Van Straaten (2005) 4 SA 468 (C).  For the obligation upon the state to engage, see Ngomane v 
Govan Mbeki Municipality 2016 (12) BCLR 1528 (CC) para 14; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v 
City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 15. 
105  Baron (n 33) paras 61–62. 
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consideration, and the courts will usually dismiss an eviction application if 
engagement has not occurred. 106   
§ A burden to incur a financial loss or forfeit gain.  The case law on private property 
v housing rights shows that there are conditions under which a private landowner is 
required to incur a financial loss or forfeit a gain in order to safeguard another’s 
right to access adequate housing.  But whether this financial burden is recognised 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case, including whether the state is 
able to accommodate the occupier.  For example, the case law on debt enforcement 
recognised that financial institutions may in some instances be required to incur a 
financial loss and perhaps even forego a mortgaged asset.107  The eviction case law 
also allows for financial loss.  As the court held in Blue Moonlight, the property 
owner was required to provide housing for a temporary period until the state was 
able to provide alternative accommodation.  In addition to having the duty to 
continue housing the occupants, the practical effect of this ruling was that the 
owner was unable to receive rent until the state was in a position to provide 
alternative housing.108  A case adjudicated under ESTA offers a final example.  In 
Daniels v Scribante, the Constitutional Court was called upon to determine whether 
or not an occupier was entitled to renovate her home without the permission of the 
landowner.109  The occupier sought to improve the habitability of the dwelling (e.g. 
levelling floors, installing an indoor water supply, windows), and was prepared to 
bear the costs of the renovation.  The landowner refused.  Before the court, the 
landowner argued that ESTA cannot compel a private property owner to tolerate 
renovations.  This would tantamount to a positive obligation upon landowners to 
provide access to adequate housing, because, in the event that the occupier leaves 
the land, the landowner would be required to compensate the occupier for the 
improvements.  The Constitutional Court accepted that this would amount to a 
financial obligation upon the landowner, but, the court continued, the Constitution 
                                                      
106 See Daniels (n 40); Hattingh v Juta 2013 (3) SA 275 (CC). 
107  See Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC); Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 
(CC). 
108 See also Baron (n 33) para 49. 
109 Daniels (n 40). 
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does not bar such an outcome. 110  Under ESTA, the courts enjoy discretion as to 
whether or not to order compensation for unauthorised improvements. 
4.2 Legislative intervention can be undesirable  
In most of the cases litigated under the horizontal application provisions the scope of the 
private obligation did not directly depend on the obligations or action, and, as a result, 
there was no need to pivot towards legislation in order to gain clarity.  Ramakatsa is an 
example of such a situation because the duty upon political parties to facilitate 
participation is not dependent or effected by state actions or responsibilities.   
In fact, Ramakatsa illustrates an example of where it is desirable to exclude the 
state from regulating the matter (or at least subject the state’s actions to a heightened 
degree of scrutiny), which in turn necessitates the need for the courts to regulate the 
matter.  In a constitutional democracy, one of the primary responsibilities of the judiciary 
is to police political debate and the electoral process.  Owing to the vested interests of the 
elected branches of government, the courts must ensure that political forces do not 
manipulate the electoral market.  In essence, the judiciary is the best-suited institution out 
of the three branches of government to regulate political participation.  In the fulfilment 
of this role, the South African Constitutional Court believes that is necessary to ensure 
that political rights are given the widest protection possible.  It is a common mantra of the 
court to suggest that electoral and political participation laws must be interpreted in 
‘favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement and participation rather than 
exclusion’.111  Often against the intention of the legislature, the Constitutional Court 
increased the political participation of individuals in society.  It has, for instance, 
extended the right to vote to prisoners and citizens living abroad, and demanded that the 
legislature facilitate effective public participation and consultation before enacting 
legislation.  When viewed from this perspective, the decision of Ramakatsa is in line with 
other political rights cases that sought to expand political participation and strengthen the 
institutions that advance democracy.112  As the contestation of political ideals occurs not 
only in the legislatures but also within political parties, burdening political parties with 
                                                      
110  ibid paras 39–53. 
111 African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission 2006 (3) SA 305 (CC) para 23.  See 
also Electoral Commission of the Republic v Inkatha Freedom Party 2011 (9) BCLR 943 (CC) 
para 37; Richter v Minister of Home Affairs 2009 (3) SA 615 (CC) para 55. 
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THE PIVOT IS… 
 
This concluding chapter connects the core arguments of this dissertation, and 
does so to provide an explanation for the pivot towards legislative remedies. 
 
1 In search of an explanation  
The judicial rebuilding of private law is a consequence of state inaction.  The duty upon 
the courts to develop private law in accordance with constitutional right norms only arises 
if legislation fails to provide adequate relief.  In nearly all of the cases discussed in this 
dissertation — though there are a few exceptions — the judiciary only exercised their 
law-making powers under the horizontality provisions because the elected branches of 
government had yet to promulgate laws capable of vindicating an infringed constitutional 
right norm.  In the event that Parliament had done so, the courts would have been 
expected to apply the enacted legislative scheme and refrain from creating a parallel 
pathway to the same remedy.1  The primacy of statutory remedies over judicially created 
law is of course a familiar practice within the tradition of the common law.  Our earliest 
law reports document that the courts have always viewed their power to apply and further 
develop the common law as conditional on legislative reticence.2  And nothing in the text 
of the Constitution alters the residual role of judge-made law.  On the contrary, the 
                                                      
1 See De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church 2016 (2) SA 1 (CC) paras 51–53; Sali v 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service 2014 (9) BCLR 997 (CC) para 4; 
Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC) paras 55, 152; Minister of Health v 
New Clicks 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) paras 96–97, 436; MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 
2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40. 
2  See Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds 1905 TS 130, at 135–36. 
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horizontal application clause confirms the subordinate status of common law.  Whenever 
a constitutional right is held to bind a natural or juristic person, section 8(3)(a) of the 
Constitution instructs the courts to develop the common law only ‘to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right’. 
The Constitutional Court has however read the horizontal application provisions 
to incorporate a degree of flexibility.  Presumably premising their authority on section 
172(1)(b) of the Constitution — which grants the judiciary the power to make any order 
that is just and equitable when deciding a constitutional matter — the court has at times 
opted not to develop the common law and rather to pivot towards legislative remedies.  
What is the best possible explanation for the pivot?  This chapter answers this question in 
two parts.  The first summarises a commonly recited explanation, but proceeds to 
demonstrate why this explanation fails to offer a complete and compelling account.  The 
second part proposes an alternative explanation, one that flows from this dissertation’s 
analysis of the case law.  
 
2 …not an act of deference 
The explanation most often narrated within the law reports and journals is that the judicial 
development of the common law in accordance with constitutional right norms must take 
place on an incremental basis and in line with its own internal logic.  In other words, the 
constitutional development of private law must continue to follow the same pattern and 
pace as had been the situation prior to the enactment of the Constitution.  Judicial 
restraint, so the argument concludes, has the benefit of allowing the legislature (and not 
the courts) to assume the primary and more active role in the law rebuilding project.3  The 
pivot towards legislative remedies is thus an act of comity in favour of the legislature’s 
law-making role, which is a line of argument that invokes theories of judicial deference.  
Although there is no universal definition of judicial deference, most of them converge on 
the notion that courts should defer their own constitutional powers whenever the elected 
branches of government enjoy a better set of institutional competencies to produce a more 
accurate outcome (or, at the very least, a more suitable procedure to arrive at an 
outcome).4  And, at first glance, it may be tempting to surmise that the South African 
                                                      
3  See Mighty Solutions v Engen 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para 38; Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) para 31; Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para 60. 
4 Katharine Young, ‘A Typology of Economic and Social Rights’ (2010) 8 ICON 385, 392. 
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Constitutional Court has in fact deferred some parts of its constitutional mandate.  The 
three benefits of rights legislation identified in the proceeding chapter — namely, 
legislative balancing is better structured, contains government policy, and clarifies the 
obligations of the state — are all benefits that arise due to the better position of the 
legislature to reconcile competing rights and other public interests.  
On closer inspection, however, the supposition of judicial deference proves weak.  
For starters, the explanation starts with a premise that is constitutionally strained. The 
constitutional development of private law cannot depend on whether the exiting 
principles and rules of the common law can accommodate constitutional norms.5  That 
would lead to an absurd result: the ability of a litigant to safeguard their constitutional 
rights against private individuals and entities would depend on the often fortuitous way in 
which the common law had developed over centuries in Europe and apartheid South 
Africa.6  While it is true that the constitutional rebuilding of private law mostly takes 
place within the common law, it should not be forgotten that it is the Constitution that 
controls private law and not the other way round.  All law derives its validity from the 
Constitution, and it is the courts that are ultimately entrusted as the final arbiters as to 
whether or not any subordinate source of law is out of sync with the commands and 
principles of the supreme law.  And, to the extent that they do not match, the courts must 
exercise their responsibility to invalidate and rebuild laws.  A litigant is entitled to any 
remedy guaranteed by the Constitution unless there is a compelling government interest 
at jeopardy.7  The fact that the legislature serves as the primary institution responsible for 
law reform is certainly not a compelling justification given that Parliament retains at all 
times the authority to overwrite judge-made law, provided of course that any legislative 
revision to the common law complies with the Constitution.8 
The shaky ground upon which this explanation of judicial restraint rests is 
probably the reason the courts have applied it so inconsistently.9  The handful of cases 
                                                      
5  See chap 1, sec 2.2; chap 3, sec 1; chap 4, sec 1; chap 8, sec 1. 
6  See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 
(CC) para 68 (the argument was originally made in the context of legislation, but the principle 
applies to the common law as well: a constitutional remedy cannot depend on the way subordinate 
sources of law develop). 
7  S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 32; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 
(CC) para 170.   
8 Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) para 116. 
9  See chap 4, sec 3. 
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that cite the ‘primary role of the legislature’ to justify judicial inaction stand in contrast to 
the greater volume of cases where the Constitutional Court effectively ignored the role 
and preferences of the legislature.  Consider the decisions of AllPay, Ramakatsa, and 
Botha.  The court not only introduced fundamental changes to private law, it did so in a 
manner that defied legislative policy.    
The argument that the pivot is not an act of judicial deference gains further 
tractions when one considers that the courts are unlikely to permit the legislature the 
freedom to exclude relevant considerations from a balancing framework of competing 
rights, unless the state can identify a compelling government interest.  The preceding 
chapter showed why: sections 36(1) (the rights-limitation analysis), 39(2) (interpretation 
clause), and 172(1)(b) (just and equitable remedies) promote judicial discretion in 
constitutional rights legislation, and, in doing so, constrain the law-making powers of the 
legislature. 10   A discernable pattern has thus emerged from the case law of the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal: through either statutory 
interpretation or judicial review: the courts have prohibited the legislature from outright 
excluding a constitutionally protected interest unless a compelling state justification 
requires otherwise.  In other words, through statutory interpretation or judicial review, the 
courts ensure that the defining characteristic of the judicial balancing process is replicated 
within rights legislation.  
 
3 …a strategy to enhance the (judicial) balancing process 
This dissertation’s analysis of the case law leads to an alternative explanation.  The 
constitutional rebuilding of private law turns on the balancing of constitutional right 
norms.  And, to this end, the Constitutional Court has adopted the judicial balancing 
process as the main law-making framework.  The process steers away from fixed and 
absolute rules, and rather encourages the judicial evaluation of all relevant facts and 
circumstance of a case before determining the prevailing interest. 11   The process 
ultimately aims to reconcile two competing considerations, which this dissertation has 
presented as the internal conflict within rights.  On the one hand, there is the need to 
protect the freedoms safeguarded by constitutional right norms.  On the other, there is the 
                                                      
10 Chap 8, sec 2.2.1. 
11  Chap 4. 
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need to ensure that the exercise of private power (which is ordinarily protected by right 
norms) does not unduly and without adequate justification infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of another.12   
Constitutional rights legislation replicates the defining characteristic of the 
balancing process.  For the reason summarised above, rights legislation also steers away 
from fixed rules opting instead for flexible balancing exercises that permit judicial 
evaluation and discretion.  Yet, despite this similarity, there are noteworthy differences.  
This dissertation identified that the balancing exercises prescribed in rights legislation 
tend to contain three beneficial features that are likely to be absent or limited in the 
judicial balancing process. 
§ First, the framework for balancing conflicting rights within legislation is more 
structured — that is, legislation is more detailed and precise — than the judicial 
balancing process.   This benefit is partly due to the fact that the legislative law-
making toolkit is far bigger than the judicial one.  The legislative law-making 
process benefits from public participation, government policy, and arbitrary line 
drawing.  The better structure is also on account of the fact that the legislature is 
forced to create frameworks that are sufficiently detailed so as to resolve all 
possible disputes that may fall within the purview of a legislative scheme.  The 
legislature does not enjoy the luxury of tailoring laws on an ad hoc basis to ensure 
the realisation of policy, which is an option within common law adjudication.13 
§ Second, legislation incorporates the policy direction of the state, which is needed 
for the full realisation of those constitutional provisions that depend on the 
formulation of economic and social policy.  In contrast, the judicial law-making 
toolkit contains neither the expertise nor the full capacity to facilitate this 
objective.14  
§ Third, legislation better defines the constitutional obligations of the state, which is 
a feature that aids in (i) defining the obligations of private individuals and entities 
                                                      
12  Chap 5, sec 5.4. 
13  Chap 8, sec 2. 
14  Chap 8, sec 3. 
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and (ii) limiting the adverse impact the application of constitutional rights may 
otherwise have on the autonomy interests of private duty bearers.15 
In the end, it is prudent to heed the wisdom of the Constitutional Court not to 
prescribe fixed rules for determining when to choose legislative remedies over judicially 
created ones.16  Doing so would undermine the intentional design of the Constitution, 
which, in turn, would limit the full law-making capacity of the Constitution to rebuild 
private law.  This dissertation nevertheless provides some indicators as to when 
legislative remedies are more desirable.  If most of the enhanced benefits of the 
legislative process are present, and the political bias inherent within the legislative law-
making process is not a significant threat to realising the constitutional right, then there is 
a strong argument for pivoting towards legislative remedies.  There is however little 
justification for seeking out new legislative remedies if such legislation would offer no 
appreciable enhancement on the judicial balancing process.   
The pivot towards legislative remedies is thus best explained as a strategy to 
enhance the judicial balancing process, as it allows for the constitutional rebuilding of the 
South African private law in a way that the judiciary is unable to do on its own.  From 
this perspective, the judicial law-making process produces the floor of the rebuilding 
project and the legislative law-making process enhances that framework.  
 
 
                                                      
15  Chap 8, sec 4.  It requires noting that a claim of judicial deference seems strange if the courts do not 
enjoy the legal power or capacity to reach a particular outcome. 
16 C v Department of Health and Social Development 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC) paras 43–44; National 










I wish to note the reasons I believe this PhD dissertation advances a new and important 
contribution to learning. 
The research topic — and, more specifically, the research question — falls within 
an underexplored area of the literature.  Chapter one explained that most of the 
scholarship to date has focused on the law-making role of the courts, with the function of 
the legislature confined to the periphery of the analysis or completely ignored.  And, to 
my knowledge, this dissertation stands as the first major research project to investigate 
the relationship between the two main law-making institutions in respect to the horizontal 
application of constitutional rights in South Africa.  The shortage of academic writing 
suggests that it is near inevitable that a good and extensive analysis of relevant laws will 
produce an original conclusion.  My hope is that this dissertation has done so.  Chapters 
eight and nine reject a commonly recited explanation for why the courts should refrain 
from exercising their law-making powers in favour of the legislature when rebuilding 
private law.  The final two chapters instead offer a new explanation, one that is both 
constitutionally defensible and grounded within the analysis of the case law. 
Should the final conclusion be unconvincing, however, I am of the view that the 
individual components of the dissertation continue to stand as original and helpful pieces 
of academic writing. 
Chapter two provided a historical account of how the drafters of the interim and 
final Constitution negotiated and formulated the horizontal application provisions.  
Although there are a few descriptions of the negotiation process — and most of these 
cover only the interim Constitution — this dissertation turned the spotlight to events that 
have remained underappreciated.  The most significant is the counter-intuitive finding 
that the horizontal application of rights was initially advocated as a means to protect the 
law-making powers of the legislature.  This discovery unscrambles two mysteries, which 
have yet to be solved in the literature.  The drafting history illuminates why the drafters 
settled on two horizontality provisions, and why the section 8 application clause is 
formulated in a somewhat awkward and convoluted manner.  Recording a narrative of 
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this significant time period in South African history is useful in and of itself.  But there is 
of course a further question as to whether or not drafting history is a valid source of legal 
interpretation.  My preference is that history should have an impact on the way we read 
our Constitution, although it should never assume a conclusive or incontrovertible role.  
The use of drafting history allowed this dissertation to underscore the conclusion that our 
supreme law formulates no comprehensive judicial law-making framework.  The drafting 
history also strengthened the argument advanced in later chapters that there is little utility 
in maintaining a distinction between direct and indirect application.  These theoretical 
models were imported from foreign jurisdictions, and, within a South African context, 
they are confusing and arguably pointless. 
Chapter three argued that the balancing exercise in horizontal application disputes 
is dissimilar from the balance exercise undertaken during the review of legislation.  
Though this dissertation is not the first to identify that there is a difference of some sort, I 
am unaware of any other scholarly writing that comprehensively articulates why the 
assumptions that underlie the rights-limitation analysis are not present in horizontal 
application disputes.  This finding is noteworthy because it consequently necessitates the 
design of new or modified methodologies that are capable of resolving conflicting rights 
in private disputes.  This is what chapters four and five set out to do. 
Chapter four theorised the existence of a balance process.  This represents the first 
scholarly description and defence of a general framework that indicates how the South 
African Constitutional Court adjudicates horizontal application disputes.  The chapter’s 
analysis of the law also clarified points of law.  Two are mentioned here.  First, the 
chapter offered a modified view of how the Constitution impacts contract law.  The 
analysis split the public policy enquiry into the intrinsic- and extrinsic-prong of the test, 
which I believe provides clarity on the operation and scope of the test.  Second, the 
analysis introduced a distinction between process and outcome-based balancing.  These 
two concepts show that judicial balancing is an inevitable path in constitutional 
adjudication, and, as demonstrated in chapter eight, these two concepts are useful for 
evaluating how discretionary or fixed any particular balancing exercise is.  
Chapter five postulated that constitutional right norms are internally conflicting.  
That is, adjudicators must reconcile the need to protect a freedom against the need to 
ensure that the freedom is not exercised in a way that unduly impairs the freedoms of 
others.  This idea led to the imagining of a power-freedom curve, which is a graph that 
 
 
sketches how these two competing interests are weighted.  The power-freedom curve 
ultimately provided an original explanation for how courts manage to negate one of the 
core criticisms directed against horizontality (i.e. horizontality undermines the autonomy 
interests that constitutional rights are meant to protect). 
The two cases studies were partly chosen because they had yet to receive a full 
analysis in the literature.  Chapter six examined the negative component of the access to 
adequate housing right, and, in doing so, documents a highly unusual practice of the 
courts to alter the scope of a constitutional right depending on whether the dispute is 
adjudicated within a common law or legislative framework.  The chapter is the first piece 
of writing to describe a strategy of the South African Constitutional Court to pivot away 
from the common law towards legislative remedies.  Chapter seven focused on the right 
to participate in political parties.  Although the South African law journals have recently 
started to examine the position and role of political parties within our constitutional 
democracy, it is my understanding that chapter seven is the first academic study to survey 
pre- and post-Constitution case law to demonstrate how — and explain the reasons as to 
why — the law has shifted in the way it regulates internal party democracy.  
 I suppose the hallmark of good legal scholarship is that which attracts further 
engagement, even if that comes in the form of critical retorts.  I hope that my dissertation 
has set out a sufficiently new and cogent account of the law, upon which I — and, 
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